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Lawyers look at law through the patterns they build. These  
patterns are expressed by the wording of legal texts and legal ar-
gumentation. Dogmatic patterns change with time and have vari-
ous local forms. However, phrases introduced to legal language 
last. This observation was what first inspired me to undertake the 
research presented in this book. I recognised that the thorough, 
historical and comparative analysis of argumentation based on 
specific phrases may show various patterns of application and ten-
dencies towards evolution. As the subject of my work, I have cho-
sen the “nature of the contract” argument. The perception of role of 
this argument in legal reasoning is not new. For instance, just  
a Byzantine lawyer of the 9th century exclaimed “oh, how strong 
the power of the nature of the contract is”1. In the 20th century 
Helmut Coing emphasized  the contribution of the notion of natura 
contractus to the dogmatic elaboration of terms implied by law in 
certain types of contracts.2  
Deliberations on the argument of the nature of the contract are 
encouraged by the fact that in the mid 20th century, the German3 
and Polish4 legislatures, among others, adopted it as one of the 
criteria of express terms of control. In Poland, a belief arose that 
this criterion was very unclear.5 The interest in the nature of the 
contract criterion has been strengthened by the fact that the Draft 
________________ 
1 Bas. 2,601.  
2 Coing 1982, 73.  
3 § 9 item 2 AGBG = § 307 BGB. 
4 Article 3531 PolKC.  
5 Olejniczak 2011, 434.   
12 
Common Frame of Reference, the most widely discussed project of 
contract law harmonisation in Europe, has applied it to a larger 
extent than it has been in the civil codes that are currently in effect.6. 
Despite the myriad and many reasons for greater interest in the 
meaning of the nature of the contract in legal argumentation, I have 
not found any monograph on the topic. Therefore, I assumed that 
an analysis of the matter in the manner specified above would pre-
sent the legal experience, which can be inspiring for the application 
of the nature of the contract argument in the rapidly changing 
modern world.  
 I started my research as a historian of law. However, at some 
points I went beyond the typical boundaries of such research. In 
setting the timeframe for the work, spanning the law of ancient 
Rome up to modern times, I had to choose a representative group 
for the research – similar to how a sociologist would structure a 
questionnaire. The limitation of the research to the civil law tradi-
tion is explained by the fact that the very words natura contractus 
were introduced to legal argumentation in ancient Roman law. 
They were further shaped, primarily, by legal discourse which was 
first directly, and then indirectly, linked with the Roman law heri-
tage collected in Justinian’s compilation. 
The starting point for the work was a reflection on the criteria 
for the selection of representative works of the ius commune from the 
13th to the 18th century7 and modern civil codifications.8 I have gone 
beyond the boundaries typical for a historian of law by also directing 
the research at the application of the nature of the contract argu-
ment in the modern legal science and judicial practice in France, 
Germany and Poland. I have included Supreme Court decisions 
from these countries issued up until mid-2011. Finally, I have gone 
beyond the typical framework for a legal historian, by addressing 
the results of historical and comparative research in light of signifi-
________________ 
6 See art. II-1:107,2; II-8:102,1,e; art. II-9:101,2,a; art. IV C-5:105,3 DCFR.  
7 See below 51–56. 
8 See below 83–85. 
13 
cant dilemmas in the modern theory of contract law. Following this 
line of thought, I have developed answers to the following ques-
tions: What are the basic lines of evolution of the nature of the con-
tract argument? What can this knowledge bring to deliberations on 
the freedom of contract principle? What is the best way to develop 
an effective means of interpretation using the nature of the contract 
argument? Is it worth introducing the nature of the contract clause 
to future statutory regulations and, if so, how? 
I present these proposals, which are the result of interpretation 
of the legal experience, because I believe they support the realistic 
thinking about the law.9 The history of the nature of the contract 
argument is an interesting test of the thesis that although there is 
no dogmatic truth, the actual development and effectiveness of 
private law encourages the belief that there are objective patterns of 
reasonableness that are discoverable by legislators and lawyers.10  
Obviously, the responsibility for this choice of research meth-
ods and the ensuing results rests solely with me. However, I could 
not have made it this far without support. The research was fi-
nanced by grants awarded by the Alexander von Humboldt Foun-
dation in Bonn and the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Edu-
cation. My research at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative 
and International Private Law in Hamburg and the Faculty of Law 
at the Ruperto Carola University in Heidelberg played a funda-
mental role in my analysis of these vast legal traditions. Therefore,  
I would like to extend my sincere thanks for providing excellent 
research conditions to the Director of the Max Planck Institute in 
Hamburg, Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult., FBA FRSE Reinhard 
Zimmermann and the former Dean of the Faculty of Law at the 
Ruperto Carola University and the Director of the Institut für 
geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft in Heidelberg, Prof. Dr. Chris-
tian Baldus.    
   
________________ 
9 Cf. Stein 1980, 126 – 127. 
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THE NATURA CONTRACTUS CLAUSE  






1.1. The words natura and naturalis  
in the Roman legal language  
 
References to nature in the Roman legal language are relatively 
frequent. They can be systematised in various manners in studies 
on the argumentation of the Roman jurists. For instance, in the 
opinion of Wolfgang Waldstein, the texts of Roman jurists that in-
cluded the word natura “may be divided into at least eight groups 
according to the meaning, within which further distinctions can be 
made”.11 It seems impossible to build a widely accepted descriptive 
classification of this area of Roman legal language suitable for any 
purpose. Hence, while adopting the pattern of Waldstein as a major 
point of reference, I shall draw attention to this linguistic practice to 
search for time and context in which the phrase natura contractus 
was introduced to legal reasoning. In this way, I noticed twelve 
typical areas in which the words natura or naturalis are used in the 
Roman legal language.12  
 
________________ 
11 Waldstein 1976, 31.  
12 Taking into account all grammatical forms of said words.  
18 
1.1.1.  Natura and naturalis in the description  
of situations regulated by the law  
 
Most often, the jurists made references to nature as a universal 
order.13 For instance, in this way, Gaius explained that “it is clear 
by nature” that an insane person could not make an enforceable 
promise or undertake a legally binding action.14 Paulus explained 
that water that falls from the sky “due to a natural cause (...) con-
sidered as perpetual”.15 Ulpian stressed that the sea “is by nature 
open to all”.16 The second-largest area of linguistic practice17 covers 
the use of the term natura to express an inherent character of a dis-
cussed quality (e.g., the wildness of certain animals)18 or a funda-
mental quality of a discussed concept (e.g., an obligation is joint 
and several as its nature is indivisible).19 Almost as often, jurists 
used the term naturalis to indicate biological kinship.20 This practice 
may be illustrated by the words of Ulpian, who, while commenting 
________________ 
13 Approx. 20% of texts contained the word natura or naturalis by BIA.This 
group included the cases systematized by Waldstein as “natural fruit as what come 
from nature” (Waldstein 1976, 42) and “natural destruction of things” (Waldstein 
1976, 43).   
14 D. 44,7,1,12: Furiosus, sive stipuletur sive promittat, nihil agere, natura manifes-
tum est.  
15 D. 8,2,28:... quod ex caelo cadit, etsi non adsidue fit, ex naturali tamen causa fit et 
ideo perpetuo fieri existimatur. 
16 D. 8,4,13 pr.:... Quamvis mari, quod natura omnibus patet… 
17 Approx. 17% of texts contained the word natura or naturalis by BIA. This 
group included the cases systematised by Waldstein as: “a concept helping to indi-
vidualise things or indicate their special qualities” (Waldstein 1976, 36) and natura 
humanae condicionis understood as references to objective qualities of human nature 
(Waldstein 1976, 44).  
18 E.g. D. 9,2,2,2 (Lab., Gai); jurists spoke of animals that are wild by nature, 
such as bears, lions, or panthers.  
19 E.g. D. 45,1,139 (Venuleius); the jurist explained that all heirs of a seller 
would be liable for his or her duty because the sale must be defended in its entirety, 
as its nature is indivisible (quia in solidum defendenda est venditio, cuius indivisa natura 
est…).  
20 Approx. 14% of texts contained the word natura or naturalis by BIA. See: 
Waldstein 1976, 46.  
19 
on Iulia et Papia law, explained that both the biological (naturalis) 
and adopted child of a senator should be treated as a son21 or this 
jurist’s explanation that the adopted child retained the inheritance 
rights resulting from kinship in the family of his pater naturalis.22 
Yet another area of the typical use of the term natura by jurists was 
to determine that which exists as being in rerum natura.23 For in-
stance, in this manner, Julian concluded that the law recognised the 
existence of a conceived child.24 Gaius explained also that a thing 
not existing (quae in rerum natura non est) but expected might be 
disposed by a legacy imposing the duty on the heir,25 and Paulus 
concluded that, in the event of the death of a promised slave, it 
should be recognised that the transaction pertained to a non-
existing thing (qui non sit in rerum natura), the value of which can-
not be determined.26 The opinion that there is a link between the 
reasonableness of law and reality pertains to what was explicitly 
expressed by the term natura rerum, introduced to legal reasoning 
in the mid-2nd century. Such an argumentative practice is illus-
trated by the view of Celsus, generalised by the Justinian jurists, 
that what is prohibited by the nature of things cannot be confirmed 
by any law (natura rerum).27 What the five uses of the term natura 
specified above had in common is the fact that they were used to 
stress the objective character of situations the law referred to.  
________________ 
21 D. 1,9,5: Senatoris filium accipere debemus non tantum eum qui naturalis est, 
verum adoptivum quoque... 
22 D. 38,8,1,4: …Evenit igitur, ut is, qui in adoptionem datus est, tam in familia natu-
ralis patris iura cognationis retineat…  
23 Approx. 10% of texts contained the word natura or naturalis by BIA. This 
group included the cases systematised by Waldstein as using the phrase in rerum 
natura to indicate “actual existence” (Waldstein 1976, 31) or to express “objective 
reality” (Waldstein 1976, 34).  
24 D. 1,5,26: Qui in utero sunt, in toto paene iure civili intelleguntur in rerum natura 
esse… 
25 G. 2,203: Ea quoaque res, quae in rerum natura non est, si modo futura est, per 
damnationem legari potest... 
26 D. 12,2,30,1: Si iuravero te Stichum mihi dare oportere, qui non sit in rerum natura 
nec aestimationem mihi praestare reus debet…  
27 D. 50,17,188,1: Quae rerum natura prohibetur, nulla lege confiramata sunt.  
20 
1.1.2. The terms natura and naturalis in the wording of law  
 
A common quality of other cases of the use of the terms natura 
or naturalis in the language of Roman jurists was that they consti-
tuted a part of legal terms or strategy of legal reasoning. The exam-
ples of legal terms include the terms obligatio naturalis28 and posses-
sio naturalis.29 What is common for both these terms is that they 
were introduced to stress the independence of the described cir-
cumstances from the law. Labeo, who lived at the turn of Antiquity 
and the modern era, used the term naturaliter tenere,30 and Proculus, 
Neratius,31 and Nerva,32 younger by a few dozen years, used the 
phrase naturalis possessio to describe the physical aspect of control 
over a thing.33 While discussing obligations, Labeo made an obser-
vation that the testator can owe his slave “by nature rather than 
under civil law”.34 Julian, who lived a hundred years later and in-
troduced the term obligatio naturalis, saw the essence of this notion 
in the fact that money received from a natural debtor (naturalis debi-
tor) was not refundable, although there had been no legal duty to 
pay it.35 Tribonian, who lived in the 2nd century, explained that the 
existence of natural debt (naturale debitum) is recognised by going 
beyond ius civile, to nature.36 These general explanations regarding 
the non-legal character of a such duty accompanied the process 
under which dogmatically natural possession and obligation were 
________________ 
28 Approx. 10% of texts contained the word natura or naturalis by BIA.  
29 Approx. 2% of texts contained the word natura or naturalis by BIA.  
30 D. 41,2,1pr.: Possessio appellata est, ut et Labeo ait, a pedis sedibus quasi positio, 
quia naturaliter tenetur ab eo qui ei isistit…  
31 D. 41,2,3,3.   
32 D. 41,2,3,13.   
33 MacCormack 1967, 51.  
34 D. 35,1,40,3: Ego puto, secundum mentem testatoris naturale magis, quam civile 
debitum spectandum esse...  
35 D. 46,1,16,4: Naturales obligationes non eo solo aestimantur, si actio aliqua earum 
nomine cometit, verum etiam quum soluta pecunia repeti non potest... 
36 D. 12,6,64: ...ut enim libertas naturali iure continetur et dominatio ex gentium iure 
introducta est, ita debiti vel non debiti ratio in condictione naturaliter intellegenda est.  
21 
distinguished from civil possession (possessio) and obligation (obli-
gatio civilis), and the legal consequences of this distinction were 
specified.37 The text of Javolenus Priscus, who lived in the second 
half of the 1st century A.D., opened the next area of the linguistic 
practice of jurists in which the concept of nature was linked to the 
wording of the law. These are examples of argumentation that re-
ferred to the nature of the claim (actio).38 The jurists concluded that, 
in line with the nature of the claim of sale (actio empti) in the case of 
a legal defect, the seller will be liable for the amount of the interest 
of the buyer.39 In the Roman legal language, this style of argumen-
tation was principally related to specific remedies.40 This practice 
was continued by the jurists of the imperial chancellery. 41  The 
highest generalisation level of the argumentation derived from the 
nature of the claim (actio) is the statement of Ulpian, who lived at 
the turn of the 2nd and 3rd centuries A.D. In line with the legal ex-
perience regarding the bona fides42 clause, he explained that bonae 
fidei claims allowed not only the adjudication of what was agreed 
upon between the contracting parties but also what was inherent in 
the nature of the remedy (naturaliter insunt huius iudici), even if it 
was not agreed to by the parties.43 This generalisation explicitly 
________________ 
37 See MacCormack 1967, 66; Landolt 2000, 228 – 237; Cintio 2009, 145 – 188.  
38 Approx. 3% of texts contained the word natura or naturalis by BIA W. Wald-
stein discussed here generally the nature of legal entities (Waldstein 1976, 61).  
39 D. 21,2,60: ...nihil venditor praestabit praeter simplam evictionis nomine, et ex 
natura ex empto actionis hoc, quod interest.  
40 Thus, in G. 4,33, the jurist explained what was typical for the nature of actio 
commodati, actio fiduciae, actio negotiorum gestorum, and many more claims; in  
D. 4,2,12,2 (Iul., Ulp.), the jurists explained that the nature of actio quod metus causa 
required damage suffered by the creditor; D. 11,7,14,13 (Ulp.) indicates that, in line 
with the nature of actio negotiorum gestorum, the judge will not rigidly adhere to 
mere action based on business transacted but will construe the rules of equity more 
liberally.   
41 E.g. C. 4,24,11 (Diocl.); C. 7,54,3pr. (Just.); I. 4,6,17.  
42 Dajczak 1998, 129-131.  
43 D. 19,1,11,1: …nihil magis bonae fidei congruit quam id praestari, quod inter con-
trahentes actum est. quod si nihil convenit, tunc ea praestabuntur, quae naturaliter insunt 
huius iudicii potestate. 
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demonstrates the jurist’s opinion that the nature of remedy was 
combined with the existence of objective premises, forming an in-
terpretation of the bona fides clause. The conviction of jurists of the 
existence of typical consequences of a specific claim (actio) found 
the follow-up in the argumentation, based on the reference to the 
nature of the legal concept or legal institution.44 Through the refer-
ence to the nature of an institution, the boundaries for its under-
standing were set. This is illustrated by the opinion of Pomponius 
that, in line with its nature (ea natura est), easement does not consist 
of the duty to do anything but in tolerance or agreement not to 
perform some act.45 Similarly, Paulus presented the difference be-
tween the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem and explained 
that the nature of the phrase “do you promise to pay on the first 
day of March” as terminus ad quem is such (natura haec est) that one 
cannot demand anything beforehand. 46  The relatively frequent 
references to the nature of legal institutions can be noticed in the 
language of Justinian compilers. They repeated the references to 
the nature of institutions known from the classical period to dis-
play their dogmatic boundaries.47 The references to the nature of 
institutions in the Justinian texts were used most frequently to 
stress the innovations adopted under the then-modernisation of 
law. Thus, Justinian’s Institutes mentioned the uniform nature of 
legacies, as opposed to the four types of legacies in the former Ro-
man law.48 Justinian’s compilers indicated also that the nature of 
fiduciary bequest (fideicommissum) was acknowledged as adequate 
________________ 
44 Approx. 10% of texts contained the word natura or naturalis by BIA.   
45 D. 8,1,15,1: Servitutium non ea natura est, ut aliquid faciat (…), sed ut aliquid pa-
tiatur aut non faciat. See: Waldstein 1976, 55. 
46 D. 44,7,44,1: …kalendis Martiis dare spondes? cuius natura haec est, ut ante diem 
non exigatur... 
47 See, e.g. C. 6,51,1,6:… ususfructu, qui sui natura ad heredes legatarii transmitti 
non patitur…; C. 5,11,7pr.: … debitum quidem remanet in sua natura… 
48 I. 2,20,2:… omnibus legatis una sit natura...  
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for legacies, too.49 Justinian law resolved the earlier doubt by con-
cluding that the easement of a place of residence (habitiatio) is gov-
erned by its own legal regime (ius proprium), a specific legal nature 
(specialem naturam) that distinguishes it from usufruct.50 The Justin-
ian jurists explained the reform of liability under pecunia constituta 
as the “extension of its nature”. 
 
 
1.1.3.  Phrases naturalis ratio and ius naturale  
in the argumentation of Roman jurists  
 
In light of the presented linguistic practice, the term natura de-
positi51 and a more general one, present in a number52 of opinions 
of late classical jurists 53  and Justinian’s legal texts 54  – the term 
natura obligationis and natura contractus may be regarded as fruits of 
the evolution of language and legal reasoning oriented as some 
objective order. Since the 2nd century A.D. the jurists referred in this 
manner to the objective qualities of a specific remedy (actio) or legal 
institution. The remarks drawn to date may be extended by two 
terms used in the legal discourse: naturalis ratio and ius naturale. 
According to available texts, in approximately the mid-2nd century, 
the naturalis ratio55 phrase emerged in the reasoning of Roman ju-
________________ 
49 I. 2,20,3: …omnia legata fidecommissis exaequare, ut nulla sit inter ea differentia, 
sed quod deest legatis, hoc replaeatur ex natura fidecommissorum, et si quid amplius est in 
legatis, per hoc crescat fideicommissorum natura…  
50 C. 3,33,13pr.: Cum antiquitas dubitabat usufructu habitationis legato, et primo 
quidem, cui similis est utrumne usui vel usuifructui, an neutri eorum, sed ius proprium et 
specialem naturam sortita est habitatio... 
51 D. 16,3,24.  
52 Approx. 2% of texts contained the word natura or naturalis by BIA. W. Wald-
stein did not distinguish the term natura contractus in his systematics of references 
to nature as an element of reasoning of Roman jurists. 
53  D. 2,14,7,5-6 (Ulp.); D.46,1,5 (Ulp.); D. 46,5,1,4 (Ulp.); D.19,5,5,4 (Paul.);  
D. 45,2,9,1 (Pap.).  
54 C. 7,17,2,1; I. 3,24,3; I.3,2,5,2.  
55 Approx. 2.5% of texts contained the word natura or naturalis by BIA.  
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rists. It served the purpose of stressing the obviousness of the pre-
sented opinion. Thus, Gaius explained that, by the decree of the 
Senate, no usufruct of money could be approved, as the natural 
reason (naturalis ratio) could not be altered by the authority of the 
Senate.56 This manner of reasoning was adopted by the late classi-
cal jurists of the late 2nd and early 3rd centuries. It may be supposed 
that it became one of the inspirations for the introduction of the 
concept of natural law (ius naturale), understood as a collection of 
principles compliant with naturalis ratio or natura rerum.57  
The oldest known direct reference to ius naturale in the dis-
course of Roman jurists can be found in the text of Pomponius.58 
The jurist, who lived in the 2nd century A.D., indicated that, under 
natural law, it was just that nobody could be enriched at the ex-
pense of another through the commission of an injury.59 This prin-
ciple was propagated and elaborated by late-classical jurists, espe-
cially Paulus and Ulpian.60 The first explained that natural law (ius 
naturale) was everything that was just and good.61 An example of 
the application of this concept to a specific issue is the opinion of 
Paulus that a marriage between a father and daughter was against 
natural law and modesty.62 Ulpian introduced a quasi-definition of 
natural law, concluding that it was “what nature has taught to all 
creatures”. 63  This jurist’s conviction of the independence of ius 
naturale understood in that manner with regard to the legislative 
decision-making is demonstrated by the dictum that natural law 
________________ 
56 D. 7,5,2,1: … Nec enim naturalis ratio auctoritate senatus commutari potuit... 
57 Cf. Koschdembahr – Łyskowski 1930, 40-42. 
58 Cf. Waldstein 1976, 78.   
59 D. 50,17,206: Iure naturam aequum est, neminem cum alterius detrimento et in- 
iuria fieri locupletiorem.  
60 See Waldstein 1988, 706.  
61 D. 1,1,11: … id quo semper aequum ac bonum est ius dicitur, ut est ius naturale… 
62 D. 23,2,14,2: Unde nec vulgo quaesitum filiam pater naturalis potest uxorem ducere, 
quoniam in contrahendis matrimoniis naturale ius et pudor inspiciendus est... 
63 D. 1,1,3: Ius naturale est, quod natura omnia animalia docuit…; similarly, Cic., 
rep. 3,19; see Waldstein 1988, 707 (further reading therein).  
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regards all men as equal.64 The manner of using the term ius natu-
rale permits us to conclude that the Roman jurists believed that this 
notion represented universal principles.65 In the Justinian compila-
tion, apart from fragments of works of the classical jurists, refer-
ences to ius naturale are included only five times and in line with 
the classical jurists’ texts.66 This permits us to presume that, in post-
classical Roman law, the indicated belief in the existence of univer-
sal principles providing a point of reference in the legal discourse 
was not rejected or amended creatively. Such observations are an 
inspiration for a deep analysis of how the use of the nature of the 
contract notion in the reasoning of Roman jurists represents their 
belief in the existence of an objective order relevant for legal dis-
cussion.   
 
 
1.2. Nature of the contract clause in the argumentation  
of classical jurists 
 
1.2.1. Natura depositi and natura obligationis in the works  
of Emilius Papinian  
 
The overview of the linguistic practice of the Roman jurists 
showed that the references to natura, while setting the boundaries 
of the legal institutions, remained in legal sources as of the 2nd cen-
tury A.D. In contract law, these included the texts of jurists who 
lived at the turn of the 2nd and 3rd centuries A.D. The first one is the 
fragment of the ninth book of Questiones of Papinian.67 While re-
________________ 
64 D. 50,17,32: … quo ad ius naturale attinet, omnes homines aequales sunt.  
65 A. Verdross distinguished, for the sake of methodological clarity, between 
two meanings of natural law, some universal principles and the people’s percep-
tion at a specific time and place; see Verdross 1971, 92.  
66 See Waldstein 1994, 32 – 33, 46 – 47. 
67 D. 16,3,24: ‘Lucius Titius Sempronio salutem. Centum nummos, quos hac die com-
mendasti mihi adnumerante servo Sticho actore, esse apud me ut notum haberes, hac epis-
tula manu mea scripta tibi notum facio: quae quando voles et ubi voles confesitum tibi 
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sponding to a question probably stemming from banking practice, 
the jurist put two issues68 under consideration. What was the type 
of contract stipulated between the parties and was the claim for 
interest justified? The answer to the first question was based on the 
words used by the debtor in his letter to the creditor. The recipient 
of payment declared that the money “entrusted to him” will be 
paid to the creditor on demand “when and where you desire me to 
do so” (quae quando voles et ubi voles).69 On these grounds, the jurists 
concluded that the parties made a contract of safekeeping (deposi-
tum). Answering the question regarding interest, he concluded that, 
if a debtor is not in default, the claim for interest would be contrary 
to good faith (bona fides) and the nature of safekeeping (depositi 
naturam).  
The first analysed issue pertained to a special case of depositum, 
called depositum irregulare70 since the Middle Ages. This case caused 
some controversy in the discourse of the Roman jurists.71 Thus, one 
can say that this was Papinian’s opinion on an issue that is re-
garded as one of the most controversial by modern Roman law 
________________ 
numerabo’. quaeritur propter usurarum incrementum. respondi depositi actionem locum 
habere: quid est enim aliud commendare quam deponere? quod ita verum est, si id actum est, 
ut corpora nummorum eadem redderentur: nam si ut tantundem solveretur convenit, 
egreditur ea res depositi notissimos terminos. in qua quaestione si depositi actio non teneat, 
cum convenit tantundem, non idem reddi, rationem usurarum haberi non facile dicendum 
est. et est quidem constitutum in bonae fidei iudiciis, quod ad usuras attinet ut tantundem 
possit officium arbitri quantum stipulatio: sed contra bonam fidem et depositi naturam est 
usuras ab eo desiderare temporis ante moram, qui beneficium in suscipienda pecunia dedit. 
si tamen ab initio de usuris praestandis convenit, lex contractus servabitur.  
68 Bonifacio 1947, 132. 
69 The term commendare used in the document interpreted by Papinian was 
used in the 2nd century A.D. in natural language to confirm the handover of money; 
see FIRA Vol. III, no. 120. In the study of Roman law, one can encounter the idea 
that such a linguistic practice could pertain to money given for safekeeping (deposi-
tum) and borrowed (mutuum); see Adams 1962, 362.   
70 Adams 1962, 363. 
71 In favour of allowing safekeeping (depositum) in such a form: D. 19,2,31 
(Alfenus, Paulus.); D. 16,3,28 (Scaevola); against: Paulus, Coll. X,7,9.  
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studies.72 With regard to said controversy, Papinian spoke in fa-
vour of the solution giving the parties to a contract more freedom. 
He decided that, in the case of the safekeeping (depositum) of a ge-
neric thing, the parties might agree that the creditor would receive 
not the same thing but the same quantity. The essence of the ques-
tion about interest claim pertained to the content of a contract of 
safekeeping (depositum) understood so broadly. The jurist first re-
minded the reader that, to ensure compliance with the require-
ments of good faith (bona fides), which included actio depositi, the 
judge could impose terms regarding interest, which bore the same 
legal force as those stipulated by the promise of the parties (stipula-
tio). Then he explained that, using this freedom, the judge could not 
impose the duty to pay interest for the period prior to the deposi-
tary delays (ante moram). Pointing out the contradiction with good 
faith (bona fides) and the nature of safekeeping (natura depositi) thus 
served the forming of a boundary to implication of a term in fact. In 
this reasoning, special attention was drawn to the new, in the lin-
guistic practice of the jurists, term of natura depositi.73 The jurist, by 
referring to natura depositi, excluded the possibility for the judge to 
imply a duty of charge for receiving a sum of money by the deposi-
tor.  
Mario Talamanca drew attention to the atypical, concurrent use 
of two criteria, bona fides and natura depositi, in argumentation. He 
concluded that the reference to bona fides is connected with stress-
ing such values as the faithfulness to the given word and the link 
between the performance of the contract and its socio-economic 
________________ 
72 Litewski 1974, 215; Zimmermann 1996, 217. 
73 The literature on the topic presented an opinion that, in his original text, 
Papinian fixed the boundary of the interpretation of a judge by referring solely to 
bona fides, and the natura depositi clause was added by Justinian compilers as an 
element of the natura contractus theory. See Klami 1969, 58 (earlier literature 
therein). The wide presence of the nature criterion in the argumentation of classical 
jurists and no positive evidence for changes of the text made by Justinian’s compil-
ers speaks in favour of adopting the originality of the text in wording retained by 
Justinian’s Digest. Cf. Mayer-Maly 1995, 296. 
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function. On the other hand, the criterion of natura depositi served, 
in his opinion, the indication that the solution should be adequate 
to the type of contract under consideration.74  
Further-reaching remarks on the joint application of bona fides 
and natura depositi criteria were made by Ricardo Cardilli. In his 
view, the criterion of natura depositi referred to the practical sense of 
the contract under consideration. This sense, in Cardilli’s opinion, 
was represented by the conviction of Ancient jurists that the fun-
damental purpose of the contract of safekeeping (depositum) is al-
ways to keep the thing in safe custody. Therefore, the term natura 
depositi was used by Papinian to express an opinion that a funda-
mental principle for the typical case of safekeeping (depositum) 
should be applied also in an atypical case, when the depositarius 
gained ownership of the received money and may have made use 
of it. The bona fides criterion was, in the view of R. Cardilli,75 to 
stress the competence of the judge to imply a depositary’s duty to 
pay with interest; however, for the period before the debtor’s de-
fault, this would be possible only if the parties had agreed so.76  
The idea that Papinian’s argumentation was grounded on 
drawing attention to the purpose,77 the practical sense of the con-
tract,78 was raised earlier by other authors. The belief that the natura 
depositi criterion expressed an outlook on the discussed contract 
from the point of view of the legitimate expectations of the deposi-
tor may be adopted as a generalisation of what is common in the 
presented views of Roman law researchers. The reference to bona 
fides could strengthen such an understanding of natura depositi and 
________________ 
74 Talamanca 2003, 197-202.  
75 Cardilli 2008, 59-61. 
76 In the study of Roman law, a view was presented that the admissibility of 
such an agreement was a result of a later amendment of the text by Justinian’s 
compilers. See Adams 1962, 369 (further reading therein). There are, however, no 
convincing sources for the adoption of such a position.  
77 Bonifacio 1947, 133.  
78 Adams 1962, 363; Klami 1969, 131. 
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make it more precise. In the argumentative practice of jurists, it was 
used, inter alia, to justify the fact that, in agreements, the intention 
of the contracting parties upon the conclusion of a contract should 
be considered rather than the verbatim interpretation of the pro- 
mise.79 Thus, the interpretation of an agreement from the perspec-
tive of the legitimate expectations of the creditor led to the typical 
economic result for the discussed contract. However, such a simple 
cohesion between the economic 80  and dogmatic 81  order, upon 
which the interpretation of a contract may be grounded, was not 
always present. This is illustrated by the example that one encoun-
ters further in the same work of Papinian. In the 27th book of Ques-
tiones,82 the jurist compared two cases of giving the same thing for 
safekeeping (depositum) to two depositaries. In the first case, vari-
ous grades of liability of the depositaries were determined at the 
contract conclusion. One of depositaries was liable for fraud (dolus) 
and the other also for negligent conduct (culpa). In the latter case, 
when concluding the contract, it was agreed that both depositaries 
were covered by the same grade of liability ‒ the breach of duty of 
diligent conduct (culpa)83 ‒ and then, under an agreement between 
the depositor and one of the depositaries, his liability was limited 
to fraud (dolus). As for the first of the indicated cases, Papinian ex-
plained that the obligation of two debtors had not arisen, as differ-
________________ 
79 Dajczak 1998, 119.  
80 I mean transactions structures covering the legitimate expectations of a party 
to a contract, independent from the positive law.  
81 I mean models and classifications of contracts imposed by the positive law.  
82  D. 45,2,9,1: Sed si quis deponendo penes duos paciscatur, ut ab altero quoque 
praestaretur, verius est non esse duos reos, a quibus impar suscepta est obligatio. non idem 
probandum est, cum duo quoque culpam promisissent, si alteri postea pacto culpa remissa 
sit, quia posterior conventio, quae in alterius persona intercessit, statum et naturam obliga-
tionis, quae duos initio reos fecit, mutare non potest. quare si socii sint et communis culpa 
intercessit, etiam alteri pactum cum altero factum proderit.  
83 The depositary’s liability only for damage resulting from fraud (dolus) was 
typical, cf. D.13,6,5,2.  
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ent obligations had not been imposed upon them. As for the latter 
case, the jurist concluded that the obligation had arisen and was in 
force, as the subsequent agreement made with one of depositaries 
had not changed the “legal position and nature of obligation” 
(statum et naturam obligtionis). The arising and permanence of the 
obligation of both depositaries in the latter case is explained in Ro-
man law studies by the fact that Papinian recognised them as a case 
which in the modern legal dogma was called joint and several obli-
gation. The Roman jurist saw the essence of the liability of joint 
debtors in the fact that there could be one obligation with one per-
formance, equally encumbering a number of debtors.84 G. Rotondi 
expressed the opinion that the term natura obligationis used in Ro-
man legal argumentation referred to the “original structure of obli-
gation and there was no need to think about the dogmatic structure 
imposed by positive law”.85 Having combined the idea of this Ital-
ian Romanist with the result of deliberations on the text of Papinian 
discussed earlier, I think that the point of referring to the nature of 
the obligation dwelled in taking into account the legitimate expec-
tations of the creditor. The reasoning based on natura obligationis 
took into account the cohesion between such expectations regard-
ing the economic result of a contract and the adopted allocation of 
risk that arose at the formation of contract86. No more fragments of 
Papinian’s works remained referring to nature when the validity or 
content of contracts was discussed. Based on the two presented 
texts, one can formulate a hypothesis that the economic results 
specified from the perspective of legitimate expectations of the 
creditor are of essential importance for such reasoning. This hy-
pothesis may be verified based on the fragment of the work of Pau-
lus and a number of Ulpian’s texts.  
________________ 
84 Lucifredi Peterlongo 1941, 21.  
85 Rotondi 1911, 57. 
86 Cf. Steiner 2009, 68-69.  
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1.2.2. Natura mandati in the argumentation of Julius Paulus  
 
In the fifth book of Questiones, Julius Paulus87 explained that the 
relation of exchange of services, “I do that you may do” (facio ut 
facias), consisting of a mutual collection of a claim for a contracting 
party that might have various legal forms. Such an agreement may 
be regarded as a mandate (mandatum) extending beyond its nature 
(naturam suam excedere) or, more easily, as a case of a transaction 
providing a remedy called actio prescriptis verbis. Biondo Biondi 
indicated this fragment as an example of the “weakening of tradi-
tional principles” of mandate (mandatum).88 The extension beyond 
the nature of mandate stressed by the jurist consisted of the break-
ing of the gratuity principle. It was expressed in the agreement of 
reciprocal performances, defined by the jurist as “we are each do-
ing service for one another” (mutuum officium prestamus). The fact 
that the jurist spoke of going beyond nature and not contrary to 
nature may be explained with a broad admission of payment for 
mandate in the practice of the time.89 The word natura means here, 
then, what is dogmatically typical and, hence, economic. In the 
discussed case, the legitimate expectations of the parties regarding 
the economic results of a contract were connected with the disrup-
tion of the dogmatic order. The jurist’s explanation of how to define 
the type of legal structure of the transaction “more easily” helped 
________________ 
87 D. 19,5,5,4: Sed si facio ut facias, haec species tractatus plures recipit. nam si pacti 
sumus, ut tu a meo debitore Carthagine exigas, ego a tuo Romae, vel ut tu in meo, ego in 
tuo solo aedificem, et ego aedificavi et tu cessas, in priorem speciem mandatum quodam-
modo intervenisse videtur, sine quo exigi pecunia alieno nomine non potest: quamvis enim 
et impendia sequantur, tamen mutuum officium praestamus et potest mandatum ex pacto 
etiam naturam suam excedere (possum enim tibi mandare, ut et custodiam mihi praestes et 
non plus impendas in exigendo quam decem): et si eandem quantitatem impenderemus, 
nulla dubitatio est. sin autem alter fecit, ut et hic mandatum intervenisse videatur, quasi 
refundamus invicem impensas: neque enim de re tua tibi mando. sed tutius erit et in insulis 
fabricandis et in debitoribus exigendis praescriptis verbis dari actionem, quae actio similis 
erit mandati actioni, quaemadmodum in superioribus casibus locationi et emptioni.  
88 Biondi 1953, 87.  
89 See Dajczak, Giaro, Longchamps de Bérier 2009, 500.  
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remove that dissonance. Unlike in the texts of Papinian presented 
earlier, the word natura used by Paulus did not have the function of 
a rule of contract interpretation due to legitimate expectations of its 
economic results. This supplements the reflection on the hypothesis 
made above. It can be concluded that Papinian’s use of the nature 
of the contract criterion taking into consideration the legitimate 
expectations of the creditor from the economic perspective was not 
something obvious in the legal language of the time. We can pre-
sume that this use of the word natura by Papinian resulted from his 
independence, originality, and innovation in the area of contract 
law.90 Let us look, then, at the examples of uses of the nature of the 
contract phrase in the argumentation of Domitius Ulpian, about ten 
years younger than Paulus. He distinguished himself from his con-
temporaries by his theoretical approach to law, and in his legal 
writings, he expressed admiration for everything natural.91  
 
1.2.3. Natura obligationis and natura contractus  
in argumentation of Domitius Ulpian  
 
The phrase natura obligationis, known from the argumentation 
of Papinian, can be found in the fragment of Ulpian’s commentary 
on the works of Sabinus.92 It also presents the issue of a plurality of 
________________ 
90 Ankum 1996, 7f (earlier literature therein) 
91 Honoré 2005, 76 and 79.  
92 D. 46,1,5-6: Generaliter Iulianus ait eum, qui heres extitit ei, pro quo intervenerat, 
liberari ex causa accessionis et solummodo quasi heredem rei teneri. denique scripsit, si 
fideiussor heres extiterit ei, pro quo fideiussit, quasi reum esse obligatum ex causa fideius-
sionis liberari: reum vero reo succedentem ex duabus causis esse obligatum. nec enim potest 
reperiri, quae obligatio quam perimat: at in fideiussore et reo repperitur, quia rei obligatio 
plenior est. nam ubi aliqua differentia est obligationum, potest constitui alteram per alteram 
perimi: cum vero duae eiusdem sint potestatis, non potest reperiri, cum altera potius quam 
altera consumeretur. refert autem haec ad speciem, in qua vult ostendere non esse novum, 
ut duae obligationes in unius persona concurrant. est autem species talis. si reus promit-
tendi reo promittendi heres extiterit, duas obligationes sustinet: 6. item si reus stipulandi 
extiterit heres rei stipulandi, duas species obligationis sustinebit. plane si ex altera earum 
egerit, utramque consumet, videlicet quia natura obligationum duarum, quas haberet, ea 
esset, ut, cum altera earum in iudicium deduceretur, altera consumeretur.  
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debtors or creditors. However, while Papinian expressed the idea 
that an obligation can exist with joint debtors,93 the text of Ulpian 
exemplifies the view that, in such a case, there were as many obli-
gations as there were debtors or creditors; however, only one per-
formance was due.94 The jurist took two cases into account. The 
first one pertained to the plurality of debtors. It involved the fact 
that one of the joint promisors became the heir of the other joint 
debtors. The second case involved the plurality of creditors. One of 
the joint creditors became the heir of another. The problem, similar 
in both cases, came down to the question of the legal consequences 
of the discussed situation. The jurist claimed that the death of one 
of the principal joint debtors or creditors would not change the fact 
that there were two distinct obligations, and by inheritance, the 
remaining debtor and creditor would be parties to each of these 
obligations. This meant that, in both cases, the creditor would have 
had at his disposal two claims (actio) regarding the same perform-
ance against one debtor. Ulpian explained that bringing one of the 
claims (actio) would result in the termination of the both obligations, 
as this was the “nature of both obligations” (natura obligationum 
duarum)95. Ulpian’s recognition that both obligations remained in 
force despite the death of the joint creditor or joint debtor ex-
pressed the thought formulated by Roman jurists since the mid-2nd 
century.96 This part of Ulpian's text was probably a recounting of 
Julian’s97 words. The novelty in Ulpian’s reasoning pertained solely 
to the use of the words natura obligatio in justifying the fact that 
bringing the claim (actio) regarding one of the concurrent obliga-
tions resulted in the consumption of the other. The argumentation 
based thereon assured the economic cohesion of legitimate expecta-
tions under both obligations regarding the same performance.  
________________ 
93 E.g. Lucifredi Peterlongo 1941, 21.  
94 E.g. Lucifredi Peterlongo 1941, 23.  
95 Cf. Steiner 2009, 37. 
96 D. 46,3,93 (Julian), D. 45,2,13 (Venuleius).  
97 Johnston 1987, 67; Kieß 1995, 96.  
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When comparing this statement of Ulpian with the above in-
stance of using the words natura obligationis by Papinian, one can 
see that the reference that both jurists made to them extended be-
yond their different dogmatic positions to the joint and several 
obligation. Both jurists used the term natura obligationis and drew 
attention to the economic sense of the evaluated situation, inde-
pendent from dogmatic sophistication.  
Yet another example enriching the image of such a linguistic 
practice is the fragment of the seventieth book of Ulpian’s commen-
tary on the Edict. It is devoted to praetorian stipulations. The text 
starts with the presentation of their division into three types: inter-
posed on account of a judgment to procure its execution (iudiciales), 
introduced to permit a new claim (actio) to enable execution to be 
made, and for the prevention of threatened injury (cautionales) and 
entered into for the purpose of causing a party to appear in court 
(communes). Having presented this dogmatic division, Ulpian con-
cluded that “all stipulations, by their nature (natura sui), are protec-
tive”, as the purpose of an agreement of this kind is to make some-
one more secure and safe.98 In the studies of Roman law, doubts 
were raised as to the clarity and usefulness of the three-element 
systematics of praetorian stipulations.99 The extent to which the 
fragment reflected the original idea of Ulpian was controversial.  
A certain resolution of the dispute regarding the origin and impor-
tance of the indicated tripartite division of stipulationes based on the 
existing sources is not possible. From the perspective of these con-
siderations, it is, however, significant to note that the sense of 
Ulpian's idea that “by their nature, all stipulations are protective” 
________________ 
98 D. 46,5,1pr.-4: Praetoriarum stipulationum tres videntur esse species, iudiciales 
cautionales communes. 1. Iudiciales eas dicimus, quae propter iudicium interponuntur ut 
ratum fiat, ut iudicatum solvi et ex operis novi nuntatione. 2. Cautionales sunt autem, quae 
instar actionis habent et, ut sit nova actio, intercedunt, ut de legatis stipulationes et de 
tutela et ratam rem haberi et damni infecti. 3. Communes sunt stipulationes, quae fiunt 
iudicio sistendi causa. 4. Et sciendum est omnes stipulationes natura sui cautionales esse: 
hoc enim agitur in stipulationibus, ut quis cautior sit et securior interposita stipulatione.  
99 Cf. Branca 1961, 35.  
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comes down to opposing the dogmatic diversity of praetorian 
stipulations with a clear opinion that they all have the same practi-
cal function.100 The reference to natura in this case does not un-
doubtedly mean the dogmatic typicality. The indications of security 
and safety clearly point to economic and psychological order. They 
show more clearly, as did the texts discussed earlier, that, in the 
opinion of the jurist, the word natura was connected with drawing 
attention to the legitimate expectations of the creditor. In another 
fragment of Ulpian’s commentary on the Edict, we can encounter 
the sole use of the term natura contractus by the late classical ju-
rist.101 It was used in deliberations on the content of contracts pro-
tected by actio bonae fidei. Quoting Papinian, Ulpian explained that 
he made a distinction between agreements (pacta) adopted at the 
formation of a contract and agreements that were added by the 
parties after the contractual obligation had arisen. The first one, 
called ex continenti, form the parts of a contract. A different ap-
proach to the latter, called ex intervallo, consisted of the fact that 
they were not considered to belong to the contract, nor did they 
confer a right of claim. Having presented this theory of Papinian 
and two illustrating examples pertaining to the agreement for the 
return of a dowry and the amount of interest for a custodian, he 
went on to state that, “if after a sale an agreement was made be-
yond the nature of the contract (extra natura contractus), then  
a claim growing out of the sale could not be brought due to the 
principle that no claim can arise under a naked agreement”.  
________________ 
100 See Guarino 1962, 214.  
101 D. 2,14,7,5: Quin immo interdum format ipsam actionem, ut in bonae fidei iudiciis: 
solemus enim dicere pacta conventa inesse bonae fidei iudiciis, sed hoc sic accipendum est, 
ut si quidem ex continenti pacta subsecuta sunt, etiam ex parte actoris insint, si ex inter-
vallo, non inerunt, nec valebunt, si agat, ne ex pacto actio nascatur. (….) ea enim pacta 
insunt, quae legem contractui dant, id est quae in ingressu contractus facta sunt. idem 
responsum scio a Papiniano, et si post emptionem ex intervallo aliquid extra naturam 
contractus conveniat, ob hanc causam agi ex empto non posse propter eandem regulam, ne 
ex pacto actio nascatur. quod et in omnibus bonae fidei iudiciis erit dicendum…. 
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In the academic discussion on this fragment, two particularly 
significant questions were raised for these deliberations. The ques-
tion regarding the originality of the text and the sense of the term 
natura contractus are included therein. As for the first question,  
a clear evolution of views in the 20th and early 21st centuries has 
been noted. Today, an opinion dominates that recognises the au-
thorship of Ulpian but also the modifications of compilers in the 
closing part of the text.102 Recently, Paola Lambrini expressed the 
opinion that the words extra naturam contractus could have been 
written by the Justinian jurists to replace the phrase “agreements 
that add something” (pacta quae aliquid addiciunt),103 known from 
Papinian’s text. The sources do not provide grounds for a direct 
verification of this hypothesis. One can refer to it indirectly, raising 
a question, fixed in academic discussions, regarding the sense of 
the natura contractus phrase in legal argumentation. The sentence it 
is used in permits us to recognise that it was a fragment of an inde-
pendent reflection of Ulpian.104 The jurist connected the sense of 
the presented theory of Papinian with two maxims used in legal 
discourse: based on the good faith rule that the intention of con-
tracting parties should be considered rather than the verbatim in-
terpretation of contract105 and the principle that no claim can arise 
under a naked agreement (ne ex pacto actio nascatur). In the aca-
demic discussion, a view has been expressed that the connection of 
the term extra naturam contractus and the principle ne ex pacto actio 
nascatur constituted solely the reference to the principle under 
which only the types of contracts defined by the law could be 
________________ 
102 Rotondi (1911, 112-113) showed that both the theory presented in the text 
and the phrase natura contractus came from Justinian compilers. Similarly, Kaser 
1949, 532; Knütel 1967, 141. This view has been gradually contested since the sec-
ond half of the 20th century. The latest works do not raise doubts regarding the 
originality of the text; see Mayer-Maly 1995, 295; Cardilli 2008, 54 fn. 135 (further 
reading therein).  
103 Cf. D.18,1,72pr. (Pap.); Lambrini 2007, 320.  
104 Similarly, Cardilli 2008, 52-56.  
105 See Schmidlin 1970, 119; Dajczak 1998, 43-45.  
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sources of obligations.106 Giovanni Rotondi connected the nature of 
the contract criterion with the structure of legal relationship agreed 
upon by the parties upon the formation of contract.107 Riccardo 
Cardilli recently commented on the matter. He concluded that the 
“term natura qualified this part of contents of sale, which, though 
accessory, would be typical for the concluded contract”.108 Ulpian, 
however, did not reflect on the contents of pactum added upon the 
formation of a contract. Paola Lambrini formulated the supposition 
that the jurist assessed an agreement (pactum) that did not change 
the significant content of the contract but added new terms.109 
What is convincing about this way of thinking is that it concerns an 
agreement amending the allocation of risks and benefits in an exist-
ing contract. The general formula of natura contractus, however, 
does not provide grounds to specify the direction and scope of 
these changes. These remarks regarding Ulpian’s reasoning also 
provide the grounds to disagree with W. Ernst’s recent opinion that 
Roman jurists denoted the essential terms as natura contractus be-
cause, beyond the nature of the contract, only the pactum was im-
plied after the formation of contract.110 Therefore, while developing 
the idea of Rotondi, I find it accurate to link the nature of the con-
tract with some order existing at the moment that a specific obliga-
tion arises. I believe that, in the search for the argumentative sense 
of the words natura contractus, one needs to take into consideration 
that Ulpian distinguished solely between specific agreements 
(pacta) included in a contract upon its formation and specific 
agreements added afterward. In this respect, his view differed from 
that of Papinian, who distinguished between the later agreements 
that added something to a specific contract and agreements added 
________________ 
106 Talamanca 2003, 73.  
107 Rotondi 1911, 111, believed that such an understanding of the contract prac-
tice was introduced by the Justinian compilers.  
108 Cardilli 2008, 55-56.  
109 Lambrini 2007, 320 and 321.  
110 Ernst 2011, 82-85. This understanding of the natura contractus phrase in 
Ulpian’s text was presented in the Accursian Glosse, see below: 58. 
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afterward that remove some parts of the content of a specific con-
tract.111 Referring to sources analysed earlier, this observation sup-
ports the opinion that Ulpian compared the phrase natura contractus 
to the allocation of benefits and risks arising at a contract’s conclu-
sion. This allocation is, in fact, the basis for the legitimate expecta-
tions of the parties. Therefore, it may be concluded that the term 
natura contractus, used here for the first time, was a creative conti-
nuity of the linguistic practice in which the reference to nature ex-
pressed the view on contracts from the perspective of the legitimate 
expectations of parties at the moment of the formation of the con-
tract. It can be supposed that the relatively late and limited implica-
tion of the natura contractus term in Roman legal argumentation 
was, in part, the consequence of the evolution of the legal language 
in which various ways of using the word natura were developed, 
and, at the same time, the result of difficulties in the “emancipa-
tion” of this criterion from reasoning based on good faith (bona 
fides). The interpretation of the good faith clause directed the atten-
tion of jurists also on the purpose of a contract. Both clauses – 
natura contractus and bona fides – expressed in the legal reasoning 
reference non-legal values.112 The reading of texts by Papinian and 
Ulpian, which included various linguistic forms of references to the 
nature of the contract, gave grounds to formulate and strengthen 
the hypothesis that they drew attention to the economic sense of 
discussed situations. The specific nature of the presented cases lies 
in the fact that the jurist's reasoning went beyond the dogmatic 
patterns and controversies and was based on perceiving the con-
tract as an instrument of achieving the expected purpose. Refer-
ences to nature in argumentation focused attention on the ade-
quacy of the agreement of the parties to achieve the purpose.  
It assumed the existence of an order allowing the achievement of 
the indicated adequacy between the instrument and the purpose. 
The qualities of this order are related to fixing the boundaries of the 
________________ 
111 See D. 18,1,72pr.  
112 See Talamanca 2003, 73.  
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legitimate expectations of the creditor. Drawing the same conclu-
sions would be possible in the flexible, varied interpretation of the 
bona fides clause.113 Therefore, it can be stated that the introduction 
of the nature of the contract clause to the Roman legal language 
was not related to the dogmatic systematisation of contracts ac-
cording to type. It provided a more precise linking of the legal ar-
gumentation with intuition regarding the existence of principles of 
the economic reasonableness of contracts, independent of positive 
law. The examples justifying this conclusion, however, come from 
only a few texts of late classical jurists who distinguished them-
selves with a predisposition toward theoretical thinking. Such  
a linguistic practice did not go beyond its “embryonic” stage in the 
late classical period of Roman law. It was not uniform, as it was 
accompanied by Paulus’ case of the use of the term natura to ex-
press what is typical in the dogmatic form of a contract. Hence,  
a question arises regarding the importance of this legal experience 
for lawyers who modernised the law in the time of Justinian and 
drew up the Justinian compilation. 
 
 
1.3. Nature of the contract in Justinian’s constitutions  
 
References to the nature of a claim (actio) or the nature of a legal 
institution occurred relatively often in the language of Justinian’s 
compilers. The Justinian jurists eagerly used this term to explain 
novelties introduced by the emperor. For instance, they employed 
this way to define what was typical of the “nature of an amended 
claim” for the return of a dowry (et natura quidem ex stipulati actionis 
haec intelligatur…), 114  presented a “uniform nature of legacies” 
________________ 
113 Cf. Dajczak 1998, 148-152. I formulated the conclusion that, in the reasoning 
of Roman jurists, the phrase bona fides was a “catalyst” for finding solutions to cases 
corresponding to the fundamental values of legal order indicated by Ulpian  
(D. 1.1,10,10): to live honestly (honeste vivere), to injure no one (alterum non laedere), 
and to give to everyone his due (suum quique tribuere).  
114 C. 5,13,1,1. 
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(…omnibus legatis una sit natura),115 and modified liability under 
pecunia constituta as the “extension of its nature” (necessarium nobis 
visum est magis pecuniae constitutae naturam ampliare). 116  Noticing 
such a condition of the sources provided an assumption to formu-
late an idea in the early 20th century: that it was the jurists of Justin-
ian times who built the theory of natura actionis pertaining to the 
“legal structure of claims”, and with it, they connected the creating 
of theoretical models of legal institutions.117 Developing this view, 
Rotondi thought that it was a theoretical generalisation that re-
placed the notion of legal relationship, absent from Ancient Roman 
law. Its reflection supposedly was – in line with Rotondi’s theory – 
the term natura contractus.118 By connecting the dogmatic innova-
tion introduced by Justinian with such a theory, Rotondi believed 
that “Justinian’s jurists and later Byzantine jurists understood the 
term natura as a definition of structure or a set of elements formed 
by the legal order, serving to build an autonomous legal figure”.119 
In other words, the nature of the claim or nature of the contract 
phrases represented, in the opinion of this Italian Romanist, all the 
elements of legal relationship required and permitted by the law.120 
However, the idea of Rotondi regarding the equality of the terms 
natura actionis and natura contractus raises some doubts. First, an 
explicit reference to the nature of the contract can be found in 
Justinian’s Code only three times. Hence, the sources for a decisive 
generalisation are very scarce. Second, the presented opinion of the 
Italian Romanist was based largely on arguments included in Basil-
ica, a Byzantine paraphrase of Justinian’s Code and Digest, drawn 
up 300 years later. In this context, it seems adequate to focus on the 
question of what the function was of the nature of the contract 
clause in the legal argumentation of Justinian’s compilers.  
________________ 
115 I. 2,20,2.  
116 C. 4,18,2pr. 
117 Rotondi 1911, 5.  
118 Rotondi 1911, 5 and 48.  
119 Rotondi 1911, 18.  
120 Rotondi 1911, 73.  
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The first example is the Justinian constitution included in the ti-
tle of the Code devoted to the abolition of the institution of the “de-
fender of freedom” (adsertor). This change of law resulted in the fact 
that litigation concerning freedom could not be continued after the 
death of a person who, as the plaintiff, aimed to prove that he or 
she was mistakenly regarded as a slave. In consequence, doubt 
arose as to whether the buyer of such a person whose status was 
the subject of litigation could, after this person's death, make  
a claim against the seller referring to the fact of having bought  
a free person, thus concluding a void sale. The essential subject of 
the imperial constitution is to clear this doubt. It explained that, 
under new regulation, the buyer could claim against the seller. The 
latter would not be held liable for eviction if it could be proven that 
the person sold was indeed a slave. In this context, the imperial 
jurists added that, if the sale had pertained to a free man, the buyer 
could have recourse against the seller and the latter should return 
to him what was contained in the bill of sale or what the nature of 
the contract required (natura contractus exigebat).121 When interpret-
ing this text, Rotondi concluded that the words natura contractus 
were used to define the scope of a seller’s liability determined by 
the legislator.122 As part of his research of the id quod interest clause 
used to determine the compensation, Dieter Medicus acknow- 
-ledged briefly that the phrase contractus exigebat123 present in the 
constitution should be regarded as its equivalent. To assess the 
function of the term natura contractus in the discussed constitution, 
it is important, in my view, to draw attention to the fact that the id 
quod interest and natura contractus phrases constituted one of the 
alternatively formulated criteria for determination of the buyer’s 
claim (actio empti). Let us remember that, in the Digest, Justinian 
repeated the opinion of classical jurists who differentiated the 
________________ 
121 C. 7,17,2: …habeat regressum adversus venditorem, ut ei quasi liberae personae 
venditor reddat id, quod emptionali instrumento continebatur vel natura contractus exige-
bat... 
122 Rotondi 1911, 11.  
123 Medicus 1962, 77.  
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scope of the seller’s liability depending on whether the seller had or 
had not known that the purpose of the contract could have not 
been achieved. As for the first of these situations, in the text of clas-
sical jurist Paulus, we can find the explanation that the seller 
should reimburse the buyer with the amount of his interest in what 
was destroyed (quod interest restituere). 124  Therefore, the idea of 
Medicus that the term natura contractus had, in this case, the same 
function that the phrase quod interest had in the discourse of classi-
cal jurists proved to be correct. One of the two known Justinian 
constitutions that contain the term quod interest125 provides grounds 
for discussing the reason for this linguistic change and the sense of 
the nature of the contract it stems from. It presents a declaration 
that, earlier, the id quod interest clause had caused an infinite num-
ber of doubts.126 Justinian explained that, “in all cases in which the 
amount or the nature of the estate is certain (...), id quod interest 
shall not exceed double the value of the estate.127 This image be-
comes clearer when this conclusion is compared with the discussed 
Justinian constitution, in which the term natura contractus deter-
mined the amount of the buyer's claim. Such a comparison permits 
the remark that drawing attention to the benefit that could be le-
gitimately expected by the buyer was the grounds for using the 
words natura contractus by Justinian’s jurists.  
The linking of the reference to nature and the presentation of 
the earlier controversy can be encountered also in the fragment of 
Justinian’s Institutes.128 This handbook brings to mind the discus-
________________ 
124 D. 18,1,57,1.  
125 Cf. Medicus 1962, 296.  
126 C. 7,47,1: Cum pro eo quod interest dubitationes antiquae in infinitum producere 
sunt...  
127 C. 7,47,1: Sancimus itaque in omnibus casibus, qui certam habent quantitatem vel 
naturam, veluti in venditionibus et locationibus et omnibus contractibus, quod hoc interest 
dupli quantitatem minime excedere... 
128 I. 3,25,2: De illa sane conventione quaesitum est, si Titus et Seius inter se pacti 
sunt, ut ad Titium lucri duae partes pertineant, damni tertia, ad Seium duae partes damni, 
lucri tertia, an rata debet haberi conventio? Quintus Mucius contra naturam societatis 
talem pactionem esse existimavit, et ob id non esse ratam habendam. Servius Sulpicius, 
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sion, known also from other sources, triggered by the opinion of 
Quintus Mucius Scaevola that “a partnership cannot be formed in 
such a way that a partner had a different share in loss and in 
profit”.129 The Justinian Institutes said that the opinion of Quintus 
Mucius was based on the contradiction of such a contractual term 
with the nature of a partnership (contra naturam societatis talem pac-
tionem esse existimavit). The corresponding fragment of Gaius’ Insti-
tutes of the 2nd century, which had a considerable impact on the 
analysed part of Justinian’s handbook, does not mention the term 
“nature of partnership”.130 The manuscript of Gaius’ work contains 
no gap that would allow the presumption that the mention was not 
preserved. 131  Having in mind such condition of the sources, it 
should be acknowledged that the phrase contra naturam societatis 
was introduced by Justinian jurists. It is probable that they used 
them to synthetically phrase the grounds underlying, in their opin-
ion, the view of Quintus Mucius Scaevola. Drawing from the dis-
cussion of jurists, one can point out two controversies. The first one 
pertained to whether it was practically reasonable to privilege one 
partner by granting him a higher share in profit than in loss. The 
second was whether it was possible, in terms of accounting, to dif-
ferentiate the share in profit and loss of one partner. The presented 
position of Quintus Mucius was probably based on the idea of eco-
nomic balance between heirs, which was primary for partner-
________________ 
cuius sententia prevaluit, contra sentit, quia saepe quorundam ita pretiosa est opera in 
societate, ut eos iustum sit meliore condicione in societatem admitti: nam et ita coiri posse 
societatem non dubitatur, ut alter pecuniam conferat, alter non conferat et tamen lucrum 
inter eos commune sit, quia saepe opera, alicuius pro pecunia valet. et adeo contra Quinti 
Mucii sententiam optinuit, ut illud quoque constiterit posse convenire, ut quis lucri partem 
ferat, damno non teneatur, quod et ipsum Servius convenienter sibi existimavit: quod 
tamen ita intellegi oportet, ut, si in aliqua re lucrum, in aliqua damnum allatum sit, com-
pensatione facta solum quod superest intellegatur lucri esse.  
129 D. 17,2,30: Mucius libro quarto decimo scribit non posse societatem coiri, ut aliam 
damni, aliam lucri partem socius ferat... 
130 G. 3,149.  
131 Horak 1969, 158.  
44 
ships.132 The justness of breaking this idea in the name of economic 
efficiency was being gradually strengthened by jurists. In the 1st 
century B.C., Servius Sulpicius Rufus explained that it was possible, 
to some extent, to privilege a partner whose service was of greater 
advantage to the partnership than the capital invested.133 In the 
mid-2nd century A.D., Gaius made a more general statement that 
equity justified such a possibility because “frequently the services 
of a person are worth as much as money”.134 Ulpian illustrated this 
thought with examples, pointing to the special value of services if 
one partner alone made a journey abroad by sea or land.135 The 
authors of Justinian’s handbook recognised the falsity of Quintus 
Mucius’ position in an unconditional and general manner.136 They 
explained that “the labour of certain persons is often so valuable in 
a partnership that it is only just that they should be admitted into it 
on the most favourable conditions”.137 The breaking of the principle 
formulated by Quintus Mucius also raised doubt from the point of 
view of a logical principle stipulating that one event cannot be 
profit and loss at the same time. The accounting model for clearing 
this doubt was proposed by Servius Sulpicius Rufus. He suggested 
that “different amounts of the profits remaining in the funds of 
partnership, after all loss has been deducted, can be paid to the 
partners”.138 The explanation of the matter included in the Justinian 
________________ 
132 Cf. Talamanca 2003, 30; Bona 1973, 27. See also Behrends 1983-1984, 205. The 
German Romanist presented the view that the position of Quintus Mucius was 
based not on a dogmatic and legal vision but on the consideration of the socio-
economic reality.  
133 G. 3,149.  
134 G. 3,149.  
135 D. 17,2,29,1.  
136 Cf: Horak 1969, 158.  
137 I. 3,25,2. There was a controversy in the study of Roman law with respect to 
whether the purpose of such a solution was to introduce a remedy against worse 
treatment of a partner who did not contribute any capital (see Wieackier 1936, 261) 
or the privileged treatment of a partner handling the affairs of the partnership (see 
Talamanca 1981, 25).  
138 D. 17,2,30. 
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Institutes is broader. Therein, one can read that “this should be 
understood in such way that if profit results in one transaction and 
loss in another, only what remains after set–off is regarded as 
profit”.139 The permanence of ambiguity regarding the accounting 
manner of breaking the principle of Quintus Mucius is confirmed 
by the Paraphrase of Institutes drawn up in Greek by Theophilus in 
534 A.D. The explanations it offers regarding the method of calcu-
lating various shares in the profit and loss of one partner are even 
more extensive. They were based on the examples of profit and loss 
in various industries and the end of a partnership.140 Hence, the 
sources provide grounds to suppose that Justinian’s jurists used the 
words contra naturam societatis to express the otherness of the view 
of Quintus Mucius consisting of a different understanding of the 
economic sense of a contract. Similarly, as in the imperial constitu-
tion presented earlier, the word natura was used by Justinian’s ju-
rists to express the thought that the dogmatic solution in force 
helped to achieve the accepted economic results of the contract. 
In Justinian’s Institutes, one can find yet another reference to 
the nature of the contract.141 The explanations demonstrating the 
similarity of sale (emptio venditio) and lease (locatio conductio) men-
tioned that, for a long time, there were doubts as to which one cov-
ered perpetual ground lease. Justinian’s compilers indicated that 
this doubt had been removed by the constitution of the emperor 
Zeno. The jurists of this emperor’s rule in the second half of the 5th 
century isolated emphyteusis (ius emfiteuticarium) as an autono-
mous type of property right made under a contract.142 Stressing the 
originality and permanence of this solution, Justinian claimed that 
“Zeno’s constitution established the peculiar nature (propriam 
naturam) of the contract of emphyteusis, which resembled neither  
a lease nor a sale but was upheld by its own agreement, and if any-
________________ 
139 I. 3,25,2: ... quod tamen ita intellegi oportet, ut, si in aliqua re lucrum, in aliqua 
damnum allatum sit, compensatione facta solum quod superest intelligatur lucri esse.  
140 Theoph. Par. 3,25,2.  
141 I. 3,24,3.  
142 C. 4,66,1. See Bottgilieri 1994, 72.  
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one entered into it, it should be sustained just as if such was the 
actual nature of the contract (natura talis esset contractus)”.143 The 
two references to the nature of the contract in the fragment ex-
pressed the idea of legal autonomy of the commented contract re-
sulting from the dogmatic finding of the specific nature of its prac-
tical purpose.  
Let us compare this conclusion with the Justinian texts pre-
sented earlier. This provides grounds to more decisively express 
the opinion that Justinian’s jurists, when speaking of the nature of 
the contract, stressed the adequacy of imperial law in achieving 
such practical objectives that the creditor may legitimately expect. 
Taking a broader look at the practice of using the word natura in 
reference to contracts, one may conclude that both the late classical 
and Justinian’s jurists assumed the existence of a dogmatic and 
economic dimension of a contractual practice. 144  The difference 
consisted of the understanding of the relation between these di-
mensions. The intuition of independence of the so-called economic 
order, represented by the phrase natura contractus, as a non-legal 
criterion for the evaluation of the validity of agreements can be 
noticed, in this context, only in the opinions of Papinian and Ulpian.  
 
 
1.4. Conclusions  
 
Lucretius, the author of De rerum natura, is regarded as the 
founder of the Roman understanding of nature.145 Inspired by Epi-
curean philosophy, he placed man in the position of an observer of 
nature who draws knowledge from it.146 Stoics opened the discus-
________________ 
143 I. 3,24,3 …lex Zenoniana lata est, quae emphyteuseos contractui propriam statuit 
naturam neque ad locationem neque ad venditionem inclinantem, sed suis pactionibus 
fulciendam, et si quidem aliquid pactum fuerit, hoc ita optinere, ac si naturalis esset con-
tractus… 
144 Differently Rotondi 1911, 73.  
145 Haselton Haight 1910, 245.  
146 Haselton Haight 1910, 245.  
47 
sion on whether the correct reading of nature may improve the 
fortune of man. 147  Marcus T. Cicero, Lucretius' contemporary, 
made a prudent conclusion that nature might permit a good life, i.e. 
in accordance with it.148 Horatio, who lived during the same period, 
pointed out the principles and rhythm of nature, stressing their 
closeness to what was proper for the fortune of man.149 In the same 
period, Virgil taught that knowing the natural law established by 
Providence frees one from fear.150 Pliny, a generation younger and 
author of Historia Naturalis, pointed out that a man is a fragment of 
cosmos, incapable of independent living. He saluted nature as the 
“giver of all things”, standing above man.151 As a result, he ex-
plained that healing human life means following the path of the 
“divine mother nature”.152 Seneca, who worked in the 1st century 
A.D. and was regarded as the exponent of the spirit of his times,153 
placed nature at the centre of Roman philosophical reflection.154 
The teachings that are repeated in his texts, to “live in line with 
nature” (secundum natura vivere),155 meant life in accordance with 
universal nature because, as he said, “nature is God, it is reason 
itself”.156 He commended the constancy of acting in line with the 
individual nature of man.157 Marcus Aurelius, emperor and phi-
losopher, was convinced that nature made him the “leader of the 
herd”,158 which transferred faith in the “order of the universe” to 
politics. He repeatedly stressed that society was a part of nature,159 
________________ 
147 Lucr. V, 115; See also Cytowska, Szelest 1990, 112.  
148 Cic. fin., IV, 14).  
149 Haselton Haight 1910, 246.  
150 Verg. georg., IV, 149.   
151 Plin. nat. II, 2.   
152 Borst 1994, 23.  
153 Joachimowicz 2004, 85.  
154 Grimal 1994, 248.  
155 Sen. vita beat.VI, 2; Sen. benef.IV, 25; Sen. otio V, 1.  
156 Sen. epist. XIX, 117, 2.  
157 Sen. otio, V, 1; see also Grimal 1994, 250.  
158 Grimal 1997, 257.  
159 M. Aur., XI.  
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drew attention to institutions that he regarded as being in accor-
dance with nature,160 and connected any difficulties in shaping men 
by the monarch with the duality of nature, made of divine logos 
and fortuity.161  
The presented views show how the idealistic, romantic, and 
sometimes religious approach to nature as reason that human ac-
tions should correspond to had developed since the end of the Ro-
man republic. The use of the word natura in the Roman legal lan-
guage, based on the conviction that it defined the objective order, 
was in accordance with this context. They used it to describe situa-
tions regulated by the law and the wording of law. The first group 
of cases is statistically predominant. The latter area of linguistic 
practice constitutes the independent achievements of Roman jurists. 
For this practice, they had to adopt some assumptions regarding 
the qualities of the objective order and its argumentative function. 
Thus, they started the deliberation on naturalis possessio and natu-
ralis obligatio (since the end of the republic). They introduced refer-
ences to the nature of the claim (actio) (since the 1st century A.D.) 
and to the nature of legal institutions (since the mid-2nd century 
A.D.). They introduced the terms naturalis ratio (since the mid-2nd 
century A.D.) and ius naturale (jurists who worked at the turn of the 
2nd and 3rd centuries A.D.). Drawing attention to the nature of the 
contract became one of the lines of such argumentative practice. 
The case of Paulus’ referring to the nature of mandate was in line 
with the earlier practice of understanding the nature of legal insti-
tutions as the designation of what was typical dogmatically.162 The 
introduction, at the turn of the 2nd and 3rd centuries, by Papinian, 
followed by Ulpian, of the nature of the contract criterion for the 
evaluation of the validity of agreements was creative from the 
point of view of legal reasoning. The reading of the texts of these 
jurists provided grounds to formulate and adopt a thesis that they 
________________ 
160 Like family; see Grimal 1997, 257.  
161 Grimal 1997, 257. 
162 D. 19,5,5,4.  
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draw attention to the objective order I defined as economic163. Such 
an understanding of the nature of the contract assumed a look at it 
from the perspective of the legitimate expectations of the creditor at 
the moment they arose. The manner of using the nature of the con-
tract criterion noticed in the works of Papinian and Ulpian did not 
go beyond the “embryonic” stage until the end of the 3rd century. 
This may be explained by the difficulty of the “emancipation” of 
the assessment using these criteria for reasoning based on bona fides. 
The sources do not permit an extended and decisive reconstruction 
of the qualities of the order underlying the nature of the contract. 
We can suppose that the introduction of the nature of the contract 
clause in Roman legal language permitted more precise, as was the 
case with bona fides, connected legal reasoning with intuition re-
garding the existence of principles of the economic reasonableness 
of contracts, independent of positive law. A small number of refer-
ences to the nature of the contract in post-classical sources show 
that, in Antiquity, this criterion did not achieve either theoretical or 
practical “maturity”. However, the observation that one can also 
notice in the reasoning of Justinian’s jurists the connection of the 
term nature of the contract with the economic dimension of the 
contract is valuable. On the other hand, this is where the similari-
ties end. The statements of jurists of the 6th century do not demon-
strate, which is noticeable in the reasoning of late classical jurists, 
the ideas of the independence of the economic order from positive 
law. When taking a broader look at this difference, it can be re-
garded as one of the signs of difference between the discourse of 
late classical jurists, inspired mainly by stoicism and the style of 
Justinian jurists, typical of the chancellery of the emperor enjoying 
the full extent of power and having the vision to restore the empire. 
Therefore, when analysing the beginnings of the nature of the con-
tract argument, three issues need to be stressed. The first is the dif-
ficulty of capturing the argumentative autonomy and specificity of 
the nature of the contract criterion. The second consists of the fact 
________________ 
163 See fn. 80.  
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that, in the Roman legal language, we can find examples of the 
word natura being used to stress both what belongs to the dogmatic 
order of a contract of a specific type164 and what serves the eco-
nomic reasonableness of contractual obligation. The third issue 
pertains to determining that the connection of the nature of the 
contract with the economic sense of a contract was clearly stronger 
in the argumentation of Roman jurists. As we shall see, this is how 
the permanent axes of discussion on the nature of the contract ar-
gument were established in the civil law tradition.  
________________ 
164 T. Mayer-Maly 1995, 296-297. This was developed by the introduction by 
medieval jurists of the term naturalia contractus as a part of the content of contracts 































THEORETICAL ELABORATION  
ON THE NATURE OF THE CONTRACT CLAUSE 
IN THE LEADING WORKS OF THE SCIENCE  
OF ROMAN LAW IN EUROPE  





2.1. Selection of sources  
 
In the 11th century, jurists who were in possession of Justinian 
texts crossed the border between drawing up legal expertise and 
genuine legal science. Legal expertise provided practical explana-
tions of specific cases. Legal science, the beginnings of which date 
back to medieval jurists in Pavia, aims at capturing and presenting 
something more. The last step on the road to legal science was 
made by two Bologna-based lawyers of the late 11th century, Pepo 
and Irnerius165. An important element of this breakthrough was the 
establishment, in the end of 11th century, of the practice of repro-
ducing the Justinian’s compilation without any changes to the con-
tent166. The adoption of the “stability of text”167 principle resulted in 
________________ 
165 See Radding 1988, 179. There are, however, no grounds for evaluation if and 
how the activities of the Bologna jurists were influenced by the Pavia jurists, see 
Lange 1997, 28.  
166 Conte 2009, 37–40; 67–70.  
167 This principle means that the manuscript and printed reproduction of a text 
did not modify it. The stability of text principle does not mean full uniformity. 
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the fact that the same Roman law texts, ordered and quoted in line 
with an established canon, became, until the 19th century, one of the 
bases for legal science in Europe. Thus, a certain European com-
munity of legal thought was built, which is now referred to as the 
civil law tradition168. Obviously, local differences and considerable 
changes in the philosophical, economic, religious, and cultural con-
text from the 12th to the 19th century resulted in many differences in 
the European legal discourse related to the Roman sources. Since 
the 17th century, these differences have become clearer. The Roman 
legal texts were still the point of reference for legal science devel-
oped over these centuries. This made the explanations of the Ro-
man texts, printed since the late 15th century169, commentaries, and 
works they inspired known and quoted in Roman law science until 
the early 19th century170. Thus, a chain of legal statements was cre-
ated, which, as a result of a lasting and geographically extensive 
impact, went beyond the historical contexts they were developed in. 
From the point of view of the studies on the nature of the contract 
clause, this chain of legal works may be regarded as sui generis ex-
perience of searching for a useful sense of phrases, in legal dis-
course, such as natura contractus, natura obligatio, or natura depositi, 
which were present in Roman texts.  
The analysis of this legal tradition offers three essential benefits 
to today’s understanding of the argument from nature of the con-
tract171. First of all, it helps to answer the question of whether the 
________________ 
There were some differences between manuscripts (see Lange 1997, 64). One of the 
fruits of European legal science is the gradual development of a critical, generally 
accepted edition of Corpus Iuris Civilis (see Lange 1997, 67).  
168 See e.g., Glenn 2000, 121–124.  
169 The first printed, and seventh total, legal book was probably Justinian’s In-
stitutes with commentary, published in 1468 in Mainz by Peter Schöffer. See Span-
genberg 1811, 651.  
170 See Bellomo 2005, 221 ff. 
171 In today’s academic discussion, there is no generally accepted position re-
garding the purpose and method of studying ius commune, see Conte 2009, 27-29. 
The  supporters of various methodological positions declare, however, that the  
study of ius commune helps in the understanding of private law issues dating back 
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functions of natura contractus172, natura obligationis173, natura stipula-
tionis174, natura depositi175, natura mandati176 or natura societatis177 in 
the Roman law texts drew any interest from the ius commune jurists. 
Second of all, it shows the direction of development of linguistic 
intuitions that formed the grounds for the application of the nature 
of the contract concept in legal discourse. Thirdly, it shows what 
the presence of this concept in the ius commune science brought to 
private law and how it shaped legal thinking, which directly gave 
rise to the European civil codes.  
The grounds for answers to these questions will be the works of 
jurists chosen on the basis of their relevance and renown in the pre-
codification European civil law (ius commune, gemeines Recht)178. 
The first link in the chain of printed ius commune works is Glossa 
ordinaria. Drawn up by Accursius (1182–c. 1262), it is the crowning 
of achievements for glossators and was the first methodological 
current of ius commune developed from the late 11th to the 13th cen-
tury, the primary objective of which was to explain the sense of 
wording of the Roman text179. The Accursian Gloss basically ac-
companied the text of Corpus Iuris Civilis from its first edition after 
the discovery of print, until the 1620s180. F. Calasso described it 
________________ 
to the early 21st century and in searching for its new order; see Bellomo 2005, 31; 
Zimmermann 2008, 3; Conte 2009, 42. 
172 D.2,14,7,5; C.7,17,2,1.  
173 D.45,2,9,1; D.46,1,5. 
174 D.46,5,1,4.  
175 D.16,3,24.  
176 D.19,5,5,4.  
177 I.3,25,2.  
178 This impact is measured by the number of editions.  
179 Calasso 1954, 543.  
180 See Lange 1997, 351. The last edition dates back to 1627. I adopted this edi-
tion as the basis. The literature presents various views as to which editions are 
closest to the medieval thought of Accursius; see Spangenberg 1811, 882; Horn 1973, 
154; Lange 1997, 351.This dispute cannot be resolved, as the manuscripts of Glossa 
Ordinaria differ in details. Among some 1200 manuscripts, there is not one which 
can be explicitly regarded as leading, see Lange 1997, 349.  
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vividly by saying that for centuries, this gloss was a “faithful 
shadow” of the Justinian text181.  
The next element of these deliberations is the Commentary on 
Digests by Bartolus de Saxoferato (1313–1357). His impact on  
a number of generations of jurists was symbolically expressed in 
the widely used maxim of nemo iurista nisi bartolista, or the fact that 
Thomas Diplovatatius, a 17th century researcher of the history of 
legal literature, called him iuris monarcha182. The views of Bartolus 
were as authoritative as the Accursian Gloss183. I shall take into 
consideration the commentary on Digest made by a disciple of Bar-
tolus, Baludus de Ubaldis (1327–1400), printed from the late 15th to 
the early 17th century184. These jurists found their methodological 
inspiration in the realism typical of the philosophy of Aristotle and 
Saint Thomas185. Their basic purpose was to use the Roman texts to 
solve their contemporary legal issues186. The cultural breakthrough 
of the Renaissance, Reformation, and geographical discoveries of 
the 17th century also brought about significant changes in the 
method of researching the Roman legal texts. It marked the begin-
ning of the gradual twilight of the ius commune system built in the 
late Middle Ages, i.e. the universal model of researching and prac-
tical coordination of concepts and norms introduced from Roman 
law texts, canon law and local laws187.  
The reading of the earlier ius commune was supplemented by 
the innovative works, in terms of methodology, based largely still 
on researching the Roman legal texts. In the 17th century, France 
became the leading centre of this type of legal science. Hence, later 
foundations of this reconstruction will be based on the works of the 
then French jurists. The deliberations on contracts by the precur-
________________ 
181 See Calasso 1954, 543.  
182 Maiolo 2007, 226.  
183 See Kamp 1936, 155, Garcia Garrido 2004, 526.  
184 Horn 1973, 327.  
185 Calasso 1954, 568; Lange, Kriechbaum 2007, 332 -335.  
186 Lange, Kriechbaum 2007, 689-692 and 758-765.  
187 See Bellomo 2005, 155.  
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sors of legal humanism, Jacobus Cujacius (1522–1590) and Hugo 
Donellus (1527–1591) are of primary importance in this respect. 
They were very famous among their contemporaries. In the two 
following centuries, they gained authority similar to that Bartolus 
de Saxoferrato and Baldus de Ubaldis188  had earlier. From this 
methodological trend, the work of Antoine Favre’s (1557–1624) 
Rationalia ad Pandectas will also be taken into consideration. This is 
the most extensive French commentary on the Digest and was used 
until the 19th century as an explanation of the application of legal 
practice in Roman law189. J. Cujacius and A. Favre (lat. Faber) 
played a vital role in introducing to legal science the thought that 
the Roman law texts are a product of history and, from that per-
spective, they may be researched and criticised190. At the same time, 
paradoxically, they contributed to the revival of the idea that Ro-
man texts may provide grounds for discussion on what the “legal 
truth” is191. On the other hand, the essential impact of Hugo Donel-
lus was that, using the Roman sources, he developed original no-
tions and structures of the systematics of private law192. All these 
ideas played a vital role for centuries to come.  
This manner of applying the Roman text, increasingly linked 
with the local development of law, was used primarily in the 16th 
century in the Netherlands and in the German usus modernus in the 
18th century. Thus, the next links in the reconstruction of the deve- 
lopment of the nature of the contract concept will be the commen-
tary of Arnold Vinnius (1588–1657) on Justinian’s Institutes, distin-
guished by the period and area of impact, and commentary by  
Johannes Voet on the Digest. The first of the above works was pub-
lished at least 42 times between 1642 and 1825193; it was widely 
known in 17th and 18th century Europe. J. Voet’s work was pub-
________________ 
188 Holthöfer 1977, 149.  
189 Holthöfer 1977, 151.  
190 Kelley 1969, 119.  
191 Giaro 2007, 66.  
192 Stein 1998, 123. 
193 Söllner 1977, 535.  
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lished at least 26 times between 1698 and 1829194; this commentary 
on civil law was widely used in 18th century Europe and its colo-
nies195. In the 18th century, the centre of gravity in legal science, 
strongly connected to the Roman texts, shifted to German countries, 
as it was there that Roman law had the highest practical impor-
tance. Some achievements of jurisprudence were referred to as the 
German usus modernus gained European significance. It included, 
primarily, Elementa iuris civili secundum ordinem Institutionum by 
Johann Gottlieb Heineccius. His work, in its initial wording or 
modifications introduced by other authors, was published in 175 
editions in the 18th and 19th century196 and was also widely used 
beyond Germanic countries in the teachings of law and in discus-
sions of legal reform197. Also, Elementa iuris civilis secundum ordinem 
pandectarum by Johann Heinneccius, which had 46 editions in the 
18th and 19th century, had a Pan-European impact198. Apart from 
that, under the German usus modernus, other works were devel-
oped that strongly influenced the form of the Roman law in the 
legal practices of various German countries. They included the 
works of Georg Adam Struve (1619–1692), Samuel Stryk (1640–
1710), Justus Hening Böhmer (1674–1749) and an extensive com-
mentary by Christian Glück (1775–1831), summarising all achieve-
ments of usus modernus. From the perspective of the evolution of 
law, these works developed into a significant point of reference for 
private legal science, which was restored in 19th century Germany. 
These are the last links in the chain comprised of the leading litera-
ture in the study of Roman law (gemeines Recht). Moreover, I shall 
also take into account the works of these times which, already in 




194 Söllner 1977, 540.  
195 Núńez Iglesias 2004, 466.  
196 See Wardemann 2007, 102-119.  
197 Wardemann 2007, 33.  
198 List: Wardemann 2007, 120–124.  
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2.2. Nature of the contract and determination  
of its contents using the notion of naturalia contractus  
 
2.2.1. Theoretical outline of elements of contents of a contract  
 
The arguments based on the nature of the contract were en-
countered in eight texts preserved in Justinian’s compilation. In the 
printed Accursian Gloss, such arguments were explained only once. 
It was the notion of extra naturam contractus. Ulpian used this 
phrase in his text in which he discussed the legal effectiveness of 
additional agreement added to a contract protected with actio bonae 
fidei. Let us remind the reader that the jurist explained that such 
terms, when added to the contract upon its conclusion (ex conti-
nenti), form a part of its content and their execution may be de-
manded by a relevant claim (actio). Any terms introduced later (ex 
intervallo), Ulpian, referring to Papinian, described as being outside 
the scope of the nature of the contract (extra naturam contractus). 
Justinian’s compilers located the text in the title on agreements (De 
pactis) of Justinian’s Digest. The printed199 Accursian Gloss, regard-
ing this fragment, explains that the word natura has the same 
meaning as substantia200. Further, in the gloss, one can read that 
there are some who describe as naturale what the author of the 
gloss calls substantiale201 . In glosses regarding the words adeo202 and 
ex eadem203, used in the next fragment of the De pactis title of the 
Digest204, the glossator consistently uses the phrase of substantia 
contractus. The manner of use shows that it was applied to describe 
________________ 
199 I use the edition: Corpus Iuris Civilis Iustinianiei cum commentariis Accursii 
Scholiis Contii et Gothofredi lucublationibus ad Accursium In quibus  Glosae ecplicantur 
similes et contrariae afferuntur, vitiosae notantur, Lugduni 1627.  
200 Gl. ad D.2,14,7,5: id est substantiam...  
201 Gl. ad D.2,14,7,5: :.. Alij dicunt id naturale, quod nos substantiale... 
202 Gl. ad D.2,14,5,6: pacta ex intervallo facta non valent extra substantiam contrac-
tus: sed de substantia sic...  
203 Gl. ad D.2,14,5,6: id est de substantia.  
204 D.2,14,7,6. 
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what makes a contract legally binding. The medieval author of the 
gloss actually made a linguistic correction of Papinian’s text. The 
gloss was inclined towards replacing the notion of natura contractus 
with substantia contractus. The reason for this modification may be 
explained based on glosses in other fragments of Papinian’s text205. 
It also pertained to an agreement concluded by the parties follow-
ing the conclusion and before the performance of a sales contract206. 
The Roman jurists concluded that if such agreements constituted 
“additional support” for the contract (quae adminicula sunt emp-
tionis), they did not provide grounds for contractual claims. The 
explanation of this wording by the gloss gave grounds for the tri-
section of a contractual obligation. It helped to precisely distinguish 
the meanings of substantia and natura. The first one referred to ele-
ments with which the parties had to agree to make the agreement 
enforceable 207. On the other hand, the gloss defined “supporting” 
terms (admicula) as accidentalia or naturalia208. A clear introduction 
of this pattern was accompanied by explanations coincident to the 
gloss referring to the word natura presented earlier. The gloss 
stressed that what some called natura should be defined as substan-
tia. The implied terms, e.g. liability for physical defects of a thing 
sold, were defined as pactum de natura or naturalia contractus209. In 
contrast, agreements regarding elements not inherent in the con-
________________ 
205 D.18,1,72. 
206 In the gloss, they were referred to as in continenti, as Ulpian described then 
in the aforementioned text; see Gl. ad D.18,1,72: ‘quo postea’ - scilicet ex intervallo. 
207 See OLD, sv substantia item 2 (underlying or essential nature, make-up; con-
stitution, that which makes a thing what it is); ALDH, sv substantia: der Bestand, 
die Wesenheit, das Wesen. On the other hand, according to MLLM , sv substantia:  
1) alimentation, catering, Versorgung; 2) Stock de marchandises, cargaison – Stock, 
cargo – Lager, Fracht; 3) Fortune savoir, property, Besitz, Wohlstand; 4) tenure 
domaniale – manorial holding, Pachtgut, dass zu einem Fronhof gehaery.  
208 Gl. ad D.18,1,72: ‘admicula’ - id est accidentalia, sive naturalia contractus, no au-
tem substantialia, ut subiicit.  
209 Gl. ad D.18,1,72 : ‘nova emptio’ - … Quae de substantia contractus dicimus esse, 
eadem quidam vocant de natura… Sed nos pactum de natura dicimus esse, quod sit super id 
quo est naturale; ut de evictione praestanda… ; ‘pactum de natura’ -  seu naturalia contrac-
tus. 
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tract were defined as accidentalia210. The trisection of contract con-
tents was adopted, with reference to the gloss, by Bartolus de 
Saxoferrato211. The concept of naturalia contractus was connected to 
the notion of natura contractus included in the Papinian’s text 
merely by a belief that each contractual obligation has a specific 
nature. A novelty, going beyond the argumentative intuition of 
ancient jurists, was the idea that the nature of the contract was ex-
pressed, inter alia, by these terms (naturalia contractus), which are 
binding when the parties did not waive or amend them212. This did 




2.2.2. The nature of the contract and naturalia contractus 
 
A step towards capturing and explaining this issue was made 
by Baldus de Ubaldis, inspired probably by the theological dispute 
concerning the relationship beteen the divine and human natures 
of Christ213 and philosophy of Thomas Aquinas214. The jurist ex-
plained that substantialia were the “original root” (radix originalis) of 
the contract and that naturalia its “extension”215. He concluded that 
naturalia was in conformity with the nature of the contract216. The 
next step on this path was made by the 16th century French jurists. 
________________ 
210 Gl. ad D.18,1,72: ‘nova emptio’ -... Quod autem in accidentalibus dixero, idem, in 
his, quae siunt super naturalibus contractibus intelligas…  
211 Bartolus de Saxoferato 1516-1529, Vol. 2, 114 (ad D.18,1,72): … Pacum super 
accidentalibus contractibus seu super naturalibus ex intervallo oppositum ad exceptionem 
tantum prodest sed si apponatur super substantialibus potest et ad actionem hoc dicit et 
habes hic unam gl. magnam…  
212 See Grossi 1986, 610-611. 
213 Grossi 1986, 614-618. 
214 Gordley 1991, 64.  
215 Baldus de Ubaldis 1577, ad C.4,38,13: ... extensio illiud radicis ex mera qualitate 
producta... 
216 Baldus de Ubaldis 1586, ad D.18,1,72,1: ... conclude ergo quod accidentalia sunt 
praeter naturam: naturalia sunt secundum naturam... 
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A pattern was developed in the area of legal humanism, which 
harmonised the possibility for the parties to modify naturalia con-
tractus, with opinions of Papinian and Ulpian claiming that going 
beyond the nature of the contract (extra naturam contractus) im-
paired the enforceability of the agreement aimed at such modifica-
tion.  
In the commentary on the text of Papinian on charging interest 
on deposited funds as contrary to natura depositi, J. Cujacius ex-
plained that the nature of the contract comprised substantialia and 
naturalia contractus217. More extensive deliberations on the matter 
can be found in an elaborate commentary on Justinian’s Digest by 
Antoine Favre, who was 35 years younger than J. Cujacius. In ratio 
decidendi of the commentary on De pactis, the French jurist pointed 
out that distinguishing the three sorts of contents in a contract was 
typical for the contemporary jurisprudence. These sorts included: 
essential (substantia), natural (natura) and terms implicated addi-
tionally by parties, like condition or terminus (accidentalia)218. In 
connection to this trisection, Favre reminded readers of the idea, 
taken from the gloss, that the concept of natura present in the Ro-
man text was identical with what was defined as substantia219. The 
essence of these deliberations consisted in theoretical connection of 
the nature with the type of contract. Assuming such a relation be-
tween the nature of the contract and its enforceability, the jurist 
made a distinction between contracts which fully correspond to 
their nature and contracts whose nature was modified. The first 
group included those contracts in which the parties reached an 
agreement on the elements described as substantia and did not set-
tle matters that were regarded as resulting from the nature of the 
specific type of contract (naturalia contractus). The nature of the 
________________ 
217 Cujacius 1658, Vol. 4, 215: haec sunt contra naturam depositi…nec sunt autinti, 
qui differentiam constituunt inter ea, quae sunt contractus naturalia et substantialia...  
218 Faber 1659, 171: … Cumque interpretes nostri soleant distinguere substantiam, 
naturam et accidentia contractus... 
219 Faber 1659, 171: … videtur Papinianus substantiam et naturam pro eodem usur-
passe. 
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given type of contract was, on the other hand, modified if the 
agreement of the parties amended or waived what was regarded as 
naturalia contractus. The nature of the contract was also modified as 
a result of implication of additional terms (accidentalia) by the par-
ties. Then, he explained that the type of the concluded contract was 
decided by the agreement of the parties with regard to these ele-
ments of its contents, which are considered as substantia. However, 
within the same type of contract, the parties may introduce signifi-
cant modifications, amending what is specified by naturalia or by 
incorporating accidentalia220. Thus, in this theoretical model, natu-
ralia contractus constituted the part of nature of the contract which 
could be modified without affecting the type221.  
The spread of such a manner of thinking is exemplified by the 
words of Johannes Voet, who lived at the turn of the 17th and 18th 
centuries; he was a representative of the Dutch jurisprudence who 
distinguished contracts “of routine nature” and “deviating from 
routine nature”222. Such a manner of making a theoretical connec-
tion between the nature and type of contract was based on the 
belief that only certain types of contracts may be sources of obli-
gations. In the science of ius commune, this idea was accepted, still 




220 Faber 1659, 170: … Quilibet contractus duplice formam habere potest, unam sub-
stantialem sine qua esse non poterit : alteram accidentalem, quae potest adesse et abesse, 
sine contractus peremptione aut mutatione, id est, quae accedit ex pacto aliquo facto super 
naturalibus aut accidentalibus contractus... 
221 Such a model is a theoretical extension of deliberations of eminent represen-
tatives of the commentators. In the commentaries on the same fragment of Justin-
ian’s Digest, they focused on the ne ex pacto actio nascatur principle included therein. 
They analysed the difference between contracts and agreements (Bartolus de 
Saxoferato 1516-1529, Vol. 1, 86v), typical and innominate contracts (Albericus de 
Rosciate 1585, 158 (ad D.2,14,7); Bartolus de Saxoferrato 1516-1529, Vol. 1, 87 (ad 
D.2,14,7,5); Baldus de Ubaldis 1585, 137 (ad D. 2,14,7).  
222 Voet 1698, II, 14, 5. 
223 Nanz 1985, 71.  
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2.2.3. Naturalia contractus and the freedom of contract principle  
 
This unanimity of ius commune jurists was broken in the 16th 
century by Mettheus Wesenbeck, professor of law from Nuremberg. 
In his study of De pactis (D.2,14) and (C.2,3), he assumed that each 
agreement concluded in a decisive manner results in an obligation 
“in accordance with the contemporary Roman law”224. This idea 
was quickly adopted by the Dutch and German lawyers who re-
searched Roman law applied in the 17th and 18th century practices 
(so-called usus modernus pandectarum). Allowing the freedom of 
contract principle in the Roman legal science did not, however, 
mean the deviation from the view that the nature of the contract is 
connected to its type, which was fundamental to an understanding 
of naturalia contractus. The trisection of the elements of contract 
contents developed in the Middle Ages was repeated by the 17th 
and 18th century German authors of usus modernus in their com-
mentaries on De pactis of the Digest. In Syntagma juris civilis, which 
made a strong impact on academic discussion and practice in the 
second half of the 17th and early 18th century, Georg Adam Struve 
deemed it obvious that one needed to distinguish substantialia, 
naturalia and accidentalia in the contents of a contract225. He ex-
plained that substantalia was comprised of elements that decided 
whether a contract belonged to a specific kind (genus), i.e. type of 
contract. He argued that their contractual modification, be it upon 
conclusion or later, resulted in the change of the nature, i.e. type of 
contract226. In this area, naturalia are also connected with the nature 
________________ 
224 Nanz 1985, 90 (with sources and literature).  
225 Struve 1678, 185 (VI, 23): ...Notandum autem hic est quod alia dicantur substan-
tialia contractus; alia naturalia; alia accidentalia..... 
226 Struve 1678, 185 (VI, 23):.. genus et differentia essetniam constituunt; proprium 
necessario essentiam consequitur; atque haec duo (...) vocantur substantialia…; Struve 
1678, 187 (VI, 26): … Aut iuri non contrarium pactum de essentialibus et tunc vel est in 
continenti vel ex intervallo adjectum. Illud itidem triplicis est generis: aliud enim est contra 
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of contract227. However, unlike substantalia, they could be modified 
without affecting the type of contract. As opposed to the above, 
Struve defined accidentalia, also referred to as conventionalia, as ele-
ments of the agreement between the parties, which can be inde-
pendent from, or even contradictory to the typical nature of the 
contract and may strengthen or weaken it228. The reference to the 
work of Ludwig J. F. Höpfner, indicated as the model 18th century 
usus modernus compendium of law229, introduced some minor, al-
though practical additions to this pattern. The author of the hand-
book, written in German, defined naturalia as statutory provisions 
(gesetzliche Bestmimmungen) 230 . He explained that they could be 
presumed, as they are usually implied in the contents of a contract. 
The examples that naturalia referred to, e.g., the seller’s liability for 
defects of goods or the buyer’s duty to pay interest if he failed to 
pay the price at the proper time, show that they were connected 
with a specific type of contract. The constancy of the presented 
opinion regarding naturalia contractus is finally illustrated by the 
explanations included in the monumental work of Christian Glück, 
who meticulously collected and systematised the achievements of 
ius commune of the 17th and 18th century. The connection of naturalia 
with a specific type of contract, appropriate for this debate, was 
developed further, with precise setting of the borders that allowed 
amendments of contract types. The jurist explained that they 
should not be of a kind that may lead to breach of the fundamental 
purpose of the concluded contract. For example, he indicated that 
________________ 
substantiam seu essentiam quod ita transformat contractum, ut alius plane contractus 
inducatur... 
227 Struve 1678), 185 (VI, 23): ... aliter  tamen de iis salva essentia ipsa possit conve-
niri…et haec naturalia vocantur… 
228 Struve 1678, 186 (VI, 24): ... Accidentalia seu conventionalia denique sunt, quae 
praeter essentiam contractus aut contra eius naturam regularem conventione singulari 
adjiciuntur (...) et quibus illius natura vel augetur vel minuitur… 
229 Landsberg 1898, 443. 
230 Höpfner 1803, 791 (§732).  
64 
the provision of a sales contract, stipulating that the object of sale 
can never be disposed of231, was null and void. Thus, the dogmatic 
vision of naturalia contractus was connected with the boundaries on 
the freedom of contract. Discussion on this principle also enriches 
the explanation of Glück that the agreement of parties made after 
the formation of contract, and pertaining only to naturalia or acci-
dentalia, does not provide grounds for a claim, but results in an 
exception. 
The reading of leading ius commune works shows that the con-
cept of naturalia contractus was developed as a dogmatic instrument 
to justify the implication of terms not agreed upon by the parties, 
but typical of the specific contract in its contents. Such an under-
standing of naturalia, probably inspired by the theological debate232 
and philosophy of Thomas Aquinas233, was common for ius com-
mune before and after the adoption of the freedom of contract prin-
ciple. It was possible because of the transformation of the former 
contracts into typical contractual obligations. Such an understand-
ing of naturalia, which was also propagated by the practice of canon 
law234, was brought by the Roman law tradition into the contempo-
rary continental theory of contract law. This, however, does not 
exhaust the experience of ius commune in using the concept of na-
ture of the contract. The reading of leading ius commune works 
showed clearly that the nature of contract was something broader 
than naturalia. In their deliberations on naturalia, the ius commune 
jurists touched upon the enforceability of the contract and freedom 
thereof.  
Let us then consider whether, and how, the concept of nature of 
the contract known from the Roman texts was present in the ius 
commune approach to those fundamental issues. 
________________ 
231 Glück 1867, 216–218 (§305). 
232 Grossi 1986, 614-618. 
233 Gordley 1991, 61.  
234 Bussi 1937, 17.  
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2.3. Nature of the contract and what makes  
an agreement enforceable  
 
The connection of the nature of the contract with required con-
tents of agreement of parties (substantalia), visible in ius commune, 
was developed by stressing the link between the nature and func-
tion of a specific type of contract. Thus, the words of Papinian, who 
declared that charging interest for money deposits was contradic-
tory to depositi naturam235, were for centuries commented on, in that 
the sense of safekeeping (depositum) consisted in the return of the 
entrusted thing and its protection236. In the canon law practice, this 
was more broadly expressed by an interpretation directive, accord-
ing to which the words of the contract should be interpreted not 
contrary to, but in line with, its nature237. The theoretical develop-
ment of such an understanding of nature of the contract was the 
introduction of this concept to discourse on what makes an agree-
ment enforceable.  
Hugo Donellus, an eminent representative of the systematic 
trend in 16th century legal humanism, having stated that Justinian’s 
definition of obligation was true238, indicated that nature was one 
of the basic issues in the description of law of obligations239. Nature 
of the contract, understood in such a manner, was used by the 
________________ 
235 D.16,3,24  
236 Gl. ad. D.16,3,24; Faber 1663, 367: ‘contra bonam fidem’ - prosequitur quado 
idem et idem etiam quando non idem debet reddi...; ‘qui beneficium’ - custodiae; Bartolus 
de Saxoferato 1516-1529, Vol. 2,  101 (ad D. 16,3,31pr.): bona fides exigitur ut res de-
posita deponenti restituat nisi extri seca…; Cujacius 1658, Vol. 4, 215:....depositum con-
sistit ex custodia, non ex usu, Quae lex sive pactio depositae pecuniam susm permittit, 
aberrat a natura depositi.... ; Faber 1663, 367:...Commendare nihil aliud est quam depo- 
nere... 
237 RRD, n. 23: verba sunt interpretanda eo modo quo non sint contra sed secundum 
naturam contractus; see: Bussi 1937, 18.  
238 Donellus 1763, XII,I,3.  
239 Donellus 1763, XII,II,1: … id ut praestet obligatio, tribus in rebus positum est. 
Primum ut sit constituta aliqua obligatio (...) Postremo ne longius producamus obliga-
tionem quam eius natura patitur (....), Tertium ad interitum et dissolutione eius pertinet....  
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French jurist in the systematic description of achievements of the 
ancient and medieval legal dogma. The starting point was the belief 
that “nature is not one and common for all contracts but is charac-
teristic of all types and distinguishes one from the other”240. Donel-
lus connected the concept of nature of the contract with a closed 
catalogue of contracts established in law. In consequence, he used 
this key to present individual types of contracts and their possible 
modifications in books XIII241, XIV242 and XV243 of his commentary. 
The premises of enforceability of an agreement, underlying the 
concept of the nature of the contract, were clearly rooted in causae244, 
defined in the dogmatic sense. In other words, the nature of the 
contract was not per se the basis for its enforceability of the consen-
sus ad idem. A contract had its nature, as it was considered in law to 
be a basis of a specific type of claim (actio).  
An example of the propagation of such an understanding of the 
nature of the contract concept as an instrument of a clear and sys-
tematic description of the law of obligations is the 17th century trac-
tate of Petro de Ognate Vallisoletano. The Jesuit, applying the late 
scholasticism method 245 , started the first disputatio, entitled De 
Natura et Essentia contractus, with a declaration that to “know the 
nature of things was of particular importance”. This developed, 
scholastic approach covered a reflection on the idea, definition and 
nature of contract. As a source of the idea, he indicated natural law, 
in line with which a contract is to serve commutative justice, i.e., 
________________ 
240 Donellus 1763, XIII,I,2: Ac primu hoc staturatur, quo modo indicavi, naturam 
contractuum non omnium unam esse et communem. Propriam cuiusque; contractus hanc 
esse. Ideo pro specie cuiusque; distingui....  
241 De singulorum contractus natura, vi et potestat quae hic singulorum obligatio pro-
pria, quae praestationes, quae ad eas obtinendas actiones, Atque hae hoc libro de his contrac-
tibus, qui consensu solo perficiuntur. 
242 De contractibus qui re fiunt, deque singulorum tum natura, tum obligatione pro-
pria pro natura cuiusque. 
243De prestationibus iis, quasi extra naturam contractus conventio ipsa inducat.  
244 Donellus 1763, XII,VI,2.  
245 See Gordley 1991, 10: The late scholastics built their contract doctrines 
around three of its virtues (…): promise-keeping, commutative justice and liberality.  
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lead to the performance of concluded contracts and fairness of 
transactions246. He defined positive law as an instrument of sup-
plementing and changing the natural law idea247. In this respect, he 
went beyond the view, characteristic of ius commune until the 
16th century and expressed by Donellus, that “consensus in idem 
does not always result in an obligation, as for that purpose a proper 
causa is required”248. In his De Natura et Essentia contractus, Petro de 
Ognate Vallisoletano defined contract as an agreement which is 
binding under commutative justice249. From that perspective, all 
contracts were divided, according to the pattern devised by the 
glossators250, into two basic groups: those that yield benefits (con-
tractus lucrativus) and those that result in duties (contractus onero-
sus)251. Such a generalisation of the essence and definition of con-
tract did not, however, lead to a general reflection on the nature of 
contract. The connection of the nature and type of contract, known 
from Donellus, is also a quality of the systematic tractate of Petro 
de Ognate. He explained the nature of individual types of contract 
through building their “true definitions” (germana definitio). The 
method applied, to that end, may be exemplified by the contracts of 
safekeeping (depositum) and partnership (societas) 252 . The “true 
________________ 
246 Ognate Vallisoletano 1668, Vol. 1, 2: ... contractus (...) tamen absolute esse de 
iure naturali. Quia supposita rerum divisione subintravit protinus naturale ius, in his 
commutationibus naturalem aequitatem servandem esse praecipiens non solum ut quod tibi 
non vis, alteri ne feceris; sed etiam ut it his sevetur aequalitas rei ad rem, quam iustitia 
commutativa prescribit, et ut si violata fuerit per restitutionem refarciatus et pacta con-
venta servari magna fide praecipiens et violatores congruis esse poaenis cohibendos.  
247 Ognate Vallisoletano 1668, Vol. 1, 2: ... quavis multa ius positivo circa contrac-
tus addiderit et immutaverit, ipsos tamen absolute esse de iure naturali...  
248 Donellus 1763, XII,VI,5.  
249 Ognate Vallisoletano 1668, Vol. 1, 7: ... Contractus est pactum obligans ex iusti-
tia commutativa.  
250 See Bussi 1937, 9 (includes sources).  
251 Ognate Vallisoletano 1668, Vol. 1, 7: ... Quia haec deifinitio tollit defectus alia-
rum, datur per verum genus et diferentiam, competit contractibus onerosis et lucrativis et 
non datur per effectus, sed per essentialia contractus.   
252 The nature of these contracts has already been argued by ancient Roman ju-
rists. In the general systematic adopted by P. de Ognate Vallisoletano, the contract 
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definition” included in De natura et causis contractus depositi ex-
plains that it is a contract consisting in gratuitous keeping of  
a thing, upon the issue of which gratuity should be stressed253. The 
deliberations on partnership (De natura contractus societatis) are 
opened by a declaration that it is not easy to distinguish the nature 
of this contract and expose its essence.254. The deliberations are 
crowned with a definition in line with which the formation of  
a partnership results in three duties: to merge contributions, act to 
gain profit and divide profit, which, in principle, should be propor-
tional among the partners255. The fragments of Petro de Ognate’s 
work show that he constructed definitions of the nature of the con-
tract by indicating the fundamental, in his opinion and in line with 
the experience of his contemporary ius commune, dogmatic qualities 
of specific types of contract. One can thus conclude that allowing 
the freedom of contract principle did not change the manner of 
combining the nature of the contract with what makes it legally 
effective, which was developed in the Romanistic legal science.  
Such an approach is flexibly continued by doctoral dissertations 
of the 17th and early 18th century, which, in their titles, included the 
words natura obligatio or natura contractus. In 1662, Hermann Hoff-
meister published his Disputatio juridica de cognoscenda obligationum 
natura earundemque tam circa contractus quam delicta operatione. The 
third thesis of the work indicates that the author intuitively identi-
________________ 
of safekeeping (depositum) is regarded as contractus lucrativus and the partnership 
(societas) as contractus onerosus.  
253 Ognate Vallisoletano 1668, Vol. 1, 872: ... Depositum est contractus quo res tra-
ditur ad custodiendum gratis, Neque est necesse addere, principaliter ; quia satis intelligi-
tur: neque ut eadem numero reddatur, quia satis exponitur dicendo, ad custodiendum.  
254 Ognate Vallisoletano 1668, Vol. 4, 3: ... Non est facile naturam huius contractus 
distinguere et essentiam aperire ab essentia aliorum valide recedit....  
255 Ognate Vallisoletano 1668, Vol. 4, 5: ... essentialis definitio: quia dum contrac-
tum dixi, genus explicui triplicem obligationem in societate requiri primam conferendi 
aliquid in unum: secundum cum collatis lucrum procurandi: tertiam lucrum dividendi et 
haec tres obligationes, aut conventio ad illas sunt essentialis differentia huius contractus. 
Illud autem verbum proprtionale necessario addendum duxi quia ut verus contractus so-
cietatis sit, requiritur, ut socii obligentur ad proportionalem divisionem....  
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fied the nature of obligation256 with its Justinian’s definition257. He 
linked the legal effectiveness of a contract with its nature258. The 
exposition on the notion of contracts based on such assumptions 
(theses 8–25) was, however, limited to the presentation of basic 
dogmatic qualities of individual types of contract259. The concept of 
natura contractus is mentioned only once and is related to the analy-
sis of the specificity of one of the presented types260.  
More flexibility in using the nature of the contract notion in the 
deliberations on the binding power of a contract is displayed in the 
dissertation of Carl Henrik Reibertopf, under the title of De contrac-
tibus censualis natura. Referring to a 17th century theologian, Francis 
de Oviedo, the author, indicates the ambiguity of the word natura. 
He found it relevant for his deliberations to construct a definition 
explaining the nature of the contract, i.e., what constitutes its es-
sence261. Using this method, he explained that contractus censualis 
was an obligation adopted in German law, which created a duty to 
hand over a thing in exchange for a pecuniary annuity of a specific 
amount262. The thesis of Hoffemeister shows that the essence of 
________________ 
256 Hoffmeister 1662, 6: Th. 5. Explicata obligationum natura et diversitate earum ef-
ficaciam, nunc earum efficaciam pleniori aliquantulum stylo inquirentibus conveniens… 
257 Hoffmeister 1662, 5: Th. 3. Definitur obligatio juris vinculum. (…) ibi in jure 
consist. Inst. de R. Corp. l. 46ff. de acquir. velamitt.poss. l. 54. ff. de condict. Indeb.quo 
cecessitate astringimur l.13. C. de contrah. empt. 99. de V. O. l. 67 ff. De procur., alicujus 
rei solvendae secundum nostrsae civitatis iura princ. Inst. De oblig.   
258 Hoffmeister 1662, 8: … Si vero pactum vestitur intrinsece seu sua natura; con-
tractus assumit naturam… 
259 Hoffmeister 1662, 9–30.  
260 Hoffmeister 1662, 26–27: Ex contractu locationis conductionis duae oriuntur ac-
tiones aeque directae, civiles et bonae fidei. Una locati, (...) Hinc non tenetur de incendio 
etamsi exortum culpa inhabitantium, presumatur (...) quia culpa haec esse levissima prae-
sumitur, ad quam ex natura contractus hujus non tenetur, multo minus de casu fortuito....  
261 Reibertopf 1720, 5: … Nomen natura varias habet significationes, quas recenset 
Frantz. de Oviedo L. II Phys. Cont. VI. Punct. 1. Hic significat aliud nihil quam essentiam 
contractus consensusalis, uti definito est oratio naturam alicujus explicans...  
262 Reibertopf 1720, 5-6: … Contractus cesualis est contractus consensualis de jure 
recipiendae annuae pensionis, ex re vel obligatione aliena pro certo pretio contituenta … 
Non quidem generali, qualis consensus est in omnibus reliquis contractibus, sed ad certam 
rem restricto, scil. ad jus constituendae annuae pensionis et revera nihil aliud est, quam 
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flexibility in connecting the contract with what makes it enforceable 
consisted in the fact that reflection on a contract unknown in Ro-
man law could consist of explaining its nature through a definition. 
Similarly, as in the period before the recognition of the freedom of 
contract, such an explanation of the nature of the contract consisted 
in indicating fundamental dogmatic elements, the agreement on 
which was a precondition for an obligation.  
Such a way of thinking can be seen in the work of Glück, sum-
marising the evolution of usus modernus. When discussing the Ro-
man law-specific distinction between contracts (contractus) and 
agreements (pacta), the jurists explained that the enforceability of 
conventio results from the agreements itself and its nature (an sich 
und ihrer Natur). Of the latter of the elements, he understood that 
the agreement displays qualities of some “principal act” 
(Hauptgeschäft)263. Further, in De pactis, the jurist explained that in 
German law, in contrast to Roman law, it is undoubted that any 
agreement not resulting from fraud (dolus) or unconscionable coer-
cion (metus) and concluded with the intention to create a legal duty 
is legally binding. He proved that there were controversies among 
the 18th century lawyers as to the base of the freedom of contracts. 
However, none of the views of Glück demonstrated in this context 
connected the enforceability of a contract with its nature264. Such  
a form of the lecture lets one conclude that, in the discourse of usus 
modernus lawyers on the enforceability of a contract, the link be-
tween understanding of its nature and its dogmatic typisation has 
been preserved. Similar to the case of naturalia contractus, the dog-
matic pattern built before the adoption of the freedom of contract in 
ius commune remained up-to-date after the adoption of the said 
principle. In this case, its duration was supported not only by the 
________________ 
emtio et venditio juris annuae pensionis, hic germanice nuncupatur der Gülden Kauf.  The 
text uses the broad understanding of a consensual contract typical for the 17th and 
18th century legal debate (which adopted the freedom of contract principle), see 
Coing 1985, 401.  
263 Glück (1867) 228 (§306).  
264 Glück (1867)279-284 (§312). 
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fact that Roman contracts became typical, but also by the practice of 
using the freedom of contract to build and define new types of con-
tracts. Examples of such use of the nature of the contract clause can 
also be seen in the later continental private law265. Defining the 
qualities of a given type of contract and the elements comprising its 
naturalia leads to a question regarding the boundaries of the devel-
opment and modification of this type of contract. Let us then go on 
to see how the ius commune jurists used the concept of the nature of 
the contract in relevant passages. 
 
 
2.4. Nature of the contract and setting the boundaries  
of the freedom of contract  
 
Cases specified in Roman texts as exceeding the nature of the 
mandate (mandatum)266 or contradictory to the nature of safekeep-
ing (depositum) 267  became an inspiration for deliberations of ius 
commune jurists on the consequences of concluding an agreement 
extending beyond the defined boundary. Let us remind the reader 
that the first of these situations consisted in defining, under the 
contract of mandate, the mutual services, as a result of which the 
contract may deviate from its nature (extra suam naturam). As the 
ancient jurist Paulus noted, when the incurred mutual expenses are 
different, then actio praescriptis verbis is more certain for claiming 
them than a claim under the contract of mandate (actio mandati). 
The Accursian Gloss does not explain the words extra naturam used 
by the Roman jurist. It does not discuss the boundaries to the con-
tract of mandate; it just explains that the Roman solution clears the 
doubt268.  
________________ 
265 See Reuscher 1890, 5.  
266 D.19,5,5,4.  
267 D.16,3,24.  
268  Gl. ad D.19,5,5,4: ‘sed tutis erit’ – Cur tutius est agere praescriptis verbis? 
Quoniam res est in dubio posita. Tollendae dubitationis causa saepe agitur praescriptis 
verbis, non tantum cum constat, non esse aliam actionem... 
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The 14th century jurists, Bartolus de Saxoferato and Baldus de 
Ubaldis, in their commentaries on the said text, showed explicitly 
that the fee for such a relation excluded regarding it as a contract of 
mandate, but as it met the term of validity of an innominate con-
tract similar to the contract of mandate, a relevant claim (actio) 
might be granted269. This fragment was commented on in a similar 
manner by J. Cujacius. He concluded that an agreement of the par-
ties may not go beyond the nature of the contract and hence Paulus, 
clearing the doubt, admitted actio praescriptis verbis270. This reading 
of Cujacius’ works also shows the new manner of connecting the 
concept natura contractus with the boundaries of the freedom of 
contract. The fragment of Papinian’s work, in which he deemed it 
contradictory to depositi naturam to claim interest on money given 
for safekeeping (depositum), became an inspiration to J. Cujacius for 
a more general reflection. The French jurist explained that a pactum 
contradictory to the nature of safekeeping (depositum) was null and 
void271. He saw this contradiction in the fundamental breach of 
essentialia contractus272.  
Hugo Donellus, J. Cujacius’s contemporary, made a step further 
in such legal argumentation. Under general deliberations on the 
________________ 
269 Bartolus de Saxoferrato 1516–1529, Vol. 2, 131–132 (ad. D.19,5,5,4): …. Quid 
mandatu non sit gratuitu ita non pariat actione mandati inter mandante et procuratorem ut 
mandatus respectu illius qui agit et contra quem agitur (...) Contractus innominatus et 
actio quae ex eo oritur datur ad similitudine contractum noiatorum quibus assimilnt....; 
Baldus de Ubaldis (1585), 174 (ad. D.19,5,5,4):... non tamen est proprie mandatum quia 
non gratuitum, cum officium hincinde prestetur. Ex hoc habes quod salarium adiectum 
mandato non impedit agi procuratorio nomine, sed facit quod inter mandantem et manda-
tarium non resultat actio mandati, sed alia actio licet...  
270 J. Cujacius 1658, Vol. 5, 1016:… mandatum, ex pacto naturam suam nonnihil ex-
cedere potest,(...) Tandem concludit Paulus, melius esse et tutuis disputationis et ambiguti-
tatis tollendae causa, ut etiam ait in l. 1 sup. De aest. omissa actione mandati, agere 
praescritpis verbis proxima et simili mandati actione.....  
271 Cujacius 1658, Opera, Vol. 4, col 215: :... si hae pactiones sunt contra naturam 
depositi, ergo non servabuntur..  
272 Cujacius 1658, Vol. 4, 215: …Propterea contra naturam contractus est pactio, 
quae manifeste adversatur contractui…  
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enforceability of obligations273, he explained that the valid obliga-
tion produces only results allowed by its nature274. The general 
indication of the nature of the contract as the boundary to the en-
forceability of obligatio was, however, only a formal innovation in 
the works of Donellus. He believed that there was no general na-
ture of contract275. He did not believe in the freedom of contract 
principle.  
The works of jurists at the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries, i.e., 
a period when the freedom of contract principle was being recog-
nised in ius commune and discussed, show various possibilities of 
using the nature of the contract clause as a boundary to its enforce-
ability. One may encounter the approach that may be defined as 
traditional in the commentary of Arnold Vinnius on Justinian’s 
Institutes. In the title on the notion of obligation (De obligationi-
bus)276, he considered, in particular, the effectiveness of implication 
of an informal additional agreement to loan for consumption (mu-
tuum), which under the Roman law was a stricti iuris obligation, 
coming into force as a consequence of handing over a thing from 
creditor to debtor. The Dutch jurist justified the unenforceability of 
such pactum with the fact that “it would extend beyond the nature 
of the contract” (esse extra naturam contractus). Such argumentation, 
based on the conviction that a duty in this case may not extend 
beyond the transfer of a thing277, repeated the idea, known from the 
________________ 
273 Donellus 1763, XII,II, Summa argumenti de obligationibus. Obligationum genera 
et de naturali obligatione; quae sit: quibus ex causis oriatur et inter quas personas: quos 
habeat effectus: quomodo disolvatur.  
274 Donellus 1763, (XII,II,1):... Id ut praestet obligatio, tribus in rebus positum est. 
Primum ut sit constituta aliqua obligatio. Tum ut norimus, quid constituta contineat, 
quamve necessitatem praestationis in se habeat. Postremo ne longius producamus obliga-
tionem, quam eius natura patitur, videamus finaturne quandoque obligatio et si finitur, 
quibus modis finantur. An sit aliqua obligatio, ex suis causis dignoscitur. Quid contineat 
quamque; praestationem habeat, et qaestio est de potestate et effectu obligationis....  
275 Donellus 1763, XIII,1,2.  
276 Vinnius 1642, III, 14; De obligationibus.  
277 Vinnius 1642, III, 14: Divisio posterior 8:... Pacta mutuo adjecta ad obligandum et 
agendum non prodesse, propterea quod re obligatio contrahi non potest ultra id quod datum 
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statements of ius commune jurists, that each type of contract has its 
own specific nature278.  
A German jurist, Johannes Althusius presented a novelty in the 
application of the nature criterion as a boundary to the enforceabi- 
lity of obligation279. The works of this Calvinistic lawyer, aimed at 
building legal dogma based on the foundation of religion and po-
litical knowledge 280 , led, in particular, to defining the general  
notion of contract (conventio). He understood it as an act of creating 
an obligation, in line with the general duty to respect agreements281. 
Upon this basis, he declared the freedom of contract principle and 
defined its boundaries as the conflict with the nature of the contract 
or the act of law (nisi conventionis natura, vel lex obstet)282. This 
statement shows that the adoption of a general, dogmatic notion of 
contract as a source of obligation opened up a possibility to use the 
nature of the contract criterion to set the boundary of the freedom 
of contract.  
Progress in the 18th century usus modernus was, however, very 
slow and limited. This is illustrated by the works of J. G. Heinec-
cius: Elementa iuris civilis secundum ordinem institutionum 283  and 
________________ 
est (...) adhaec nullas in mutuo esse praestationes doli aut culpae et si qua de his pactio fiat, 
eam esse extra naturam contractus:...  
278 The commentaries of Favre and Stryk fit this approach. The fragment of 
Papinian, in which he concluded that charging interest on deposited money was 
contradictory with depositi naturam, inspired them to deliberate on the dogmatic 
dissimilarities between a safekeeping (depositum) and a loan for consumption (mu-
tuum); see Faber 1663, 367; Stryk 1712, 191 (XVI, 3, §3).  
279 He is indicated as one of the pioneers of the natural law school, see: Nanz 
1985, 135.  
280 See Nanz 1985, 135; Abellán 2004, 306.  
281 Althusius 1649, I,64,5: …conventio est, qua ex duorum pluriumve in idem nego-
tium seu placitum, consensu obligatio ad dandum quid vel faciendum contrahitur… 
282 Althusius 1649, I, 64,30: Porro res in conventionem deducuntur ab alterutro con-
trahentium, vel ab utroque. Et quot sunt res, tot etiam obligationes et conventiones dicun-
tur, (...) nisi conventionis natura, vel lex obstet...  
283 The work had 175 editions in the 18th and 19th centuries, see: Wardemann 
2007, 102–119. However, some of them contain major modifications of the original 
work of Heineccius.  
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Elementa iuris civilis secundum ordinem pandectarum284. In the latter, 
in the commentary on the amendments of bonae fidei and stricti iuris 
contracts, the jurist, developing the Roman law285, explained that 
the contracts of good faith could be drafted to the boundary with 
the contradiction to their nature286. Rationale provided in this con-
text, stipulating that the agreement contradicting the nature of the 
contract does not have legal effects287, permits us to conclude that, 
similar to A. Vinnius, J. Heineccius connected the boundary of  
a contract’s enforceability defined by its nature with its type. Such  
a way of thinking confirms the explanation presented in lecture on 
ius civile, based on the systematics adopted in Institutes, that a con-
tract, due to its name (nomen) and cause (causa), has a nature in 
which the legally binding obligation is rooted288.  
However, the edition of Institutiones iuris civilis Heineccianae289, 
published in 1800 and edited by Peter Waldeck, shows that the 
criterion of nature as the boundary to the freedom of contract, in-
troduced by J. Althusius, was also repeated and slightly developed 
in the usus modernus study of contract. In the indicated “amended 
and revised” edition of Institutiones, we read that the boundaries of 
the objects of contractual obligation (conventio)290 are imposed by 
nature and law. Similarly, an individual’s capacity to conclude  
a contract may be excluded by nature or law. The nature criterion 
________________ 
284 The work had 46 editions in the 18th and 19th centuries, see: Wardemann 
2007, 120–124.  
285 D.2,14,7,5.  
286 Heinnecius 1728, 119 (II, 14, §356):…Contractui b. f. adiectum, pro eius parte 
habetur, si in continenti adiectum sit (...) nec naturae contractus adversetur....  
287 Heineccius 1728, 119, (II, 14, §356).  
288 Heineccius 1770, 355 (III, 14, §776):.. Pactum ergo est conventio destituta nomine 
et causa, (id est, datione vel facto,) quae obligationem civilem sua natura producere posit; 
vel est nuda rei vel facti in futurum promissio. 
289 P. Waldeck was a professor of law in Göttingen. In 1828, the work was al-
ready used for lectures at the local university, see: Wardemann 2007, 114.  
290 Waldeck 1800, 377(III, 14, §583); provides a general definition of contract as 
a source of obligation: Constat omnis conventio legitima rei promissione ex parte unius et 
acceptatione promissi ex parte alterius....  
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was detached from the type of contract, in this case. The promise of 
an impossible performance, pertaining to a thing excluded from 
trading or immorality291, was indicated as contradictory to its na-
ture. In the same manner, nature was indicated as an obstacle to 
perform what one must perform anyway, a contract concluded by 
“minors or insane persons and conclusion of a contract by the deaf 
and mute using speech”292. Breaking the link between the nature of 
the contract clause with its type was therefore based on identifying 
nature with the fundamental premises of validity for ex contractu 
obligation. Compliance with nature, in this case, results in the fun-
damental reasonableness of the contract. This conclusion inspires 
the question regarding the productiveness of such an understand-




2.5. Search for the general nature of contract  
as what makes the agreement enforceable   
 
The sources indicate that the German gemeines Recht jurists of 
the second half of the 18th century, remaining under the influence 
of natural law, introduced a new area of application of the nature 
of contract concept in the systematic description of law. They com-
bined the notion of the nature of contract with the fundamental 
qualities of its reasonableness, specified in legal dogma since the 
Antiquity. In the commentary on Justinian’s Digest by Justus Hen-
ning Böhmer293 published by his son, Georg Ludwig Böhmer, the 
________________ 
291 Waldeck 1800, 378 (III, 14, § 584): In obiecto desideratur I. ut tum natura tum 
iure in potstate contrahentium positum sit a) Unde nullius momenti est, promissio rei quae 
nec est, nec esse potest b) rei commercio exemtae c) rei turpis... 
292 Waldeck 1800, 379 (III, 14, §585): In personis similiter necesse est, ut nec natura, 
nec iure conventionem inire impediantur. Natura impdiuntur qui eo quo necesse est modo, 
consensum declarare nequeunt, veluti sunt infantes et dementes in omni conventione a) 
surdi et muti in his, quae contrahuntur per verba solennia ore nuncupata ....  
293 A student of Stryk, influenced by Thomasius; see: Landau 2004, 506.  
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deliberations on De pactis are opened by the chapter entitled De 
natura conventionum. After the presentation of the definition of con-
tract294 as a unanimous declaration of real intent295, it discusses 
such issues as apparent contract296, conclusion of a contract as  
a result of fraud297, use of violence298, unconscionable coercion299, 
and error as to substantialia300. Next, the same chapter identified as 
suspicious such contracts that were concluded in fraud of the law301, 
gained an unlawful effect302, or breached the right of a third party303. 
Hence, the structure and contents of the chapter permit the conclu-
sion that J. H. Böhmer identified the nature of contract with the 
contract’s reasonableness as consisting in the fact that it must lead 
to the realisation of the true and unanimous intent of the parties, 
which is not in breach of the law.  
A similar way of thinking can be encountered in the paraphra- 
sing of J. Heineccius’ Institutes by Ludwig Julius Friedrich Höpfner, 
who, in the second half of the 18th century, was regarded as the 
greatest German civil lawyer at that time304. In one of the para-
graphs of De obligationibus, he distinguished the principles resulting 
from the nature of contract. In this fragment, he indicated that the 
contract is based on the agreement of the parties and cannot have 
consequences that the parties would not want. He explained that 
________________ 
294 Boehmer 1797, XXVII, 1, §2: Hae promissiones ut valeat, utaque pars in illas con-
sentire debet, quo vulgo acceptationem vocant: Promissiones utrinque acceptae dicuntur 
pacta seu conventiones.  
295 Boehmer 1797, XXVII, 1, §6: Consensus est declaratio voluntatis. Voluntatem au-
tem praecedere debent repraesentationes intelectus; nihil enim in voluntate est, quod non 
antea fuit in intelectu. Paciscentes igitur intellectus nec non voluntatis usu gaudeant 
oportet. 
296 Boehmer 1797, XXVII,1, §11.  
297 Boehmer 1797, XXVII, 1, §12. 
298 Boehmer 1797, XVII, 1, §14. 
299 Boehmer 1797, XXVII, 1, §15. 
300 Boehmer 1797, XXVII, 1, §16. 
301 Boehmer 1797, XXVII, 1, §17. 
302 Boehmer 1797, XXVII,1, §18. 
303 Boehmer 1797, XXVII,1, §19.  
304 Landsberg 1898, 442.  
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contractual obligations had been introduced for the people to as-
sure that the benefits they expected were guaranteed305. Therefore, 
compared to the work of Böhmer, this is a more synthetic identifi-
cation of the nature of contract, with the reasonableness inherent in 
the fact that the contractual obligation arises when the parties want 
and objectively can establish it. Such an understanding of the es-
sence of the nature of contract expressed, in line with the position 
of the natural law school, the freedom of contract principle. How-
ever, it did not bring new elements that set boundaries to the use of 
said freedom.  
Such general deliberations on the nature of contract are not pre-
sent in the work of Christian Glück that summarised the dogmatic 
accomplishments of usus modernus. When analysing this theme in 
the evolution of Romanistic legal science, it is worth noticing that 
the premises for the validity of the contract were connected, by 
Böhmer and Höpfner, with the nature of contract, that Glück col-
lected and discussed in detail in paragraphs 287 through 305 of De 
pactis306. From today’s perspective, this fragment of his work is 
regarded as the crowning accomplishment of usus modernus in the 
development of general theory of contracts307.  
 
 
2.6. Conclusions  
 
The connection of the nature of the contract with what is dog-
matically typical of it, clearly noticeable only in one Roman text308, 
later became an idea shaping this concept in the Romanistic legal 
________________ 
305 Höpfner 1803, 792 (III, 14, §733).  
306 Glück 1867. The jurist distinguished the following as the elements which 
impact the arising of a contractual obligation: capacity to conclude a contract (§288), 
declaration of intent (§289–291), existence of at least two parties (§292), fraud (§ 
293– 296), error (§297–299, pp. 141–166), unconscionable coercion (§301–301), sham 
contract (§302), certainty of terms (§303) and the possibility of performance (§304).  
307 Nanz 1985, 130.  
308 D.19,5,5,4 (Paul.).  
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science, from the Accursian Gloss to the extensive work of Glück. It 
brought about an original and permanent dogmatic heritage. The 
first element was the concept of naturalia contractus, already incor-
porated by the gloss. It was generally used to express the idea that 
the contents of a contract include what the parties agreed on, as 
well as the elements they did not cover but which are typical for 
the given type of contract. The jurists repeated for centuries, 
unanimously, that the parties may contractually modify the ele-
ments that qualified as naturalia. Since the 16th century, legal sci-
ence has been systematically distinguishing contracts as either fully 
corresponding to their nature or contracts that “deviate from their 
routine nature”, as a result of an agreement regarding naturalia. The 
gradual adoption of the freedom of contract principle in the ius 
commune did not change this way of understanding naturalia con-
tractus. In the 16th century, these elements started to be referred to 
as contractual provisions by implication. The approval of the free-
dom of contract principle gave, in this context, grounds to express  
a thought that the boundary of enforceability of agreements per-
taining to naturalia contractus is not to waive the principal purpose 
of the contract. The idea of Cujacius that the nature of the contract 
is comprised of substantialia and naturalia contractus synthetically 
expressed the second area of dogmatic accomplishments based on 
the connection of the nature of the contract with the contract's type. 
The methodological implications of this idea are elaborated by the 
belief of Donellus that “nature is not one and common for all con-
tracts but is characteristic of all types and distinguished one from 
the other”309.  
The sources help to illustrate the impact that these ideas had on 
the new, systematic model of describing the law of contracts which 
was applied since the 16th century. It was based on the conviction 
that explaining the nature of the contract consists primarily of de-
________________ 
309 Donellus 1763, XIII,I,2.  
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fining its individual types310. The permanence of such a method of 
elaborating on the nature of the contract in the tradition of ius com-
mune is illustrated by the comparison of Donellus’ commentary, 
which did not allow the freedom of contract, with the 17th century 
treatise of De Contractibus in genere by Petro de Ognate Vallisole-
tano, who, in line with the late scholasticism, recognised the free-
dom of contract and based it on the principle of commutative jus-
tice. Linking the nature of contract with the “qualities of a principal 
act”, noticed in the works of Glück summarising the accomplish-
ments of usus modernus, shows that such an understanding was also 
continued by the ius commune jurists who, in the description of con-
tracts, followed the systematic process of the Justinian’s Institutes 
or the Digest. The analysed 18th century monograph of Reibertopf’s 
De contractibus censualis natura shows that in the period of freedom 
of contract, the identification of the nature of the contract with its 
type provided a possibility to start research on the nature of the 
contract, which consisted in the description of fundamental dog-
matic qualities of new contracts that were unknown to ancient Ro-
man law.  
In the discourse of ius commune jurists, one can also encounter 
an idea, already noticeable in the Antiquity, that the nature of the 
contract may be understood as a criterion providing the boundaries 
to enforceability of atypical agreements incorporated into a contract. 
Let us remind the reader that in such statements of Papinian and 
then Ulpian, I have identified the “embryonic” form of the nature 
of the contract argument which drew attention to the objective or-
der which I defined as economic311. In the works of ius commune 
jurists, this criterion was understood differently. Connecting the 
nature of contract with its type, significant for the development of 
ius commune dogma, resulted in the fact that, from medieval works 
to the 18th century, one can encounter examples of this criterion 
________________ 
310 For weaknesses of the method that medieval jurists used to explain notions 
by defining them, see: Otte 1971, 117.  
311 See fn. 80.  
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being used to distinguish between individual types of contracts. 
The 16th century works of J. Cujacius and H. Donellus contain 
statements generalising the criterion of the nature of the contract as 
the boundary to the enforceability of contract. However, the actual 
possibility to disconnect this criterion from the type of contract can 
be seen in the work of the 16th century pioneer of the freedom of 
contract principle, Althusius. He defined these boundaries as the 
conflict with the nature of the contract or with the law. In spite of 
the fact that the freedom of contract principle was generally ac-
cepted in the 17th and 18th centuries’ usus modernus, the leading 
works did not propagate the use of the nature of the contract crite-
rion for setting the boundaries to this freedom. I have found the 
example of such a general application of the criterion of nature in 
the freedom of contract in the paraphrasing of Heineccius' Insti-
tutes, published at the end of the 18th century and edited by Wal-
deck. It brings to mind the linguistic practice noticeable in the 
statements of some 18th century, usus modernus jurists who were 
under the influence of the natural law idea. They identified the 
sense of the nature of contract with the contract’s reasonableness. It 
was seen in the fact that a contract can, and must, lead only to the 
realisation of a true and unanimous intent of the parties, one which 
is not in breach of the law. The detailed principles of reasonable-
ness thus indicated were, in further evolution of law, systematically 
distinguished as objective and subjective premises of the validity of 
contract or a legal transaction. Thus, one can generally conclude 
that the nature of the contract concept directed the attention of ius 
commune jurists at various aspects of the systematic order312 of the 
contract law. In such a manner of legal thinking, one can search for 
inspirations for distinguishing a general part of the law of obliga-
tions and building the specific part as a systematic description of 
individual types of contracts. To this description, naturalia were 
incorporated as elements of contents of specific types of contracts 
which are valid unless the parties excluded them. Just a casual 
________________ 
312 See fn. 81.  
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reading of the systematics of the 19th and 20th century civil codes 
shows the impact of the ius commune tradition on the adopted de-
scription of the law of obligations. Hence, a question arises regard-
ing the meaning of nature of the contract or nature of the obligation 
in the discussion which directly preceded the modern codifications 
of the civil law in Europe. The question about the further produc-
tivity of the nature of the contract criterion requires the considera-
tion of the purpose and the manner of incorporation to codes. The 
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3.1. Choice of civil codes analysed 
 
The connection of the nature of the contract clause with the sys-
tem reasonableness of contract law description, which is typical for 
ius commune jurists, is reflected in the development of the civil law 
tradition. Its development since the 17th century has consisted of 
the construction of the private law theory based on the idea of ra-
tionalism313. The next step on this evolutionary track was the emer-
gence of national civil codes which started at the end of the 18th 
century and lasted until the 20th century. Today they have a signifi-
cant influence on the legal landscape of countries that adhere to the 
civil law tradition. The evolution of private law presented in prior 
chapters provokes the following questions: To what extent and in 
what manner does the presence of the nature of the contract clause 
in legal argumentation impact codified contract law? Has the na-
ture of the contract criterion been incorporated into the code of 
contract law and to what end? These questions will be examined in 
________________ 
313 See Glenn 2000, 132-135.  
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the context of the selected European civil codes. Historical and 
comparative arguments show that two of these codes, the French 
Code Civil of 1804 and the German civil code of 1896, are marked 
by two specific qualities. They include the innovative character of 
these codes and the impact of these legal texts on the codification 
processes in other countries. The first of these codes is a product of 
rationalist natural law. The starting point for this stream of juris-
prudence was the conviction that, exercising reason, one can recog-
nise universal principles of law, adherence to which is beneficial for 
humanity.314 The impact of the Code Civil was a phenomenon of 
practical significance similar to that of the “reception” of Roman 
law.315 The French Code Civil was adopted in Belgium and Luxem-
bourg. It had been in force for almost one hundred years in the 
German lands of Rheinland and Badenia before BGB was adopted. 
In 1808 this law was also enacted by a legislature of the Duchy of 
Warsaw and remained in force in some parts of the Polish territo-
ries till 1946. The French Code Civil had a significant impact on the 
civil codes of Netherlands (1838)316, Italy (1865 and 1942), Romania 
(1865), Portugal (1867)317, Spain (1889) and Albania (1928).318 Code 
Civil influenced considerably many civil codes outside Europe.319  
The original form of the German civil code was influenced sig-
nificantly by Savigny’s opposition to the idea of the prompt codifi-
cation of civil law in Germany. In his famous polemics with Anton 
Friedrich Thibaut in 1814, he claimed that the swift adoption of the 
code would not give the Germans legal unity as it would mean the 
adoption of a solution that was accepted in only some German 
states. He saw the right path as being the “organic development” of 
________________ 
314 Grotius 1625, Prolengomena, 8. 
315 Koschaker 1947, 135-137; Zweigert, Kötz 1996, 98.  
316 In 1992 it was replaced with a new civil code.  
317 In 1867 it was replaced with a new civil code.  
318 After World War II it was gradually repealed by specific acts. For contract 
law it was in 1956.  
319 Zweigert, Kötz 1996, 108-117.  
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legal science common throughout the entire German nation.320 The 
concept that the “entire science of law is nothing else but the his-
tory of law”321 reflected the essence of the new outlook on Roman 
law. The ancient Roman legal texts were interpreted and system-
ised by the 19th century German pandectics and led to the emer-
gence of an original theory of private law. The achievements of the 
pandectistic school served as the basis for preparatory works for 
the German civil code which was adopted in 1896. 
The impact of the pandectistic dogmatics, and its main result, 
i.e. the German civil code of 1896, extended beyond Germany’s 
borders. It had an important impact on the science of private law in 
Austria, Switzerland, Italy, Greece, Russia and Poland. Its conse-
quences included changes in interpretation and amendments to the 
ABGB. Achievements of the pandectists and BGB were, aside from 
Code Civil, the important points of reference in the works on the 
Swiss law of obligations (1881); the Polish code of obligations of 
1933, which was largely incorporated in the civil code of 1964; the 
Greek civil code (1940); the Italian civil code of 1942 and the Portu-
guese civil code of 1966.322 The dogmatic solutions adopted in the 
Polish code of obligations were largely incorporated in the Polish 
civil code of 1964, which remains in force today. The pandectistic 
school and BGB had a direct impact on the 20th century codification 
efforts in all Central and Eastern European countries.323 BGB also 
had considerable influence in the Far East.324  
In addition to deliberations on the French and German civil 
codes, I will present new and little known examples of the incorpo-
ration of the nature of the contract clause into the Polish and Rus-
sian civil codes in the late 20th century.  
________________ 
320 Savigny 1814, 161.  
321 Savigny 1850, 2.  
322 See Zweigert, Kötz 1996, 107 and 146.  
323 Hamza 2002, 149-188.  
324 Zweigert, Kötz 1996, 153-155.  
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3.2. The nature of the contract clause  
in the French Code Civil 
 
3.2.1. The nature of the contract in the deliberations  
of Jean Domat and Robert J. Pothier  
 
The legal method that provided the basis for the French code 
was the so-called rationalist natural law. This breakthrough in 
thinking about law, typical of this stream of jurisprudence, was 
triggered primarily by lawyers who were not French: Hugo Grotius 
(1583 – 1645) and Samuel Pufendorf (1632 – 1694). De iure belli ac 
pacis by H. Grotius provides grounds for the conclusion that his 
understanding of the nature of the contract was different from that 
of the ius commune jurists. In discarding the division into nominate 
and innominate contracts, the jurist explained that the Romans 
singled out some contracts by naming the predominating types of 
transactions.325 He recognised the balance of the relationship be-
tween contracting parties that resulted from their conscious and 
voluntary will as a representation of the nature of the contract.326 
This style of reasoning suggests the link between the nature of the 
contract and the support of the legitimate expectations of the con-
tracting parties, which was noted as early as the argumentation of 
Ulpian and Papinian. This idea, however, was not elaborated.  
The seminal work of the 17th century French theory of the law 
of nature is the work of Jean Domat (1625 – 1696), Les loix civiles 
dans leur ordre naturel. The word nature is relatively frequently en-
countered in his description of contract law as one of the linguistic 
keys used for systemic presentation. Jean Domat, however, went 
beyond the catalogue of causae repeatedly referred to in the ius 
commune until the 16th century, which made a contract enforceable. 
He adopted the principle of freedom of contract and explained that 
the number of causae that correspond to various exchanges of 
________________ 
325 Grotius 1625, II,12,3. 
326 Grotius 1625, II,12,9 and II,12,26.  
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goods and services is infinite.327 However, like the ius commune 
jurists, he linked the nature of the contract with the types of con-
tracts328 Like Donellus and Petro de Ognate Vallisoletano before 
him,329 Domat also adopted an outline consisting of the presenta-
tion of typical agreements starting with an explanation of their na-
ture as a basis for the title “On contracts”.330 Consistently and in  
a manner reminiscent of mathematical algorithms, the presentation 
commences with definitions.331 They indicate the essential elements 
of a legally binding agreement and sometimes the function of the 
contract. The definitions are in French and Latin and are corrobo-
rated by Roman legal texts.332 
In the work of Domat, the nature of the contract is also under-
stood, as is the case in the ius commune, as a source of the elements 
________________ 
327 Domat 1777, , 27 (L. I, tit. I, sec. 1) and 48 (L I, tit. II, sec. 1,3 and 5.  
328 Domat 1777, 27 (L. I, tit. I, sec. 1, 1) : Ce mot de convention est un nom géneral, 
qui comprend toute sorte de contracts, traités et pactes de toute nature.  
329 See above: 65-68.  
330 Domat 1777, 27-47 (L. I., tit. I): De conventiones en general.  
331 Domat 1777, 48 (L. I, tit. II, sec. 1): De la nature du Contrat de vente, et comment 
il s’accomplit, 1 Definition de la vente; 87 (L. I, tit. IV, sec. 1): De la nature de louage,  
1 Définition du louage en général; 107 (L. I, tit. V, sec. 1): De la nature du prêt  à usage, et 
du précaire, 1 Définition du prét à usage ; 120 (L. I, tit. VI, sec. 1): De la nature du Prét,  
1 Définition du prét ; 126 (L. I, tit. VII, sec. 1): De la nature du Dépôt, 1, Définition du 
dépôt ; 135 (L. I, tit. VIII, sec. 1): De la nature du Société, 1 Définition de la société; 153  
(L. I, tit. IX , sec. 1): De la nature des Dots, 1 Définition de la dot ; 172 (L. I, tit. X, sec. 1): 
De la nature des donations entre-vifs, 1 Définition de la donation ; 183 (L. I, tit. XI, sec. 1): 
De la nature de l’usufruit, et droits de l’usufruitier, 1 Définition de l’usufruit ; 197 (L. I, tit. 
XII, sec. 1): De la nature des servitudes, de leurs especes, et comment elles s’acquierent,  
1 Définition ; 212 (L. I, tit. XIII, sec. 1): De la nature et de l’effet des Transactions,  
1 Définition ; 217 (L. I, tit. XIV, sec. 1): De la nature des compromis et de leurs effets,  
1 Définition du compromis ; 222 (L. I, tit. XV, sec. 1): De la nature des Procurations, 
Mandemens, et Commissions, 1 Définition de la procuration . Only the last three titles of 
the book which do not pertain to typical agreements (L. I, tit. XVII): Des Personnes 
qui exercent quelques commerce publics; (L. I, tit. XVII): Des Proxenetes, ou Entremet-
teurs; (L. I, tit. XVIII): Des Vices des Conventions  
332 E.g. Domat 1777, 48 ( L. I, tit. II, sec. 1, 1):... Si pecuniam dem, ut rem accipiam, 
emptio et venditio est (D.19,5,5,1); Sine pretio nulla venditio est (D.18,1,2,1); Pretium in 
numerata pecunia consistere debet (I. 3,23,2); Nec merx utrumque, sed alterum pretium 
vocatur (D.18,1,1).  
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of the contents of a contract which are not covered by express terms 
but are characteristic of a given type of contract.333 Domat justified 
this understanding of the contents of a contract with the opinion of 
Gaius, a Roman jurist, that in consensual contracts the duties of the 
parties also cover implied terms resulting from ex bono et aequo.334 
For example, in his description of a sales contract he juxtaposed the 
principles related to the risk of losing the thing sold before its trans-
fer; the time, manner and place of transfer of a thing; implied war-
ranties; and time and place of payment derived from the Roman 
law as such “natural consequences” (suites naturelles).335  
In addition to Domat, another French lawyer, Robert Joseph 
Pothier (1699 – 1772), constructed a theory used when drawing up 
Code Civil.336 It was he who was dubbed the “father of the Napole-
onic Code”.337 In treatises on selected types of contracts,  Pothier 
used an outline according to which each type of contract has its 
own nature. Like  Domat, he started to explain nature based on the 
definition and proceeded to detailed rules typical of the specific 
contract, which could supplement the expressed terms.338 The trea-
tises on selected types of contracts were preceded by the issue of 
Traité de obligationes, which contributed the systematic presentation 
of the general theory of contracts to legal science. In his definition 
of contract, R. J. Pothier rejected the limitation of enforceable 
agreements to the types of contracts specified by law, which was 
typical of Roman law. Based on the natural law, he defined a con-
________________ 
333 Domat 1777, 49 (L. I, tit. II, sec. 1, 7):... des engagemens qui suivent de la nature 
du contrat.  
334 Domat 1777,  49 (L. I, tit. II, sec. 1, 7): ...Ces engagements obligent comme le con-
tract même, dont ils sont les suites – De eo quod alterum alteri, ex bono et aequo praestare 
oportet (D.44,7,2,3)...  
335 Domat 1777, 49-55 (L. I, tit. II, sec. 2) and 55-57 (L. I, tit. II, sec. 3.  
336 Frėmont 1859, 147.  
337 Arnaud 1969, 112.  
338 E.g. Pothier 1772, 4 (II, sec. 1): De la nature du Contrat de Vente; Pothier 1831, 
173: De la nature du contrat de constitution de rente; 293: Ce que c’est que le contrat de 
louage; ce que c’est que le contrat de louage des choses, et quelle est sa nature; 375: De la 
nature du contrat de louage d’ouvrage et des trois choses nécessaires pour le former. 
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tract as an agreement through which one or more parties promise 
to transfer a thing, or to perform a certain act or to abstain from 
performing the same act.339 In the commentary on the contract thus 
defined, one encounters the notion of a nature of the contract. Poth-
ier included it as one of the principles of interpretation.340 It indi-
cates that expressions that are susceptible to having two meanings 
must be construed in a manner which “suits best the nature of the 
contract”.341 In explaining this principle, Pothier used the example: 
if the payment to lessor is 300, then it should be assumed that this 
amount is to be paid annually as it is in line with the “nature of  
a lease contract” in which the rent is paid every year.342 Using this 
style of argumentation, Pothier, differently from Domat, continued 
a more formalistic approach to the nature of contract. He narrowed 
the evaluation according to the nature of the contract down to the 
conformity with dogmatic structure of certain types of contracts.  
 
 
3.2.2. Inclusion of the nature of the contract clause  
as a criterion for interpretation in article 1135 of Code Civil 
 
The significance of the work of Domat and Pothier, was fre-
quently, and often in an exalted manner, emphasised over the 
course of the work on this part of Code Civil.343 The use of the 
________________ 
339 Pothier 1764, 8 (I, I, §1):..De là il suit que dans notre droit on ne doit point définir 
le contrat comme le définissent les interprétes du droit romain: conventio nomen habens a 
jure civili, vel causam ; mais on le doit définir: une convention par laquelle les deux parties 
réciproquement, ou seulement l’une des deux, promettent et s’engagent envers l’autre à lui 
donner quelque chose, ou à faire ou à ne pas faire quelque chose.  
340 Wording in line with the linguistic practice, according to which the explana-
tion of a nature of obligation is based on building definitions covering the essential 
dogmatic qualities which were included in the first volume of Traité des obligations: 
De la nature et des effets des obligations divisibles (IV,II,II), De la nature et des effets des 
obligations individuelles (IV,II,III) or De la nature des obligations pénales (V,I).  
341 Pothier 1764, 113 (I,I,VII): Lorsque, dans un contrat, des termes sont susceptibles 
de deux sens, on doit les entendre dans le sens qui convient le plus à la nature du contrat.   
342 Pothier 1764, 113 (I,I,VII).  
343 See e.g. Fenet 1836, 215 ff.; p. 313ff.; 414ff.  
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word nature in the preparatory works for the code is an example of 
the actual impact these jurists had on codification. It should be re-
membered that Domat and Pothier similarly transferred the model 
of systematic description of contract from ius commune, which con-
sisted of distinguishing the nature of individual types of contracts, 
constructing their definitions and contrasting them with the so-
called naturalia contractus. This model was formally continued in 
the systematics of description for some typical contracts in book 
three of the Code Civil.344 However, J. Domat’s and R. Pothier’s 
views differed as to how to “translate” the relationship between the 
type and nature of the contract into general principles of contract 
law. In the initial period of work on the French civil code, the fun-
damental role of such criteria as nature, equity and custom was set 
forth in article 11 of the draft, the so-called livre préliminaire. The 
draft was presented on 13 August 1800 by Portalis345  and was 
based on the derivative and limited character of the positive law.346 
The Preliminary Book (livre préliminaire) became the subject of 
many, at times critical, opinions of the Court of Cassation and 
courts of appeals, and was the subject of debate in the course of 
legislative process. For instance, the court of appeals in Lyon re-
ported that the “metaphysical and legal” maxims included in the 
draft might be useful in journalism or legislative discourse, but 
would prove dangerous in the text of the code.347 As a consequence, 
the livre préliminaire draft was replaced by the short Titre prélimi-
naire.  
________________ 
344 Cf. Book III, title VI, section 1. De la nature et de la forme de la vente; title XIII, 
section 1 De la nature et de la forme du mandat; title XIV chapter 1 De la nature et de 
l’étendue du cautionnement.  
345 See Wołodkiewicz 2009, 222 fn. 242: tit. V, art. 11 livre prėliminaire: Dans les 
matières civiles, le juge, a défaut de loi précise, est un ministre de d’équité. L’ équité est le 
retour à la loi naturelle, ou aux usages reçus dans le silence de la loi positive.  
346 Wołodkiewicz 2009, 222 – 223. 
347 Fenet 1827, 36.  
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The principle allowing judges to include natural law and cus-
tom into reasoning was, however, “smuggled” into regulations 
pertaining to the effects of obligations.348 Article 32 of the draft Title 
on contracts and conventional obligations was phrased as follows: 
“Agreements are binding not only as to what is therein expressed, 
but further as regards all the consequences which equity, usage or 
law attribute to an obligation by its nature”349. In the discussion 
before the Council of State, this provision was also criticised in  
a manner similar to the criticism of Livre préliminaire. Opinions 
were expressed that it created considerable uncertainty as to the 
contents of an obligation which might result in “grave inconven-
ience” (graves inconvéniens). In response to the criticism, the chair of 
the commission which prepared the draft used the example of natu-
ralia contractus, which was well known from ius commune and the 
work of Domat. François-Denis Tronchet noted that a warranty was 
an example of a duty of a seller that may exist in the absence of an 
express term since it resulted from the nature of sales.350 Article 32 
of the draft was adopted by the Council of State without any modi-
fications.351 In reference to the draft itself, it was noted during the 
discussion of the draft before the Tribunal that everything in con-
tracts is not explicitly expressed. Therefore, in the application of 
this rule judges are aided by separate codified principles of inter-
pretation352. This provision was included without any changes as 
article 1135 of the adopted Code Civil. The principles of interpreta-
tion of contract adopted by the members of the commission were 
taken, almost verbatim, from Pothier’s Traité des obligations.  
________________ 
348 See Deroussin 2007, 443.  
349 Fenet 1836, 8: Les conventions obligent non seulement à ce qui y est exprimé, mais 
encore à toutes les suites que l’équité, l’usage ou la loi donnet à l’obligation d’après sa 
nature.  
350 Fenet 1836, 54.  
351 Fenet 1836, 55. 
352 Fenet 1836, 320. 
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A change was made in the case of the above principle regarding 
expressions that are susceptible to having two meanings consisting 
of replacing nature du contrat with matiére du contrat in article 54.353 
Further legislative efforts reveal no doubts with respect to this 
modification.354 The provision has been included in Code Civil as 
article 1158 and in wording suggested by the commission.  
The work on the French civil code outlined above allow us to 
conclude that its authors did not recognise a linguistic difference 
between Domat and Pothier in the use of the nature of the contract 
clause as a basis for a more comprehensive discussion of the topic. 
We can suppose that, from the point of view of legislators, the deci-
sive element was that both “fathers” of the code were convinced 
that each type of contract had its own nature. The drafting of the 
general provisions of contract law was governed by the conviction, 
fixed in ius commune and noticeable in the discussion surrounding 
the code, that such an understanding of nature was the source of 
contract terms (naturalia contractus) that were not expressed in 
words but also not excluded by the parties. Article 1135 CC may 
thus be regarded, historically, as a continuation of the work of ius 
commune jurists. However, this article was included, following the 
views of J. Domat, in a general principle declaring the freedom of 
interpretation based on equity and custom.355 What is more, the 
wording adopted in article 1158 CC allows us to assume that, ac-
cording to the authors of Code Civil, this was to be the sole argu-
mentative function of the nature of the contract clause.  
 
________________ 
353 Fenet 1836, 23: Les termes susceptibles de deux sens doivent ètre pris dans le sens 
qui convient le plus à la matière du contrat.  
354 Fenet 1836, 67;422.  
355 See Deroussin 2007, 442–443. What draws attention is the fact that this pro-
vision contains a surviving and very general principle, which, in line with the 
original assumptions was to be included in the rejected Livre preliminaire.  
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3.3. Nature of the obligation and nature of the contract  
in the German civil code  
 
3.3.1. Nature of the contract in the pandectistic revolution  
of the private law system  
 
The methods and concepts developed by the pandectists gained 
fundamental significance for the drafting of the German civil code. 
It emerged and developed in Germanic countries during the 19th 
century as the creative renewal of private law theory based on Ro-
man law. The first element which distinguished it from the ius 
commune was the new, systematic approach to Roman law texts. 
This change was initiated in 1807 by publishing the work of Georg 
Arnold Heise, Grundniss eines Systems des gemeinen Civilrechts zum 
Behelf von Pandekten-Vorlesungen. The Roman legal texts became the 
basis  for the new general private law theory. Friedrich Savigny 
made the next step, which turned out to be a breakthrough. He 
rejected the study of Roman law applied in judicial practice of 
some Germanic countries356 and introduced a vision that Roman 
legal texts should be the foundation for building a general theory of 
private law typical for the German nation.357 The ideological foun-
dation of this programme was the concept that law must express 
the spirit of the nation. For Savigny, the historical source from 
which the German theory of private law should be derived was 
ancient Roman law. This resulted in yet another difference from ius 
commune. It consisted of a decisive separation of ancient Roman law 
from the achievements of the medieval and early modern legal 
studies. As a consequence, the development of private law theory 
in 19th century Germany was based fundamentally, on ancient law 
texts. Savigny regarded ius commune primarily as a chain of jurists 
and their work that passed on the knowledge of Roman law to 
modern times. The dogmatic tradition of the medieval and early 
________________ 
356 Koschaker 1947, 268.  
357 Koschaker 1947, 263.  
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modern study of law was used in 19th century Germany, mostly in 
the area of public law. The idea that the pan-German private law 
theory must be built on a foundation of ancient Roman law was 
Savigny’s argument against its swift codification. Thus, the pandec-
tistic school also opposed the theory of rationalist natural law on 
which the modern codes of that period were based, for example, 
Code Civil. The essence of the changes brought about by the pan-
dectists is well illustrated by the notion of contract and its place in 
the legal system. Arnold Heise separated the so-called “general 
part” (Allgemeine Lehren), and in it he defined the notion of a legal 
transaction (Rechtsgeschäft). The pandectists adopted the definition 
that legal transactions were lawful acts covering the expression of 
will intended to establish, amend or repeal legal consequences in  
a permitted manner and form.358 A contract became a type of a le-
gal transaction. Following Heise, the law of obligations was distin-
guished (Obligationen, Schuldverhältnisse) as one of the areas of pri-
vate law. It was further divided into a general part on obligations 
and parts covering specific obligations. The general part on obliga-
tions discussed contract as one of the sources of obligations. As 
part of the presentation on individual obligations, typical contracts 
were described. The concepts and legal principles appropriate for 
this dogmatic structure were substantiated, at times arbitrarily, by 
Roman legal texts. Savigny rejected the idea that the theory of con-
tract developed in the legal science of the 17th and 18th centuries 
referred solely to the source of obligations. He introduced the idea 
that the concept of contract belonged also to other areas of private 
and public law.359 In the creation a new systematic position of con-
tract in the private law, the pandectists brought into play the notion 
of naturalia contractus coined in ius commune. They used argumenta-
tion based on the nature of contract. It should be noted that in the 
language of ius commune jurists, this notion was the starting point 
________________ 
358 See e.g.: Mühlenbruch 1835, 197 (§ 101); Böcking 1852,  24 (§ 85); Arndt 1868, 
73 (§ 63); Windscheid 1875, 174 (§ 69); Regelsberger 1893, 478 (§ 135).  
359 Savigny 1840, 314 (§141); Savigny 1853, 7 (§52).  
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for the thinking that led to the systematic description of contract 
law. This scientific tradition was continued and further developed 
in the creation of the new system of private law started by 19th cen-
tury German legal theorists. Apart from that, the works of the pan-
dectists clearly demonstrate the application of the nature of the 
contract as an argument connecting the discussion of contract law 
with the economic purpose of transactions.  
 
 
3.3.1.1. Naturalia negotii and the content of contract 
 
Recognising a legal transaction as a central element of the 19th 
century German theory of private law gave rise to the generalisa-
tion of the pattern of the contents of contracts comprised of three 
elements, introduced in the Middle Ages. The notions of substan-
tialia, naturalia and accidentalia contractus were transformed into 
substantialia, naturalia and accidentalia of a legal transaction360 This 
model was adopted by Georg Friedrich Puchta,361  a jurist who 
played the key role in the development of a method consisting of 
building a formal system of legal notions (Begriffsjurisprudenz), 
which was fundamental for 19th century German legal science362. 
His contemporary, Christian Mühlenbruch raised the issue of the 
relation between essentialia, naturalia and accidentalia and nature 
taking into consideration the contents of a legal transaction. He 
limited the nature of a legal transaction to what was required for its 
validity. This idea was repeated in later pandectistic discussion by 
Karl Georg von Wächter.363 Christian Mühlenbruch explained natu-
ralia negotii in a more innovative and flexible manner than the ius 
commune jurists. He indicated that these were the elements of  
________________ 
360 Wening-Ingenheim 1831, 208 (§131).  
361 Puchta 1838, 41 (§45).  
362 Larenz 1991, 20.  
363 Similarly Wächter 1880, Vol. 1, 362 (§74).  
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a legal transaction which resulted from law or the nature of 
things.364 The argument with respect to the nature of things would 
permit, according to the then current understanding, the implica-
tion of the term in a legal transaction in a manner supplementing 
positive law, taking into account the practical rationality of the case 
under review.365  Pandectistic literature, however, predominantly 
regarded naturalia negotii as terms derived from law, which was 
similar to the thinking of ius commune jurists on naturalia contractus. 
This was expressed by the explanation that naturalia negotii were 
the elements of the content of legal transactions implied by cus-
tom366 or an act of law.367 Bernard Windscheid even juxtaposed 
naturalia negotii derived from the law itself with essentialia and acci-
dentalia negotii intended by the parties.368 In the pandectistic dis-
cussion of the contents of a legal transaction, two aspects of un-
derstanding nature in contract law clashed. On one hand, this 
discussion confirmed the permanence of the link between the 
nature of the contract and its type, the link existing from ius 
commune, in legal reasoning. On the other hand, they made natu-
ralia negotii an instrument for the implication of terms, which goes 
beyond the characteristic interpretation of a contract. In the system 
built by the pandectists, naturalia negotii could mean terms derived 
from regulations related to a specific type of contract and provi-
sions included in the general part. The assumption that various 
types of contract may have some naturalia negotii in common was 




364 Mühlenbruch 1835, 201 (§104).  
365 Cf. Radbruch 1960, 6.  
366 Keller 1861,  96 (§50).  
367 Wächter 1880, Vol. 1, 363 (§74); Bekker, 1886, 141 (§99); Regelsberger 1893, 
601 (§165).  
368 Windscheid 1875, ,231 (§85).  
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3.3.1.2. The nature of contract and the contract law outline 
 
Soon after its publication, the new systematics of law by  
A. Heise proved to be influential in the modification of a Roman 
law handbook by Anton Friedrich Justus Thibaut, which was im-
portant at that time.369. He put the argumentation used by some 
usus modernus jurists in a new context, which consisted of deriving 
the elements of the systematic description of contract law from the 
nature of contract370. Three levels of such description may be seen 
in the work of Thibaut. The first level was the so-called “general 
nature of contract”, which was a source of an obligation based on 
the freedom of contract principle. The structure of the section on 
contracts (Ueber Verträge insbesondere) included in the general part 
(Allgemeiner Theil) was a result of the declaration that “the general 
nature of contract” reveals itself upon answering three questions: 
who can enter into a contract? How must an agreement be made? 
What are the objects and effects of contracts?371 The second level 
consisted of combining contracts of different types according to 
their nature, taking into consideration the dogmatic or functional 
similarities. This is the basis for Thibaut’s claim that consensual 
contract comprised the “full nature of contract”.372 He argued that 
“by nature of contract” both parties to a bilateral contract are 
obliged the moment the obligation arises.373 The third, most de-
tailed level of description of contract law pertained to the “individ-
ual nature” of typical contracts.374 A distinct link between the na-
ture of the contract and its functional qualities was a novelty in 
relation to the language adopted by usus modernus jurists. This led 
to supplementing, and at times breaking, the traditional dogmatic 
schema. 
________________ 
369 Coderch, Sánchez-Ostiz 2004, 880.  
370 See above 87.  
371 Thibaut 1809, Vol. 1, 108 (§141).  
372 Thibaut 1809, Vol. 2, 267 (§854).  
373 Thibaut 1809, Vol. 1, 130 (§170).  
374 Thibaut 1809, Vol. 2, 266 (§853).  
98 
Let us turn to some examples from the works of the pandectists. 
In the works of Friedrich Karl Savigny, the link between the nature 
of the contract and its functional qualities can be seen in the delib-
erations on the simplicity of formation of some contracts. He de-
fined the absence of formal requirements when concluding sales 
and lease contracts as a consequence of their “special nature” ade-
quate to daily and customary trade.375 In another group of consen-
sual contracts of a “completely different nature”, he included man-
date and societas (partnership) contracts. In relation to these, he 
explained the ease of establishing a legal duty by the fact that the 
law limited any related risk by right of the mandator or partner to 
withdraw from the contract. 376  Among synallagmatic contracts, 
Ludwig Pforden separated those which, in line with their nature, 
require the previous performance of one of the parties, e.g. a lease 
or an emphyteusis.377 Friedrich Ludwig von Keller explained that 
the theory developed in Roman law regarding the nature of a sale 
was partly relevant for the entire scope of bilateral obligations.378In 
his comments on the performance of contract, Karl Georg von 
Wächter argued that the duty of parties to perform concurrently, 
unless otherwise agreed, was inherent in the “nature of non-
gratuitous contractual dispositions”. 379  Edward Hölder distin-
guished contracts, in line with their nature, with two opposing par-
ties from contracts without this kind of variance between parties.380 
Such use of the nature of the contract was not common in pandec-
tistic discourse. The examples presented show, however, that in 
their language, some pandectists returned to the connection of the 
nature of the contract with the qualities of its economic reasonable-
ness, which was a connection based on a number of ancient texts. 
However, as opposed to ancient times, such linguistic practice was 
________________ 
375 Savigny 1853, 226 ( §75). 
376 Savigny 1853, 225-226 (§75).  
377 Pforden 1840, 326.  
378 Keller 1861, 606 (§323).  
379 Wächter 1880, Vol. 2, 387 (§189).  
380 Hölder 1891, 220 (§42).  
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not limited to the argumentation in the hard cases. In the context of 
the pandectists’ discourse, it became one of the factors in the devel-
opment of the systematic order381 of contract law. This was ex-
pressed by various outlines of the presentation of contracts in the 
handbooks of the pandectists,382 and primarily in their distinction 
between a number of principles pertaining to contractual obliga-
tions. In the pandectists’ systematic description of obligations, the 
argumentation from the nature of things can also be seen.  
 
 
3.3.1.3. The nature of the contract and the nature of things  
in legal reasoning 
 
The reasoning based on the nature of things has been known 
since antiquity. In Rome, the formula of natura rerum was intro-
duced by Lucretius.383 Analysis of ancient Roman law has shown 
how this reasoning was adopted and developed by Roman jurists. 
The introduction of the nature of the contract clause into legal ar-
gumentation is rooted in this practice.384 The notion of the nature of 
things (Natur der Sache), which belongs to the humanities, was ap-
plied in academic discussion in the Middle Ages and modern times. 
This formula was also adopted in the German theory of private law 
in the 18th century385. Burkard Wilhelm Leist presented the broad-
est in the 19th century studies on this reasoning386. He criticised the 
fact that lawyers perceived reality through the patterns of Roman 
legal texts. Leist promoted the return of legal science to the Roman 
form, the essence of which he understood as focusing on issues 
related to life and economics.387 On the other hand, Savigny and 
Jhering emphasized the creative qualities of argumentation based 
________________ 
381 See fn. 81.  
382 See e.g. Pforden 1840, 302; Keller 1861, 431 (§220).  
 
384 See above 25.  
385 Marx 1967, 4.  
386 Radbruch 1960, 28.  
387 Leist 1854, 28 – 32; Radbruch 1960, 29.  
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on the nature of things in 19th century opinions which indicated 
them as a basis for building a systematic vision of law.388 Eventu-
ally, the pandectists were faced with a controversy as to the appli-
cation of the nature of things criterion in the interpretation of 
law.389 The views of Derburg are an example of the recognition of 
the usefulness of the nature of thing test within the area. He be-
lieved that any relationship in real life had an inherent “internal 
order” which could be referred to as the nature of things. He con-
cluded that, in the absence or ambiguity of a legal provision, a ju-
rist should refer to the nature of things and thus fill any gap in the 
law.390 In the doctrine of the law of obligations as constructed by 
the pandectists, this argumentation is observed when defining the 
place of performance, if the parties had not defined it. Roman law 
did not contain any general principles that specified such a place. 
Thus, defining it was one of the challenges faced by pandectists. 
Friedrich Karl Savigny accepted this challenge when discussing the 
territorial jurisdiction of courts in cases regarding the performance 
of an obligation. He shared a belief that jurisdiction should lie with 
the court that had territorial jurisdiction over the place of perform-
ance.391 In his detailed explanation of the matter, he stated that 
some actions are “by virtue of their nature related to a specific 
place” (e.g. the construction of a house or its lease) and this nature 
indicates the place of performance of the obligation.392 Christian  
F. Mühlenbruch made a general declaration that if the place of per-
formance was not specified, it would be determined based on the 
“nature of the legal relationship” (Natur des Rechtsverhältnisses). He 
explained that this formula meant either the place where the obli-
gation could be performed or a place in which the performance 
would not cause unintended and unexpected inconveniences or 
________________ 
388  See Radbruch 1960, 7 .  
389 Windscheid 1875, 61 fn. 1a (§23).  
390 Dernburg 1892, 87 (§38).  
391 Savigny 1849, 209 (§370).  
392 Savigny 1849, 213 (§370).  
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burdens for the other party.393 Bernard Windscheid, like Savigny, 
indicated that the place of performance could be determined by its 
nature (Natur der Leistung) only when the performance of the obli-
gation in a different place was not possible.394 Thus the pandectics 
failed to develop a uniform understanding of nature as a criterion 
indicating the place where the obligation must be performed. In  
a narrow sense, it was identified with a practical obviousness. In  
a broader sense pandectists linked the nature of the obligation with 
the evaluation of economic reasonableness. From the point of view 
of the study of the nature of the contract argument, it is relevant 
that references to the nature of things resulted in the presence of 
the word nature’ in the rules indicating the place of performance of 
the obligation.  
 
 
3.3.2. Inclusion of the nature of the legal relationship as a criterion 
for interpretation with respect to the German civil code 
 
The pandectistic school had  significant influence on the Com-
mittee that prepared the German civil code commencing in 1881. 
The pandectistic approach to contract in the German system of pri-
vate law proved to be decisive for the systematics of the code (BGB) 
adopted by the Reichstag in 1896. The notions of naturalia negotii or 
nature of the contract, which were present during the development 
of the system, were not, however, included in the statute which 
formed the basis for the interpretation of contracts or set the 
boundaries of the freedom of contract. These functions are per-
formed by the good faith (Treu und Glauben)395 and good customs 
clauses (gute Sitten).396 The notion of naturalia negotii as an instru-
ment of interpreting the contents of a contract remained significant 
in the German theory of private law.397 In the text of the code 
________________ 
393 Mühlenbruch 1838, 489 (§466).  
394 Windscheid 1891, 89 (§282). 
395 See § 157 and 242 BGB.  
396 See § 138 BGB.  
397 E.g. Flume 1992, 80; Bork 2006, Schellhammer 2008, 959.  
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adopted in 1896, the nature of the legal relationship (Natur des 
Schuldverhältnisses) clause is found only once. It is included in the 
provision determining the place where the obligation is to be per-
formed.398 Such a limited transfer of the notion of nature to the text 
of the code probably resulted from the growing importance of legal 
positivism. The legal positivism reluctantly permitted argumenta-
tion based on the nature of things in statutory interpretation and 
filling legal gaps399. This positivistic approach considerably limited 
the possibility of developing a tendency, noticeable in the work of 
the pandectistics, to apply the nature of the contract as an instru-
ment that facilitated the inclusion of ideas concerning the economic 
reasonableness of a contract in legal argumentation. In this context, 
a question arises: Why was the nature of the legal relationship 
adopted in article 269 BGB? 
In September 1882, the Committee drafting the German civil 
code went on to work on a draft provision pertaining to the place 
of performance of an obligation. The first paragraph of this work 
opened with a principle in line with which a debtor should perform 
the obligation in the place implied by the nature and manner of 
performance (Natur und Beschaffenheit der Leistung) or which is de-
termined in the content of a legal transaction.400 Further, part of this 
paragraph related to cases in which the obligation could be per-
formed in a number of places and where the parties did not specify 
the place of performance. In such cases the performance must be 
made in the place set by the nature of obligation (Natur des Schuld-
verhältnisses) or by the presumed intention of the parties.401 If none 
of the criteria provided a clear answer, the next paragraph of the 
draft set the place of performance as the debtor’s place of residence 
at the moment of performance of the obligation and, in the case of 
payment, as the creditor’s residence.402 In the rationale for this ex-
________________ 
398 § 269 BGB.  
399 Radbruch 1960, 8.  
400 Schubert 1990, 815. 
401 Jackobs, Schubert 1978, 181.  
402 Jacobs, Schubert 1978m 182.  
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tensive regulation, the absence of general principles of Roman law 
regarding the place of performance was stressed, as were the vari-
ety of solutions adopted in “new legislation”.403 The eclecticism 
typical of this draft was also expressed by the manner in which the 
nature clause was introduced. The notion of the nature of the per-
formance (Natur der Leistung) included in the first part of the pro-
posed paragraph was adopted from  Savigny and Windscheid. In 
the draft, as in the works of said lawyers, this meant the attribute of 
a performance due to which a duty may be performed in one place 
only (e.g. conveyance of real property may only be carried out 
where the property is located).404 The nature of the obligation crite-
rion adopted later in the paragraph was connected, in the rationale, 
with solutions adopted in certain statutes, e.g. the Prussian Land-
recht, the Austrian civil code, and the German commercial code.405 
In the discussion of the draft, doubts were raised regarding the 
editorial correctness of the nature clause included in the provi-
sion.406 As a consequence, article 229 of the draft code adopted by 
the first committee omitted the  concept of the nature of the per-
formance. What remained was the nature of the obligation criterion 
(Natur des Schuldverhältnisses), applied jointly with the premise of 
presumed intention in cases in which the place of performance of 
the obligation was not prescribed by the statute, legal transaction or 
the manner of the performance (Beschaffung).407 It was emphasised 
that the justification of such a model was based on its concurrence 
with the “latest legislation”, as well that this is the better solution 
than the rule adopted in article 1247 of the Code Civil. This domi-
nance was demonstrated by the flexibility resulting from the nature 
of the obligation clause, which permitted the taking into considera-
tion of the practical sense of individual obligations.408 This position 
________________ 
403 See Schubert 1990, 818.  
404 Schubert 1990, 817. 
405 Schubert 1990, 823.  
406 Jacobs, Schubert 1978, 182.  
407 Jacobs, Schubert 1978, 187.  
408 Schubert 1990, 824.  
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was not challenged in the course of the legislative process in which 
the linguistic definition of the place of performance of the obliga-
tion was being refined.409 As a consequence, article 269 BGB as 
adopted by the Reichstag places the flexible nature of the obligation 
criterion over the arbitrary criterion of the place of the debtor’s 
residence as the place of non-pecuniary performance. Thus, the 
only instance of the inclusion of the nature of the obligation clause 
in the German civil code broke with the typical linguistic and ar-
gumentative practice of ius commune. It preserved in the code the 
reasoning that connected the nature of the obligation with its prac-
tical sense; reasoning which was being revived in the 19th century. 
In the text of the code it was, obviously, limited to the rule specify-
ing the place of performing the obligation. It gained broader mean-
ing in the deliberations regarding the notion of the nature of things 
surrounding the German science of law dating back to the first half 
of the 20th century.410 This is illustrated by a thesis of Coing, who 
concluded that the nature of things, with regard to typical transac-
tions such as a lease or sale, was independent from statutory law. It 
had an economic structure covering the interests and expectations 
typical of a party to a contract.411 This approach to the nature of the 
contract clause turned out to be significant for the development of 
German law in the second half of the 20th century and the amend-
ment to BGB in 2001.  
  
 
3.3.3. The inclusion of the nature of the contract clause  
by amendment of the German civil code of 2001 
 
The March 1956 judgment of the Supreme Court of the Federal 
Republic of Germany served as the precedent that inspired the in-
troduction of the nature of the contract as one of the criteria for the 
________________ 
409 Jacobs, Schubert 1978, 187.  
410 Stratenwerth 1957, 21. 
411 Coing 1950, 121.  
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control of standard terms in the Act of 9 December 1976.412 The 
starting point for the judges’ rationale in the case was the observa-
tion that a contract for towing a ship may be formatted as a contract 
to perform a particular piece of work, a freight contract or a service 
contract. The decision was grounded on the principle that regard-
less of the type of contract chosen by the parties, the debtor always 
has the “cardinal obligation” to provide a ship that is seaworthy. 
We can see the ratio decidendi of this solution in the principle that 
the economic reasonableness of a contract may influence the free-
dom of the parties to formulate the contents of a contract.413 Such 
reasoning, based initially on the good customs and good faith 
clauses of the German civil code proved useful in controlling the 
increasingly popular practice of using standard form contracts.414  
Paragraph 9 of the Act of 1976, which is rooted in this tradition, 
stipulates that provisions in standard business terms are invalid if, 
contrary to the requirement of good faith, they unreasonably 
prejudice the other party to the contract. Section 2 (2) of this para-
graph specifies that such unreasonableness is deemed to exist when 
the essential rights or duties inherent in the nature of the contract 
are limited to such an extent that the attainment of the purpose of 
the contract is jeopardised.415 This application of the nature of the 
contract clause was also a novelty in the area of the control of stan-
dard form contracts.416 The entry of this provision into force trig-
gered an academic discussion regarding its interpretation. In line 
with the Act, nature of the contract was the criterion based on 
which judges controlled standard terms. Hence, the question of 
what a judge should use as the basis for applying the clause be-
came significant in practice. The views demonstrated at that time 
can be divided into two groups.  
________________ 
412 Wolf, Horn, Lindacher 1994, 360; Hoyningen-Heune 1991, 135.  
413 NJW 1956, 1065.  
414 See e.g. NJW 1971, 1036; NJW 1973, 1878.  
415 Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen of 9 De-
cember 1976.   
416 See Schubert, Schmidt, Regge 1992, XXVIII.  
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The centre of gravity of the first group was an emphasis on the 
economic reasonableness of a judge’s assessment. The justification 
for such reasoning was seen in the origin of the provision.417 This 
idea animated by the notion that “the nature of the contract is de-
fined by the interests that were reasonably included in the contract 
and should be protected”.418 This line of thought was crowned by  
a study of AGBG paragraph 9, section (2)(2) based on the law and 
economics approach. The research of Beimowski confirmed that 
control based on paragraph 9 AGBG was in fact reduced to the 
economic core of the contract as this control covered the assessment 
of the reasonableness of the allocation of risks and interests. On 
these grounds he criticised the editing of said provision.419  He 
claimed that the nature of the contract clause was as ambiguous as 
good faith or significant detriment. For the sake of legal certainty, 
he suggested that this provision of the Act be replaced with specific 
economic implications one should consider when assessing con-
tractual terms.420  
The quality that linked the second group of views was the un-
derstanding of the nature of the contract as a normative model 
guiding the judge’s assessment. The methods of constructing said 
model were different. The method of reasoning closest to the legal 
practice, known already from ius commune, was to use the leading 
type of contract as a standard for control.421 In cases when such an 
approach yielded no solution, it was recommended that the judge 
should consider the hypothetical intention of the parties and make 
an assessment from the point of view of justice.422 An original at-
tempt to link the ius commune tradition with the economic reason-
ableness of contract was made by Jürgen Oechsler. He suggested 
that judges adopt the purpose of a contract as intended by the par-
________________ 
417 Stein 1982, 115.  
418 Wolf, Horn, Lindacher 1994, 361.  
419 Beimowski 1989, 35.  
420 Beimowski 1989, 36.  
421 Hoyningen-Heune 1991,138.  
422 Hoyningen-Heune 1991,138; Becker 1986, 317.  
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ties as a starting point for building a normative model covering 
naturalia contractus relevant for the purpose.423  
Despite these methodological discrepancies, the views indi-
cated have one significant thing in common. In line with the juris-
prudence on which the provisions are based, they adopt a view 
that a judge may be guided by principles that are not expressed in 
the content of a contract or statute in argumentation based on the 
nature of the contract. Obviously, it remained unclear as to what 
grounds the judge was to construe these principles and what 
method was to be used. However, such a level of ambiguity was 
satisfactory for the German legislature.  
As part of efforts undertaken in 2002 to modernise the German 
law of obligations, the linguistic formula used in paragraph 9 (2)(2) 
AGBG was copied into the Civil Code as paragraph 307 (2)(2). The 
vulnerability of this equilibrium is illustrated by the view ex-
pressed after the amendment of the Code that the adoption of the 
nature of the contract clause was a relic of the focus of attention on 
the typical contracts period, something which lost importance with 
the increase in the number of mixed contracts.424 Shortly after the 
amendment of BGB, a controversy arose as to whether and to what 
extent the adoption of the linguistic formula of paragraph 9 (2)(2) 
AGBG resulted in a change of meaning.425 Doubts about the utility 
of nature of the contract clause expressed an opinion that a differ-
ence between items 1 and 2 of section 2 of paragraph 307 BGB is 
hard to find as both stipulate a significant limitation of rights and 
duties which is not compatible with the essential principles of the 
________________ 
423 Oechsler 1997, 319 – 320. In my view, this is not correct historically. The no-
tion of naturalia contractus was introduced to indicate elements of contracts result-
ing from the law and not built by interpretation of a judge, as was assumed by 
Oeschler.  
424 Kothe, Micklitz, Rott, Tonner, Willingmann 2002,216.  
425 Kothe, Micklitz, Rott, Tonner, Willingmann 2002,216; they believe that by 
being incorporated in the code, the provision gained new meaning; Lorenz, Riehm 
2002, 56; believes that the amendment of the law of obligations did not basically 
alter the general clause from article 9 AGBG.  
108 
statutory provision.426 These first opinions on the inclusion of the 
nature of the contract clause in  the BGB provide yet further con-
firmation of the difficulties in making a practical connection be-
tween the nature of the contract notion and the non-legal objective 
criteria for contract assessment. This difficulty had been apparent 
throughout the centuries-long discussions of ius commune jurists. 
The question of what conclusions may be drawn in this respect 
from the German jurisprudence and current academic discussion 
still needs to be elaborated.427 At this point, let us turn to the appli-
cation of the notion of nature in the drafting of provisions on con-
tract law in other civil codes.  
 
 
3.4. Typical uses of the term nature in the linguistic  
formulation of contract law in 19th and 20th  
centuries codes 
 
Study of the Code Civil and BGB reveal two uses of the term 
nature in the drafting of the statutes that govern obligations. The 
term was used as a criterion for interpreting the contents of a con-
tract in France (art. 1135 CC) and resolving doubts as to the place of 
performance of the obligation in Germany (§ 269 BGB). The Ger-
man theory of private law shows, moreover, that the absence of the 
term nature from the BGB as the criterion for interpretation of con-
tents of contract does not prohibit the fixed use of the term naturalia 
negotii in interpretation of the BGB.  
A reading of a number of other European civil codes from the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries permits one to state that there was 
no linguistic rigorism in the use of the word nature when drafting 
the law of obligations in the codification process. However, one can 
see some regularity in this linguistic practice. Historically, the 
source of the first regularity is the tradition of ius commune. This 
________________ 
426 Basedow 2003, 1177 – 1178.  
427 See below 132-140.  
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regularity consists in the connection of nature with the type of  
contract and in the use of the notion of naturalia contractus in the 
interpretation of the contents of certain types of contracts. Articles 
1135 CC, 1258 CCE and article 2, section 2 of the OR allow the addi-
tion of implied terms based on the nature of an act. In the interpre-
tation of article 1374 CCI, which is the basis for the implication of 
implied terms in line with the law, customs and equity, one can 
encounter the view that this provision is based on the naturalia con-
tractus principle, in line with which the contract has consequences 
typical of the type regulated in law, as well as a specific type high-
lighted during interpretation.428 The direct source of the second of 
the isolated tendencies to use the notion of nature, is the theory of 
contract interpretation developed by Pothier. Under this theory, he 
formulated a principle according to which an ambiguous term will 
be construed in the manner which best suits the nature of the con-
tract. This was the foundation of article 1158 CC. Through the ap-
plication of the nature of contract clause, it is clearly continued in 
article 1286 CCE and article 1369 CCI. The third distinguishable 
tendency results from the introduction of reasoning based on the 
nature of things into the legal language. The modern discussion of 
the principles of performance introduced the criteria of nature of 
the transaction (Natur des Geschäftes) and nature of the obligation 
(Natur des Schuldverhältnisses). The first instances can be found in 
article 905 ABGB, which was one of the inspirations for article 269 
BGB as specified above. Similar phrasing can be found in article 316 
of the Code of the Russian Federation of 1994. Reasoning based on 
the nature of things is also included in some codes in the context of 
specifying the time for performance of an obligation429 or impedi-
ments to the transfer of debts.430 This limited presentation already 
shows that the idea recurring in statements regarding the interpre-
tation of the term of nature is to stress the objective character of the 
________________ 
428 Rescigno 2003, 1637.  
429 See § 1418 ABGB. 
430 Art. 164, sec. 1 OR.  
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assessment criteria it represents.431 Some connected this objectivity 
with the dogmatic structure of contract types.432 Others linked it to 
seeking “the economic logic behind the agreement of parties”,433 or 
to the “reconstruction of the risks and benefits pattern determined 
by the parties to the contract”.434 This suggests that the alternative, 
which is visible from a broad historical perspective, between link-
ing the nature of the contract to its economic435 or systematic436 
reasonableness returned in the interpretation of modern codes. 
With the aim of providing a more thorough assessment of linguistic 
intuition, it is worth including two instances of the use of the na-
ture of the contract clause introduced to the Polish and Russian 
codes in the late 20th century. These changes stem from the dog-
matic formulation of the freedom of contract principle by lawyers 
educated under communist regimes, who adjusted the civil law to 
a market economy.437   
 
 
3.5. The feature (nature) of the legal relationship  
as a limitation on the freedom of contract pursuant  
to the amendment of the Polish civil code of 1990  
 
The criterion of nature was adopted in the Polish unification 
and codification of the law of obligations in 1933. As in the Aus-
trian and German civil code, article 190 § 1 of the KZ served to de-
fine the place of performance by reasoning based on the nature of 
things.438 The Civil Code of 1964, which superseded this codifica-
________________ 
431 Cf. Bydlinski 1973, 286; Cendon 1991, 600; Galgano 2007, 433; Rodriguez 
Marin 2000, art.1286.  
432 Puig Brutau 1978, 246.  
433 Honsell, Vogt, Wiegand 2003, 68. 
434 Cendon 1991, 600.  
435 See fn. 80.  
436 See fn. 81.  
437 See Dajczak 2011,. 50-52.  
438 Article 190 §1 KZ: The debtor must perform an obligation in the place speci-
fied in the contract or implied in the nature of obligation.  
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tion, repeated this principle of defining the place of performance of 
an obligation. However, the word nature was replaced by fea-
ture.439 The nature clause was introduced to the Code by a provi-
sion that was added in September 1990, shortly after the change in 
political regimes. “Parties forming a contract may arrange their 
legal relationship at their discretion so long as the content or pur-
pose of the contract is not contrary to the (features) nature of the 
relationship, the law and the principles of social coexistence”440.  
The introduction of the nature of the legal relationship as of one 
of the boundaries to the freedom of contract was not preceded by 
any discussion in the literature or public knows discussion in the 
Codification Committee which drafted the provision.441  The as-
sumption that the legislature included this criterion in anticipation 
of the need to protect against the abuse of the freedom of con-
tract442 brings to mind the beginnings of the principle of the free-
dom of contract in the private law. It should be remembered that 
Johannes Althusius, one of the pioneers who introduced this prin-
ciple to usus modernus at the turn of the 17th century, marked its 
boundary by any contradiction with the nature of the contract or 
law.443 In the case of usus modernus, the law of nature school, the 
pandectistics and the interpretation of article 3531 PolKC, this did 
not result in a uniform understanding of the nature of the contract. 
The controversies that arose regarded the purpose and method of 
the use of this clause. In the opinions presented in the first years 
following the entry of this provision into force, the two patterns of 
understanding the nature of the contract, known from the ius com-
mune, returned without any references to the civilian tradition. The 
first pattern consists of the link between the nature and type of 
contract, known from the Middle Ages. The second represents the 
view, apparent in legal reasoning since the 18th century, which 
________________ 
439 Article 454 § 1 PolKC.  
440 Article 3531 PolKC.  
441 Trzaskowski 2005, 247; Machnikowski 2005, 313.  
442 Trzaskowski 2005, 314.  
443 See above 74. 
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connects nature with what makes an agreement enforceable. Join-
ing these two positions resulted in distinguishing two levels of 
generality in the application of the nature of the contract clause.444 
Linking nature to the type of contract was permitted as a narrower 
meaning of the nature of the contract as specified in article 3531 
PolKC. It was ascribed the function of a distinguishing criterion to 
specify whether the rules related to a specific type of contract were 
compulsory (ius cogens)445  or to determine precisely the specific 
allocation of risks and benefits.446 Moreover, inspired by the charac-
teristic German law usage of the nature of the contract clause as a 
criterion for control of standard form contracts, another position 
was developed. This inspiration led to a proposal to regard the 
nature of the legal relationship in article 3531 PolKC as  
a general clause that permits an assessment of the validity of con-
tracts from the point of view of the principle of justice.447 The pro-
tagonists of such an understanding of the nature of the contract 
clause link it primarily to consumer contracts.448 This way of think-
ing was brought about by the view that the nature of the legal rela-
tionship clause may, in civil law, have a protective function similar 
to that of the rule of law principle in the Constitution of Poland.449 
In the 21st century the issue of whether and to what extent the na-
ture of the legal relationship may limit the freedom of contract 
based on argumentation detached from positive law became the 
centre of gravity in the academic discussion of the “nature of the 
legal relationship” criterion as specified in 3531 PolKc.450 This Polish 
academic discourse is yet another example of the difficulties the 
________________ 
444 Safjan 1993, 15-16.  
445 Safjan 1993, 16.  
446 Trzaskowski 2005,  372.  
447 See above 106.  
448 Łętowska 1999, 368; Traple 1997, 237: postulates that the solution adopted 
by the Polish legislator is too far-fetched and may pose a threat to the principle of 
the freedom of contract.  
449 Guść 1997, 20.  
450 Radwański 2002, 235; Machnikowski 2005, 324; Trzaskowski 2005, 349.  
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dogma of private law has in disconnecting from the linking of the 
nature of the contract with its type, which was fixed in the ius com-
mune. These difficulties are confirmed by the widely accepted 




3.6. Nature of mixed contract clause (существо 
смешанного договора) in the 1994 civil  
code of the Russian Federation 
 
The introduction of the freedom of contract principle after the 
change of the political regime in Russia has been named as one of 
the greatest democratic achievements in the process of political 
transformation.451 The Russian Civil Code of 1994 separately regu-
lates the freedom to enter into a contract, and freedom to make up 
its express terms452 The regulation pertaining to the other aspect of 
contractual freedom indicates a possibility of concluding a contract 
which is not a type of contract defined by law.453 The Russian legis-
lature has decided that if the contract concluded by the parties cov-
ers the elements of a number of contractual types, then these ele-
ments are governed by the provisions pertaining to specific types. 
Pursuant to article 421, section 3 of the RusKC, such an application 
of provisions may be difficult due to a contradiction with the inten-
tion of the parties or the nature of a mixed contract. As a boundary 
to the freedom of contract, Russian theory of private law relies on 
peremptory norms (ius cogens).454 This is accompanied by an open-
ness to a relatively far-fetched statutory limitation of this freedom, 
justified by the opinions of 19th century Russian jurists.455 This con-
________________ 
451 Танага 2003, 10.  
452 Cf. Танага 2003,53.  
453 Art. 421 sec. 2. RusKC. 
454 Танага 2003, 170.  
455 Танага 2003, 120.  
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text shows even more clearly that the nature of the contract clause 
included in article 421, section 3 of the RusKC serves only as  
a means to evaluate the permissibility of the application of provi-
sions pertaining to typical contracts to atypical contracts. In prac-
tice, they may be applied to the removal of doubts regarding the 
contents of a contract.456 The Russian academic debate presents no 
deeper reflection on the meaning of the nature of mixed contract. 
From a broader historical and comparative perspective, one may 
regard the introduction of this criterion to the Russian Civil Code 
as yet another “embryonic” expression of linguistic intuition con-




3.7. Conclusions  
 
The connection of nature with the type of contract, known from 
the ius commune, was continued in the systematic description of 
types of contracts by Domat and  Pothier. On the other hand, the 
academic discussion which the Code Civil and the German Civil 
Code  stemmed directly from brought some innovations to the use 
of the nature of the contract argument. There were statements that 
led to making the understanding of naturalia contractus, as it has 
been known from ius commune, more flexible. Such statements were 
illustrated by the ideas of Domat, who connected the “natural con-
sequences” (suites naturelles) with what results from ex bono et 
aequo,457 and the view of Mühlenbruch, who included the elements 
of a legal transaction resulting from the law or the nature of things 
in naturalia negotii.458 
________________ 
456 Танага 2003, 170.  
457 Domat 1777, 49 (L. I, tit. II, sec. 1, 7):...Ces engagements obligent comme le con-
tract même, dont ils sont les suites – De eo quod alterum alteri, ex bono et aequo praestare 
oportet (D.44,7,2,3)...  
458Mühlenbruch 1835, 201 (§104).  
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In the 19th century German theory of private law, references to 
the nature of contract also brought about creative development of 
the practice of the systematisation of factors that can determine the 
validity of contracts. One good example is the handbook of Anton 
Friedrich Justus Thibaut of 1809. He separated three levels of gen-
erality of the nature of contract. The most general level covered the 
issues which were included in the general part of civil law. The 
second level was aimed at capturing the fact that contracts, “due to 
their nature”, may be similar. The last level specified by Thibaut 
covered the “individual nature" of typical contracts. In the German 
pandectics, one may also find statements in which the use of the 
nature of the contract notion was explicitly independent from the 
type of contract and reflected the practical purpose of transactions. 
An example of such linguistic practice would be the words of Karl 
Georg von Wächter, who argued that in the “nature of non-
gratuitous contractual dispositions” dwelled a principle which 
stipulated that in the absence of a different agreement of the parties, 
performances should be made simultaneously.459 
The results of discussions in which the nature of the contract 
was related to a systematic order460 of law were broadly reflected in 
civil codes. In the original text of the French and German civil codi-
fications, the criterion of the nature of the contract itself was men-
tioned only once. It was included in article 1135 of the CC, which 
stipulated the incorporation of the natural consequences of a con-
tract into its content and paragraph 269 of the BGB, which deter-
mined the place of performance of an obligation in accordance with 
its nature. The limited inclusion of the criterion in the respective 
codes was therefore a change from the linguistic practice of ius 
commune jurists. In France, this created the possibility of going be-
yond the terms implied in law (naturalia contractus), towards the 
implication of terms in fact based on the economic reasonableness 
test. In paragraph 269 of the German Civil Code , the nature of the 
________________ 
459 Wächter 1880, Vol. 2, 387 (§189).  
460 See fn. 81. 
116 
obligation criterion indicates the only practically reasonable place 
of performing an obligation. The connection of the nature of the 
contract with its economic meaning, noted in the discussion of an-
cient jurists and known from the views of 19th century pandectists, 
was used as a criterion to control standard terms in the German Act 
of 1976.461 Since the amendment of the German Civil Code in 2001, 
it has been included in paragraph 307(2)(2) of the BGB. In the 1990s, 
potentially new argumentative possibilities were created by the 
introduction of the nature of the relationship clause as one of the 
boundaries to the freedom of contract in article 3531 PolKC and the 
inclusion of the notion of the nature of mixed contract in Russian 
law as a criterion for the application of statutory rules to innomi-
nate contracts (article 421, section 3 of the RusKC). These changes 
in law may be regarded as an expression of a conviction or an intui-
tion that the nature of the contract argument may be productive 
regardless of the contractual type standard. This does not mean 
that the ius commune achievements have been contested. Their du-
rability is confirmed by the presence of naturalia contractus or  
a more general phrasing of naturalia negotii in the today’s theory of 
private law. The changes in law show that we are dealing with at-
tempts to find new productivity in the nature of the contract crite-
rion. This search is connected with the question of how to under-
stand this criterion in isolation from the type of contract. To date, 
historical and comparative deliberations draw attention to eco-
nomic reasonableness, but also reveal how difficult it is to intro-
duce such a template in practice. It remains to be seen, then, what 
the interpretation of the nature of the contract criteria by academics 
and judges brought, in this respect, to the French, German and Pol-
ish Codes.  
 
________________ 









THE INTERPRETATION OF THE NATURE OF THE 
CONTRACT STATUTORY CLAUSE. EXAMPLES 
FROM THE CIVIL CODES  








The codification of civil law was supposed to exclude the possi-
bility of judge-made law. However, experience shows that the in-
terpretation of codes leads to the implication of terms which were 
not expressly set out in the contract and were not incorporated 
under the law. Interpretation may also lead to abrogation of con-
tractual provisions. The notion of the nature of the contract has 
become one of the legal arguments used to that end. This experi-
ence is, however, much less extensive than is the case with good 
faith or good customs clauses. It reveals ambiguities and concerns. 
To a certain extent this may be explained by the limited or late in-
corporation of the nature of the contract clause (presented above) in 
the codifications discussed. However, in some part this results from 
doubts as to the root of the meaning of the nature of the contact 
argument. In light of the historical and comparative background 
presented, this is related to the choice between the reference to eco-
nomic reasonableness or reasonableness inherent in the systema-
tised description of the law of contract. Bear in mind that the es-
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sence of the first meaning was rooted, in line with the ancient Ro-
man tradition, in the adequacy of the contract’s contents in light of 
the legitimate expectations of the parties. On the other hand, the 
nature of the contract argument based on the reasonableness of the 
systematic description of the particular types of contracts leads to 
supplementation or modification of the agreement, in accordance 
with the statutory regulations of contract law. Let us see, then, 
what the interpretation of article 1135 CC and article 9 AGBG and 
art. 307 BGB in Germany and article 3531 PolKC in Poland would be 
in the light of said doubts. This will provide the next link in the 
reconstruction of the conditions for a productive application of the 
nature of the contract clause in legal reasoning.  
 
 
4.2. Interpretation of article 1135 Code Civil 
 
According to article 1135 CC “Agreements bind not only as to 
what is expressed therein, but further as regards all the conse-
quences which equity, usage or law attribute to an obligation by its 
nature”. The nature of the obligation clause is one of the criteria 
used as a test for the implication of terms which were not expressly 
set out in the contract. It should be noted that this provision is in-
cluded in the section pertaining to the legal effects of obligations 
(De l’effet des obligations). It forms a part of the regulations govern-
ing this issue. It may also be regarded as a principle, “smuggled” 
from Livre préliminaire, allowing the judge to build on natural law 
and customs462. The question regarding the grounds for and the 
boundaries of freedom of interpretation of article 1135 CC has be-
come an axis of a slowly crystallising argumentative sense of the 
notion of nature inherent in this provision. The basic elements of 
the crystallisation process include: pinpointing the relation of arti-
cle 1135 CC to the pre-codification law, determination of the auton-
________________ 
462 See Deroussin 2007, 443.  
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omy of article 1135 CC as grounds for implied terms and defining 
the relationship between the three criteria included in the provision.  
 
 
4.2.1. Views on the relationship between article 1135 CC  
and the pre-codification law  
 
In 19th century French legal theory and practice, attention is 
drawn to the relationship between article 1135 and previous laws. 
The examples this kind of thinking consisted of highlighting simi-
larities between the phrasing of the provision and the Latin maxims 
rooted in Roman law texts. Olivier Le Clerq, in a broad comparison 
of Code civil with the Roman law, combined three Roman princi-
ples with article 1135: “…one person is bound to another with re-
spect to that which one person is due to perform for another in 
accordance with what is fair and equitable”463; “…for those matters 
which exist by practice and custom come within actions based on 
good faith”464 and “…if nothing was agreed on, they are held re-
sponsible for the duties naturally inhering in this action”465. Pursu-
ant to these out-of-context principles pertaining to the application 
of the good faith clause (ex fide bona), Le Clerq declared full con-
formity of article 1135 with Roman law466. This method of superfi-
cially, basically ahistorically, combining the phrasing of a provision 
with Roman law maxims was repeated a number of times in the 
19th century. The first example is one of the few applications of 
article 1135 CC in the 19th century French law reports. The dispute 
between Mr. Pery and Mr. Patural pertained to whether the sale of 
“everything the company holds” results in the prohibition for the 
seller to pursue a business that competes with that of his/her for-





466 Le Clerq 1811, 265–266.  
467 Recueil Daloz 1860, 219.  
120 
a prohibition. In the appeal procedure, a dispute between the par-
ties arose as to whether such a judgment was in line with article 
1135 CC. Patural, who defended the prohibition against competi-
tion, based his defence on article 1135 CC. Like Le Clerq, he rea-
soned that the provision is a mere repetition of the Roman princi-
ples in line with which the contract also covers customs468 and 
hence the implication of the non-competition clause as a term im-
plied by custom was legitimate. He argued that “when interpreting 
an agreement in the light of its nature”, one must note that this is 
the sale of a goodwill (fonds de commerce). Therefore, in his opinion, 
it was necessary to take into account the custom, in line with which 
the seller is prohibited from carrying out the same type of business 
in the same area469. The court of appeals, in the judgment of 2 May 
1860, rejected the existence of the absolute prohibition against 
competition. The court also ruled that such a duty did not result 
from the textual meaning of the contract or the mutual intention of 
the parties470. Another example is the comment of Huc to the Code 
civil dating back to late 19th century. Huc, like Le Clerq, identified 
article 1135 CC with the Roman law maxim which required the 
performance of the obligation in line with what was good and just 
(ex bono et aequo)471.  
These two examples demonstrate the tendency to schematically 
connect article 1135 with the Roman good faith maxim472 that was 
emphasised in the 19th century theory of private law. This resulted 
in two considerable limitations to the autonomy and the practical 
meaning of the nature of the contract clause. The first was ex-
pressed by combining, in legal argumentation, article 1135 KC with 
article 1134 CC and ordering the performance of obligations in ac-
cordance with good faith473. The latter consisted of concentrating 
on equity and custom in the interpretation of article 1135 CC.  
________________ 
468 D.21,1,31,20(Ulp.).  
469 Recueil Dalloz, 1860, 220.  
470 Recueil Dalloz 1860, 220. 
471 Huc 1894, 134.  
472 Marcadé, Mourlon 1865, 14; Marcadé 1867, 404; Aubry, Rau 1902, 563 fn. 3.  
473 See Marcadé 1867, 404; Deroussin 2007, 443.  
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4.2.2. Forming the creative role of article 1135 CC  
in legal reasoning   
 
As early as in the first published judgment in which the court 
applied article 1135 CC, it was connected in argumentation with 
article 1134 CC. In the judgment of the Court in Trier of May 1807, 
this provision of the Code Civil served as grounds for an opinion 
that the breach of the statute made a contract void 474. Examples of 
combining these provisions are present in the argumentation of 
French courts to this day. Since the second half of the 19th century, 
the combination of articles 1134 and 1135 CC has also served the 
purpose of providing the rationale for the courts, in some cases, to 
modify or make contracts more precise475. This demonstrates the 
continuation of the idea of a connection of article 1135 CC to the 
performance of obligations in accordance with good faith476. This 
reasoning is not, however, strictly adhered to. In the second half of 
the 19th century and in the early 20th century, the courts discovered 
implied terms that went beyond the scope of what was at least the 
presumed intention of the parties – this was understood as a con-
sequence of custom or equity.477. As early as in judgments of the 
mid 19th century, article 1135 CC provided grounds for the inclu-
sion of the customary institution of an open account between mer-
________________ 
474 Bull. civ. 1807, I, 80. In this case the court considered the link between legal 
effects of an agreement and the statutory regulation of the priority of mortgages.  
475 E.g. as for the duty to inform, WLF A9375DZA (28.11.2006); as for the duty 
to provide guarantee in the assistance contract (assistance bénévole),Bull. civ., 1996,I, 
463 (17.12.1996); as for the duty to vacate a construction site, WLF A8751CKC 
(2.02.1994); as for the duty to take the technical competence into consideration, Bull. 
civ.1995, I, 7 (1.12.1995), assemblée plénière; as for duty to determinate a reasonable 
delivery date, WLF A7890CUR (17.05.1995); as for right to modification of the ob-
ject of lease, WLF A6497AYB (13.01.1999); as for the scope of copyright transfer, 
WLF A6721AYL (15.05.2002); as for excluding liability in an insurance contract, 
WLF A8382DKN (13.10.2005).  
476 Bergel 1989, 251.  
477 See Deroussin 2007, 444.  
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chants478 and for recognising the obligation to pay a bonus, apart 
from the price, in line with the custom known and accepted by the 
parties479. Clearly, the references to custom are a small, but perma-
nent consequence of finding implied terms based on article 1135 
CC480. Huc, the author of the 19th century commentary mentioned 
above, saw equity as the source of the service provider’s duties to 
guarantee security (garantir la sécurité) adopted by courts in the 
1880s481, or the source of prohibition to criticise the mandator by 
the manager handling his business482. The first judgment was de-
veloped by the famous and cited until this day decision of the 
Court of Cassation of 21.11.1911. The Court ruled that the conclu-
sion of a carriage contract imposed on the carrier a special duty 
consisting of transporting the passenger safe and sound to the pas-
senger’s destination483. The Court based the decision on article 1134 
CC. In the theory of law, this decision is presented by some authors 
as an apt example illustrating that the so-called obligation de sécu-
rité484 is derived from equity. However, other than carriage con-
tracts, since the second half of the 20th century the courts have not 
been making any equity-related considerations when recognising 
this duty in contracts. They consistently confirm typical cases 
where it is implied and treat its breach as a breach of contract. 
When justifying such a view, the courts most often refer to article 
1147485 or articles 1135 and 1147 CC jointly486. The briefness (lacon-
________________ 
478 See ZEC 1862, 405 (26.06.1858).  
479 See ZEC 1862, 405 (15.02.60).  
480 See WLF A6365CQS (11.01.1996); WLF A3996CNC (1.06.2000);WLF 
A6091CNW (6.02.2001); WLF A8231BSN (6.05.2003); WLF A5489DW9 (4.06.2007).  
481 Huc 1894, 134 (14.11.1885).  
482 Huc 1894, 134 (06.12.88).  
483 Bull. civ., 1911, I, 134.  
484 Terré, Simler, Lequette 2002, 449; Lamoureux 2006, 500; Henry 2007, 1396. 
485 Art. 1147 CC: A debtor shall be ordered to pay damages, if there is occasion, 
either by reason on non-performance of the obligation, or by reason of delay in 
performing, whenever he does not prove that the non-performance comes from an 
external cause which may not be ascribed to him, although there is no bad faith on 
his part.  
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isme) of reasons for the judgment, typical of French courts, leaves, 
however, the details of such deliberations unknown487. The obliga-
tion de sécurité is probably rooted in the judges’ sense of equity. 
However, its use in legal practice over the last few decades con-
firms that it has been recognised as an objectively existing legal 
duty and inspires to link the nature of the contract clause with  
a test of the existence of this duty488. This will be done following 
discussion of the beginnings of another duty of considerable practi-
cal significance introduced to judicial reasoning489, i.e. the duty to 
inform.   
In the judgment of January 1894, the Court of Cassation noted 
that, in line with article 1135 CC, an agreement is binding not only 
as to what is expressed therein, but further as regards all the conse-
quences which equity, usage or law attribute to an obligation by its 
nature. On these grounds, the court recognised the existence of an 
“implied in the contract” duty of a water consumer to inform the 
second party of the agreement of any and all circumstances in 
his/her house related to water supply. As a consequence, the court 
ruled that the breach of this duty provided grounds for liability for 
damage caused by a change in water pressure to neighbouring real 
estate490. Article 1135 CC was the earliest indicated legal basis for 
the deliberations of the Court of Cassation regarding the duty to 
inform, which have been intensive since the 1980s491. In a number 
________________ 
486 E.g. the duty to assure security of a person whose trust has been induced, 
WLF A6344AHG (17.01.1995); the duty to assure the security of blood products, 
WLF A7812CS7 (13.11.1996); the duty to assure security of karate course partici-
pants: Bull. civ., 1999, I, 330 (01.12.1999).  
487 Mimin 1951, 253; Duxbury 2001, 47. 
488 Ripert 1952, 169; Lamoureux 2006, 514.  
489 Fabre-Magnan 2004, 420 –421.  
490 Recueil Dalloz, 1894, 207 – 208.  
491 E.g. the duty of a manufacturer to provide instructions necessary to use a 
hazardous product, WLF A6888A31 (14.12.1982); the duty to inform about medi-
cines and medical procedures, WLF A2983AAQ (8.04.1986); the duty of an installa-
tion contractor to inform about any modifications affecting its use, WLF A7715AAY 
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of cases this is supported by the duty to provide instructions or 
advice492. French courts, with their characteristic laconism, do not 
explain the source of this implied term in more detail. What is more, 
in judicial practice one can encounter the same solutions sometimes 
justified by 1135 CC and other times by a different legal basis493. 
The introduction of the duty to inform in the 1980s was accompa-
nied by the idea that its basis was not clear in legal theory494. In the 
1990s, courts stressed the basic importance of article 1135 CC as 
grounds of informative duties495. The specific source of the duty to 
inform is not, however, clear. Some authors, as was the case with 
the obligation de sécurité, point to equity.496 However, in the juris-
prudence and theory of law, one finds attempts to indicate an ob-
jective source of the duty, which was most developed  primarily 
based on article 1135 CC. Such thinking in jurisprudence is illus-
trated by the opinion of the Court of Cassation that “the duty to 
inform shall be effectively based on the fact that it affects the per-
formance of the obligation itself”.497 In academic debate, this is ex-
pressed in the view of Fabre-Magnan that a judge should apply 
article 1135 CC to justify the duty to inform when he or she con-
cludes that “it belongs to the nature of the contract and should be 
implied in all similar contracts”498.  
________________ 
(15.03.1988); the duty of a gas supplier about any favourable changes of tariffs, 
WLF A 8600AB7 (11.06.1996).  
492 E.g. the duty to provide advice and instructions by a professional seller as 
for the quality of material and its use, Bull. civ. 1985, I, 211 (3.07.1985); the duty of  
a real estate agent to provide instructions and advice to the principal: Bull. civ. 1985, 
I, 227 (30.10.1985); the duty of entities providing laundry services to provide an 
information and advice, WLF A1342CZQ (23.05.1995); the duty of the water sup-
plier to provide information and advice regarding price tariffs: WLF A2142AXM 
(20.11.2001).  
493 Fabre-Magnan 1992, 360.  
494 Christianos 1987, 31.  
495 Fabre-Magnan 1992, 356-357.  
496 Terré, Simler, Lequette 2002, 450; Henry 2007, 1397. 
497 See Fabre-Magnan 1992,362.  
498 Fabre-Magnan 1992, 360.  
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 The overview presented shows the basic stages and quali-
ties of the process of discovery and the strengthening of the role of 
article 1135 CC as an autonomous basis for the introduction of im-
plied terms. In the argumentation of judges, one can easily find the 
terms resulting from custom. On the other hand, finding a precise 
distinction as to which implications are rooted in equity and which 
are imposed by law in line with the nature of the contract is not 
easy. The indicated attempts to objectify the obligation de sécurité 
and the duty to inform draw our attention, however, to the nature 
of the contract. They aspire to pose a question concerning the rela-
tionship between the widely accepted implication of these duties 
and the meaning of the nature of contract in the French theory of 
private law.  
 
 
4.2.3. Towards the nature of the contract as an autonomous basis 
for implication of implied terms under article 1135 CC 
 
4.2.3.1. The issue of the scope of the freedom of interpretation  
based on the concept of the nature of the contract  
 
The negligible practical significance of article 1135 CC until the 
1880s is reflected in the then leading commentaries on civil law. In 
the seminal work of Aubry and Rau, the notion of the nature of the 
contract was given no explanation.499 In the extensive Explication du 
Code civil by Marcadé, one finds only a mention that the implication 
of implied terms may be based on general principles of law.500 The 
concept known as the ius commune, which states that each type of 
contract has its own nature clearly returned in 20th century French 
legal theory. The explanations of Planiol and Ripert, dating back to 
the first half of the century, presented two possible consequences of 
such reasoning in the absence of a different intention of the parties. 
________________ 
499 Marcadé 1897, 404; Aubry, Rau 1902, 564.  
500 Marcadé 1897,404. 
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The first is based on the interpretation of the nature of the contract 
so as to find the terms implied in law adequate to particular types 
of contracts. The second consisted of the fact that the judge, “under 
the pretext of the interpretation of the supposed intention of the 
parties, creates legal duties by the power of his or her authority” by 
generalising the statutory provisions or the analysis of the practical 
consequences of a contract.501 The latter signifies the recognition of 
the presence of objective duties which are discovered and impli-
cated by the judge depending on how the judge understands the 
nature of the contract. Initially, the first method of reasoning 
gained dominance. A number of authors of the second half of the 
20th century supported the idea that the phrasing of article 1135 CC: 
“...la loi donnent à l’obligation d’après sa nature” gave grounds for the 
judge to imply terms based on the mandatory rules and, in the ab-
sence of a different intention of the parties, optional provisions 
adequate to the particular type of contract as well.502 In the scope of 
such reasoning, the implication of implied terms that do not result 
from custom or statutory provisions may only be justified by eq-
uity.503 A change was brought about by the practice of implication 
of implied terms by the courts, which has been growing signifi-
cantly since the 1980s. Generally, it is regarded as an indication of  
a process consisting of deviating from the classical theory of con-
tract based solely on the intention of the parties towards an objec-
tive interpretation aiming at strong subordination of the contents of 
a contract to values and functions which are deemed objectively 
useful to society.504 In the context of the interpretation of article 
1135 CC, this drew the attention of some judges and academics to 
an opinion that the nature of the contract may include an “objective 
________________ 
501 Ripert 1952, 167-168.  
502 Colin, Capitant 1959, 459–460; Mazeaud and Mazeaud 1978, 316; Terré, Sim-
ler, Lequette 2002, 448. 
503; Mazeaud and Mazeaud 1978, 317-318; Terré, Simler, Lequette 2002, 440 – 
441; Fabre-Magnan 2004, 420. 
504 Starck, Roland, Boyer 1995, 67-68; Larroumet 1996, 123-126 and 130; Bergel 
1989, 251; Pellé 2007,58–59.  
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nature of duties” which is not provided for in statutory provi-
sions.505 Such reasoning can be found in the reasons for judgments 
based on article 1135 CC: the duty to inform may be “effectively 
based” on the fact that it affects the performance of the principal 
duty;506 the judge should accept the existence of the duty of “eco-
nomic diligence” (diligence de l’économie) in a mortgage agree-
ment; 507  “due to the nature of the obligation” the prohibition 
against the use of a photographic film for a purpose other than to 
create the cover of a magazine does not extend to the use of the 
photographic film to promote the magazine.508 This way of think-
ing is exemplified in academic discourse by linking the nature of 
the contract in article 1135 CC with the “objective economy of the 
contract” (l’économie objective du contrat) as a necessary element of 
further interpretation of its content”509 or an explanation that the 
duties to assure security and to inform established in the judicial 
practice “may be treated as implied in law and, to a lesser extent, as 
a result of law-making authority of the judge”.510 These statements 
illustrate the slow, in part intuitive, admission of the nature of the 
contract clause into article 1135 CC as a basis for implied terms 
discovered by the judge. Presented in 2005, the study of Frédéric 
Rouvière includes a theoretical reflection on the function of the 
nature of the contract concept in the French judicial practice511.  
Perceiving it as the next link in the process of emancipation of the 
nature of the contract clause in article 1135 CC complements the 
French experience regarding the relevance of the notion in legal 
argumentation. 
________________ 
505 Ripert 1952, 168. It seems that this position was presented by Planiol and 
Ripet who claimed that “in fact the judge corroborates the existence of specific 
duties”. 
506 Judgment of 23.04.1985, as cited in Fabre-Magnan 1992, 362.  
507 WLF A5577CY9 (22.03.1995).  
508 WLF A8382DKN (15.05.2002). 
509 Larroumet 1996, 132. 
510 Lamoureux 2006, 514.  
511 Rouvière 2005, 165-190.  
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4.2.3.2. Basic qualities of judge-made-law built upon article 1135 CC 
and the concept of the nature of the contract  
 
It is typical, and in line with the history of interpretation of arti-
cle 1135 CC, that for Rouvière the basic point of reference for theo-
retical reflection on the nature of the contract is the Traité des obliga-
tions of Pothier, published over 200 years earlier. Thus he came 
back to the connection of the particular type of contract and its na-
ture.512 The French academic discussion also recalled the distinction 
between the elements of the nature of the contract in this sense – 
those terms which make the agreement legally binding – and those 
terms which are implied in the contents of a contract in the absence 
of a different intention of the parties.513 This, however, did not 
mean a simple return to the medieval theory recognising the essen-
tialia and naturalia contractus proper solely with respect to particu-
lar types of contract. In line with jurisprudence and the theory of 
private law at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries presented 
above, Rouvière declared that the meaning of the nature of the con-
tract clause is independent from statutory provisions.514 Thus ex-
pressed, the objective character of the nature of the contract was 
combined with its practical, economic dimension in a clearer man-
ner than that of Planiol and Ripert. Rouvière saw the essence of the 
practical sense of the analysed clause as assisting in the implication 
of implied terms in a manner which guaranteed and retained the 
benefit gained from the agreement.515 Rouvière noticed that such an 
understanding of the analysed clause served to remove excessive 
uncertainty as to its application in legal argumentation.516 Such an 
explanation, however, raises questions regarding the principles 
applied to achieve specific goals. The comparison of the courts de-
cisions based on article 1135 CC with the presented view of Rou-
________________ 
512 Rouvière 2005, 176, fn. 695. 
513 Rouvière 2005, 178, fn. 700.  
514 Rouvière 2005, 177.  
515 Rouvière 2005, 177.  
516 Rouvière 2005, 176.  
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vière allows the drawing of two groups of conclusions. Firstly, it is 
true that the part of these decisions which do not result from cus-
tom may be systematised based on the two indicated goals. The 
first purpose consists of assuring the benefits of a contract legiti-
mately expected by a party.517 The second aim is to assure a balance 
between the parties, such as is required to take full advantage of 
the contract.518 The first of the above goals may be implemented by 
further specification and correction of allocation of risk taking into 
consideration the legitimate expectations of the creditor. In inter-
pretation of article 1135 CC, this is expressed by the implication of 
the duty to assure security (obligation de sécurité) for a person whose 
life or health has been entrusted to the contractor executing the 
contract 519  or the duty to exercise supervision over things en-
trusted to a contracting party (obligation de surveillance) as implied 
terms.520 Assuring the the expected contractual benefit is also sup-
ported, according to article 1135 CC, by the duty of commitment to 
perform the contract by the contracting party521. The latter of the 
two goals may be realised through: the duty of a professional to 
provide information or advice regarding factual or legal circum-
stances which are not usually known for a layperson and which are 
required to fully take advantage of the contract522; implication of  
________________ 
517 Cf. Rouvière 2005, 166 and 170. 
518 Cf. Rouvière 2005, 174.  
519 E.g. in a passenger transport contract, Bull. civ., 1911, I, 134 (21.11.1911); 
medical services contract, WLF A7812CS7 (13.11.1996); contract for organisation of 
sport exercises, Bull. civ., 1999, I, 330 (1.12.1999). 
520 E.g. regarding things left in a hall by participants in a meeting held in  
a room leased by a hotel, Bull. civ., 1987, I, 262 (13.10.1987)); regarding things left in 
a school cloakroom (judgment of the Court of Appeals in Paris of 10.04.1991; Juris-
Data, 021433). 
521 E.g. the duty to vacate a construction site, WLF A8751CKC (2.02.1994). 
522 E.g. the duty of a professional seller to inform a layman customer of the 
properties and purpose of the purchased material, Bull. civ., 1985, I, 211 (3.07.1985); 
the duty of a real estate agent to inform the principal of any explicit, in the agent’s 
view, excessive price, Bull. civ., 1985, I, 277 (30.10.1985); the duty of a contractor to 
inform of any major modification to an installation, WLF A7715AAY (15.03.1988).  
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a debtor’s warranty not provided in express terms but adequate to 
the purpose of the contract;523 and the duty to take into considera-
tion the capacity of the contracting party to use any performance 
rendered524. Hence, one finds principles serving the implementa-
tion of values fundamental to the proposed sense of the nature of 
the contract clause. Obviously, these principles are generalisations 
based on court rulings. This reasoning brings one to second group 
of conclusions inspired by  Rouvière. The assumption that there are 
principles of productive reasoning based on the nature of the con-
tract clause cannot rule out the creative role of judges in their ap-
plication. This is expressed not only in the discovery of the indi-
cated principles, but also in specifying the scope of its application. 
This is illustrated by decisions in which judges explained that  
a professional seller’s duty to inform does not cover the indication 
of legal restrictions on the use of the purchased things525 or rejected 
a notary’s duty to inform of publicly known facts526.  
Finally, let us look at the conclusion from the point of view of 
Domat according to which “the natural consequences of a contract 
result from equity”527. The French legal experience shows that it 
was not easy to comprehend an independent, productive sense of 
the nature of the contract clause included in the statutory provision. 
The difficulty consisted of capturing it as grounds for legal argu-
mentation independent from equity but flexible, i.e. extending be-
yond the statutory provisions of contract law. This distinction from 
________________ 
523 With regard to the assistance contract (assistance bénévole). E.g.: Bull. civ., 
1996, I, 463 (17.12.1996); WLF A6755CUQ (17.03.1993); the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals in Douai of 7.01.1999, Juris-Data, 042087.  
524 E.g. the duty of a website designer to take into account whether the con-
tracting party will be capable of managing it, the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
in Agen of 4.10.2004, Juris-Data, 275157).  
525 E.g. The Court of Cassation ruled that a seller was not obliged to obtain an 
administrative consent to install an alarm system, WLF A 2410CKH (27.10.1981), or 
of legal restrictions related to the installation of cameras in an enterprise’s cafeteria, 
WLF A9971AYX (25.06.2002).  
526 Bull. Civ., 1996, I, 423 (26.11.1996). 
527 See above 88.  
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equity is based on the objectivity of criteria underlying the argu-
mentation. The judge’s sense of equity may be subjective. In light of 
the presented legal experience, this argues for restriction of the 
equity-based argumentation to cases unique due to facts or proper-
ties of the parties. The trend towards the gradual “objectification” 
of duties based on article 1135 CC observed in the argumentation of 
judges and the theory of private law confirms the independence 
and productivity of the nature of the contract clause in legal rea-
soning. The aspiration to assure and maintain the benefit a party 
could legitimately expect upon entering into a contract may be re-
garded as an objective basis of that argumentation. This idea of 
using the nature of the contract as an argument referring to the 
economic order528 of the relationship built by the parties is not new. 
Its initial form can be seen in the reasoning of ancient Roman law-
yers.529 The argumentation based on article 1135 CC is still, how-
ever, the first important practical test of the idea. It helped pinpoint 
specific principles of reasonableness which are reflected in contrac-
tual duties discovered by courts and widely recognised in aca-
demic debate. We have seen that said discovery is an ongoing 
process. It was a breakthrough in both its progress and intensity in 
the early 1980s. This overlapped with the end of the era of the 
purely individualistic concept of contract in the French theory of 
private law.530 In 1976, the nature of the contract clause was incor-
porated into German private law. In 1990, it was included in the 
Polish civil code. Let us note that German law makers made the 
nature of the contract the criterion for judicial controls of standard 
form contracts and Polish legislators made it one of the boundaries 
to the freedom of contract. Despite this dogmatic difference, in both 
Germany and Poland the nature of the contract clause serves to 
control the contents of contracts and as basis for the reasoning 
________________ 
528 See fn. 80.  
529 See above 38-39.  
530 S. Pellé 2007, 207.  
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which may lead to its modification. Let us then compare the results 
of the French test with the German and Polish argumentation based 
on the analysed clause. 
 
 
4.3. Interpretation of the “conflict with the nature  
of the contract” in line with § 307 BGB 
 
4.3.1. Basic qualities of German judge-made-law developed through 
interpretation of the nature of the contract 
 
It should be noted that the inspiration to introduce the provi-
sion which included the nature of the contract clause in 1976 was 
the jurisprudence pertaining to the so-called “cardinal duties”. The 
nature of the contract criterion can be encountered in the argumen-
tation of German judges before the establishment of these leading 
cases. Reading the jurisprudence of the Court of the German Em-
pire dating back to the drafting of the BGB, the jurisprudence of the 
Court of the German Empire and the Supreme Court of the Federal 
Republic of Germany prior to the entry into force of the Standard 
Contract Terms Act of 1976, one can distinguish three basic forms 
of this argumentative practice. 
The first is comprised of cases in which the nature of the con-
tract covered what resulted from the statutory regulation of par-
ticular types of contracts.531 The second is comprised of judgments 
in which judges refer to the nature of the contract as a normative 
model, which is not regulated by an act of law but which is a pro- 
duct of legal reasoning.532 Finally, there are judgments in which the 
nature of the contract was a linguistic formula drawing attention to 
the benefits expected from a contract. This is illustrated by recog-
nising the unauthorised excess copies of an edition as contrary to 
________________ 
531 E.g. RGZ 1, 391–393 (24.03.1880); RGZ 11, 263– 266 (7.04.1884); RGZ 12, 301–
304 (10.11.1884); RGZ 13, 2-4 (20.02.1885); BHGZ 47, 202-206 (22.03.1967). 
532 E.g. RGZ 91, 243 – 248 (19.11.1917); LNR 1972, 11722; (23.03.1972).  
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the “nature of a publishing contract”;533 an opinion that a with-
drawal from an inheritance contract must be made in a certain form, 
as the nature of this contract is the same as a testamentary disposi-
tion,534 or the argumentation that in the event of a breach of reli-
ance under a sea freight contract one cannot presume its continua-
tion due to its nature.535 
The second and third groups of cases provide yet further con-
firmation that the detachment of the nature of the contract clause 
from terms implied by law leaves a variety of opportunities to use 
it in legal discourse. Taking this practice into consideration, one 
may presume that the criterion of “cardinal duties” was introduced 
into the argumentation of judges as a linguistic formula alternative 
to the nature of the contract, a formula which draws attention to 
the benefits expected upon entering into a contract.536 The links 
between the jurisprudence that formed the basis for article 9(2)(2) 
AGBG, jurisprudence resulting from the application of this provi-
sion and jurisprudence based on article 307(2)(2) BGB, therefore 
created grounds for the recovery and development of argumenta-
tion combining the nature of the contract with the benefits expected 
upon entering into a contract.537 For practical purposes extensive 
and detailed collections of said case law have been compiled. The 
obvious disclaimer that this is not an exhaustive collection538 is 
merely a formal confirmation that using the nature of the contract 
clause is connected with judicial discretion. Conventionally, one 
speaks of a breach of cardinal duties in terms of various instances 
of excluding or limiting liability.539 
________________ 
533 RGZ 12, 108 – 118 (24.03.1884).  
534 RZG 10, 250 – 251 (7.12.1883).  
535 LNR 1960, 10999 (20.06.1960).  
536 After the incorporation of the nature of contract clause in the act, the “car-
dinal rights” idea was regarded as redundant, see: Coester 2006, 345. 
537 E.g. NJW 1992, 2016 – 2018 (5.05.1992); NJW 2005, 1774 – 1776 (1.02.2005). 
See also: Lorenz, Riehm (2002), 56. 
538 Palandt, 438.  
539 Prütting, Wegen, Weinreich 2011, 508.  
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Let us analyse the achievements of the German practice as the 
next part of the history of the nature of the contract clause in practi-
cal legal argumentation. The pattern established for the purpose of 
the systemisation of the French jurisprudence based on article 1135 
CC reveals a basic similarity as well as differences in details. Fun-
damental similarities include the fact that the nature of the contract 
clause in Germany became the basis for argumentation supporting 
the benefit which the creditor may legitimately expect and sup-
porting the possibility of using this benefit. In France, the ex-
pected contractual benefit is achieved by the implication of terms 
to the specification of risk allocation,540 and in Germany, judges 
revise the contractual risk allocation in line with the nature of the 
contract.  
Examples of such practice include the recognition of the inva-
lidity of the complete exclusion of liability for damage caused by an 
object of lease in the event of ordinary negligence on the part of the 
lessor;541 the impossibility of holding a credit card holder liable for 
its unfair use by a third party,542 or the invalidity of a provision 
under which a general contractor is held to have subsidiary liability 
vis-à-vis the ordering party, i.e. in the event of a subcontractor’s 
failure to perform.543 The French courts, in support of using the 
contractual benefit, implicated the duty to inform of any factual or 
legal circumstances which are not usually known for a layman 
based on article 1135 CC, whereas German judges deemed informa-
tion which was misleading for a layman as contrary to the nature of 
the contract. This is illustrated by the judgment in which the Su-
preme Court of the Federal Republic of Germany ruled that it is 
impermissible to apply a contractual provision which may lead  
a “legally uneducated client” to understand that he or she is not 
entitled to reimbursement of the amount that has not been used 
________________ 
540 Obligation de securité and obilgation de surveillance.  
541 DB 2002, 1441 (24.10.2001).  
542 BGHZ 150, 286–299 (16.04.2002).  
543 BGHZ 150, 226–237 (21.03.2002). 
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under a prepaid phone services contract544. Another concern that 
stems from the interpretation of article 1135 CC with respect to the 
use of a contractual benefit was expressed in recognising the duty 
to take into account the objective capacity of the creditor to use it. 
Similarly, the contractual benefit is protected in Germany by inter-
pretation of the nature of the contract which supports insurance 
law. On this basis, the court ruled that a clause excluding health 
insurance coverage for a person who was disabled at birth or as  
a result of an illnesses that surfaced in the first year of life was inva-
lid545. 
The dogmatic distinction between articles 1135 CC and § 9(2)(2) 
AGBG and article 307(2)(2) BGB causes, however that the same 
values are implemented in both countries in different ways. This 
distinction is also offered as a reason for the difference in the dif-
ferent intensity and scope of their detailed specifications. The ar-
gumentation that supports keeping and using the contractual bene-
fit has been expressed in the interpretation of article 1135 CC pri-
marily through the extensive implication of the duty to inform. The 
implementation of this argumentation strategy based on the nature 
of the contract clause in Germany also includes, as has been shown, 
proper information for the creditor. The mainstream argumentation 
based on article 9(2)(2) AGBG and article 307(2)(2) BGB is, however, 
the protection of freedom necessary to make use of the contractual 
benefit. 
This approach in jurisprudence is illustrated by deeming the 
following clauses invalid: prohibiting the issue of a duplicate per-
sonal bus ticket and, consequently, excluding the possibility of us-
ing a means of transport or the refund of a fare if a passenger lost 
the original ticket546; conditioning the duration of health insurance 
on the duration of a specific employment relationship;547 or prohi- 
________________ 
544 Judgment of 9.06.2011 (III ZR 157/10).  
545 NJW-RR 2008, 189 – 192 (26.09.2007).  
546 BGHZ 162, 1774 –1776(01.02.2005).  
547 Judgment of 27.02.2008 ( IV ZR 219/06).  
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biting, on an unlimited basis, a lessor from keeping pets548. This 
way of applying the nature of the contract clause to develop the 
protection of contractual benefits may be explained by the fact that 
in Germany this criterion is one of the premises of judicial control 
of standard form contracts. Similarly, one can justify the applica-
tion of the clause discussed to prevent excessive disproportion of 
performances549. The reference to the nature of the contract clause 
also excluded the risk of unilateral change of contractual terms if 
the change factors are not clearly and precisely expressed in the 
contract550. 
The differences presented above demonstrate that the protec-
tion of the indicated values using the nature of the contract clause 
is as much an issue of the sensitivity of judges to the said value as it 
is of the absence of clear grounds for their protection in legislation. 
Consideration of the grounds for the implementation of these val-
ues, other than the nature of the contract, lies outside the scope of 
this study. Let us simply state that the development of consumer 
protection by legal means led, in particular, to the provision of pre-
cise limits and duties, some of which were implicated earlier by 
reasoning based on article 1135 CC or article 9(2)(2) 2 AGBG551. It is 
important for the consideration of the nature of the contract clause 
that the German jurisprudence confirms the conclusions made 
based on French judicial practice. We can see clearly that there are 
values which are fundamental to the economic sense of the nature 
of the contract and the law-making role of the courts consists of the 
________________ 
548 NJW 2008, 218. 
549 E.g. it is invalid to apply a clause limiting the liability of a dry-cleaner’s to 
15 times the value of remuneration if this is significant disproportion to the value of 
damage; see ZIP 81, 1104; Palandt, 442.  
550 E.g. it is invalid to apply a clause which makes the performance of a travel 
agency’s dependent on the customs of the destination country and resulting rec-
ommendations; see BGHZ 100, pp. 157 – 185 (12.03.1987).  
551 See e.g. as for duty to inform in France see article L 111-1 through L 111-3 
Code de la consommation; as for prohibited clauses § 308 and 309 BGB.  
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discovery of principles serving said values and determining their 
scope. 
The BGH judgment is an example of the doubts concerning the 
scope of protection of said fundamental values. The BGH court 
ruled that the duty to pay extra remuneration for the transfer of 
software to a more powerful computer is not a significant limita-
tion of the rights resulting from the nature of a licence agreement 
for a definite period552. A reading of the French and German judg-
ments illustrates the fact that the objectivisation of the argumenta-
tion related to the nature of the contract results from the consolida-
tion of precedential authority. However, the theory of law may 
describe and stimulate the practice in many ways. It should be 
noted that in France there are already authors who confirm the 
objective nature of contractual duties implicated under article 1135 
CC. The French theory of private law captured the fact that the 
nature of the contract clause is something more than a mere refer-
ence to the terms implied by statute in the absence a different inten-
tion of the parties. It accurately expressed the values fundamental 
to the application of the nature of the contract clause. Thus, this 
legal experience can be generally accepted as the legitimisation of 
the usefulness of the discussed clause. The French theory, however, 
did not present detailed proposals as to how to use it. It left it to the 
intuition of judges with respect to the values underlying the legal 
reasoning. The German theory, on the other hand, introduced more 
doubts in this respect, but also more detailed proposals.  
 
4.3.2. Between scepticism and moderate conservatism  
of the German theory of private law with regard  
to the nature of the contract clause  
 
The doubts recorded shortly after the introduction of the nature 
of the contract clause to the BGB still remain. Almost a decade after 
the amendment, still presented the view that it is very difficult to 
________________ 
552 BGHZ 152, 233 – 246 (24.10.2002).  
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separate this criterion from the criterion incorporated in the next 
sentence of the same paragraph,553 i.e. the clause on conformity 
with the “essential principles of the statutory provision”.554 The 
scepticism regarding the nature of the contract clause has been ex-
pressed in the opinion that “its practical sense can hardly be identi-
fied”.555 However, the very presence of the clause in the statutory 
provision and its application by the courts has had an impact on 
the academic discussion. Today, the belief that the analysed clause 
can be useful is predominant in the German theory of private law556. 
The main grounds for this opinion is the idea that it is not possible 
to exhaustively catalogue or systematise the normative criteria for 
the assessment of the contracting parties’ legitimate expectations 
with respect to performance and the scope of legal protection.557 
The usefulness of the nature of the contract clause as a link be-
tween the law and the diversity and unpredictability of life was 
aptly expressed by Thomas Lapp. He concluded that an interpreta-
tion based on this clause recalled the judgment made in accordance 
with the “spirit of times”, just as Johann W. Goethe did in Faust.558 
By recognising the law-making role of courts559, the German theory 
of law concentrated on building tools to objectify the reasoning 
based on the nature of the contract. Despite earlier controversies560, 
the view that the nature of the contract clause required any dispute 
as to an agreement between parties to be in line with an external 
normative pattern started to dominate. The starting point in build-
ing this normative model are the expectations of parties, the result 
of which was the entering into of a specific contract. The authors 
________________ 
553 § 307 (2)(2) 1 BGB.  
554 Prütting, Wegen, Weinreich 2011, 507. 
555 Coester 2006, 341.  
556 Cf. Lorenz, Riehm 2002, 52; Coester 2006, 341.  
557 Lorenz, Riehm 2002, 52; Fuchs 2006, 710.  
558 Lapp 2010, n.65.  
559 Cf. Fuchs 2006, 706.  
560 See above 105-106.   
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reiterate that the constructed normative pattern should be primar-
ily based on typical methods of statutory interpretation. It is com-
mon ground that when this is not sufficient, this pattern may also 
be based on “justice considerations”561. This reasoning is defined as 
a special case of “supplementary interpretation” of contract that is 
functionally similar to the formulation of statutory provisions562. 
Among the detailed hints as to how to construct the pattern of  
a dispute in line with the nature of the contract clause,  the key fact 
that many German authors stress the significance of the “legitimate 
horizon of customers’ expectations” in the application of article 
307(2)(2) BGB563. 
This view confirms and further specifies the idea formulated 
earlier, i.e. that one of the values underlying the argumentation 
based on the nature of the contract is the desire to realise the bene-
fits a creditor legitimately expects. Obviously, any change in the 
presumed scope of expectations is bound to change the results of 
reasoning based on the nature of the contract. That this interrela-
tionship has been noticed is best shown through the relationship 
between the noted evolution of judicial practice mostly in France, 
and the poetic statement of Lapp, that through the nature of the 
contract, “the spirit of time becomes the interpreter”. The task of 
the academic is to propose the method of specific interpretation. In 
Germany, we encounter the opinion that the quality of the commu-
tative justice model which derives from the nature of the contract 
should consist of providing a proper balance of interests564. When 
there is no basis in legislation for building such a model, then the 
task of interpretation is to build the dogmatic structures of new 
________________ 
561 Coester 2006, 341; Lapp 2010, n. 65; Ballo 2010, 389; Fuchs 2006, 707; Palandt, 
435; Prütting, Wegen, Weinreich 2011, 507.  
562 Fuchs 2006, 711-712.  
563 See Coester 2006, 343; Fuchs 2006, 706; Stoffels 2009, 204; Prütting, Wegen, 
Weinreich 2011, 507. 
564 Fuchs 2006, 707.  
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types of contracts 565. The predominant opinion is that the reason-
ing based on the nature of the contract clause “is not an empirical 
task, but a normative process” 566. From a broad historical perspec-
tive, this recalls the alternative between referring to the dogmatic 
and economic orders567. The fact that  one cannot exhaustively cata-
logue detailed instances of the application of the nature of the con-
tract clause is made clear in the German theory of private law by  
a limited reflection on the values underlying the criterion and prin-
ciples supporting their implementation. Among the principles for-
mulated above based on French and German jurisprudence, two 
are emphasized in the German “justice considerations”: “making 
equal the risks and benefits the disproportion of which results from 
unilateral use of the freedom of contract”568 and “removal of con-
siderable asymmetry in information”569. Therefore, the results of 
the academic discussion in Germany inspires to draw conclusions. 
Firstly, it leads to a suggestion that in the interpretation of the na-
ture of the contract clause, the replacement of the “justice consid-
erations” formula by the criterion of legitimate expectations and 
principles discovered in legal practice that support the realisation 
of said expectations and retention of contractual benefits would be 
closer to actual practice. Secondly, highlighting the fundamental 
values apparent in the jurisprudence and principles that serve to 
implement them as a framework of economically rational argumen-
tation speaks in favour of further analysis of the test due to the 
nature of the contract. Taking into consideration the French and 
German experience, we will similarly examine the interpretation of 
the nature of the contract clause in article 3531 of the Polish civil 
code.  
________________ 
565 Coester 2006, 342; Fuchs 2006, 706; Stoffels 2009, 207; Palandt, 435.  
566 See Fuchs 2006, 712.  
567 See fn. 80 and 81. 
568 Fuchs 2006, 506. 
569 Fuchs 2006, 512.  
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4.4. Interpretation of article 3531 of the Polish civil code 
 
4.4.1. The dispute regarding the freedom of interpretation based  
on the nature of the legal relationship clause  
 
It should be noted that the nature of the legal relationship 
clause is one of the boundaries to the freedom of contract under 
Polish law. It was introduced in article 3531 PolKC and incorpo-
rated into the civil code in September 1990. This provision declares 
the freedom of contract, which was considerably limited during 
nearly 50 years of communist rule. The first academic opinions 
showed that the clear restoration of the freedom of contract gave no 
clarity as to the method of interpretation of the nature of the legal 
relationship clause570. In contemporary discussion about the nature 
of the legal relationship under article 3531 PolKc, broad consent is 
limited to the belief that it may be regarded as a referral to the set 
of parameters fundamental for the validity of contract. 
The essential controversy pertains to whether non-legal factors 
may affect their construction. Restraint or opposition with regard 
to the admissibility of these factors in judge’s reasoning is com-
bined with a focus on the rule of literal interpretation of the notion 
of the nature of the legal relationship571. As a consequence, the ba-
sis of reasoning is limited to the text of legal regulations, presump-
tions about the codified law of obligations or implications of the 
statutory regulation572. A decisive rejection of the use of non-legal 
factors 573 has been supported by a proposal to use the nature of the 
legal relationship clause as a basis for recognising these statutory 
provisions, which are common for all obligations or obligations of 
the same genus, as one of the boundaries of the freedom of con-
tract574. However, the views that combine the nature of the legal 
________________ 
570 See above 111-112.   
571 Radwański 2002, 234; Machnikowski 2005, 324.  
572 Radwański 2002, 235.  
573 Machnikowski 2005, 326.  
574 Machnikowski 2005, 339-346.  
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relationship clause with the effects limited to the immediate impli-
cations of statutory provisions relate to doubts as to the practical 
sense of such reasoning.575 
It should be noted that shortly after the introduction of article 
3531 PolKc, the German theory of private law inspired some Polish 
authors to include “justice considerations” in the argumentation 
based on the nature of the legal relationship576. The ensuing ex-
tended academic discussion allowed the formulation of the pro-
posal to move beyond Polish statutory regulations by taking into 
consideration the principles and values reconstructed based on the 
comparative analysis of the law of obligations. Instances of breach-
ing the “general nature of obligation” were identified as follows: 
excessive restriction of the freedom of a party to contract;577 the 
imposition of conditions that cause a contracting party to be pro-
foundly uncertain or dependent;578 the absence of minimum use-
fulness and reasonableness of an obligation;579 and the breach of 
the doctrine of privity of contract, excluding exceptions to the doc-
trine allowed by law580. These principles were formulated taking 
into consideration the achievements of the German, French and 
Swiss theory of private law.581 The proposal to adopt the clause of 
“minimum reasonableness and usefulness of obligation” in the 
interpretation of nature of the legal relationship as a premise for the 
validity of contract, however, met with strong criticism.582.  
The Polish academic debate on the nature of the legal relation-
ship has only been taking place for about 20 years. Its course con-
firms the difficulty in separating the reasoning based on the nature 
of the contract clause from the dogmatic order of statutory regula-
________________ 
575 See Machnikowski 2004, 775; Machnikowski 2005, 345.  
576 See Łętowska 1999, 368 ff. 
577 Trzaskowski 2005, 318 ff. 
578 Trzaskowski 2005, 333 ff. 
579 Trzaskowski 2005, 347 ff.  
580 Trzaskowski 2005, 352 ff.  
581 See Trzaskowski 2005, 318 - 352.  
582 Machnikowski 2005, 327.  
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tions, which has been seen in the French and German experience. 
The Polish theory of private law demonstrates also that breaking 
the limitation itself does not result in a clear structure of argumen-
tation grounded on the nature of the contract clause. However, 
some of the qualities of reasoning based on the nature of the legal 
relationship and rooted in non-legal factors have been noticed in 
the Polish academic debate as well.583 In this respect, the Polish 
theory of private law confirms some of the achievements of the 
French and German academic debate. However, the references to 
judicial practice in each of the analysed legal systems discussed 
earlier provided the final grounds for conclusions as to whether 
and what objective values and principles underlie the productive 
reasoning based on the nature of the contract clause. It remains to 




4.4.2. Controversies with respect to the Polish theory of private law 
and the nature of the legal relationship clause  
in the argumentation of judges  
 
Clearly, the controversies in legal academic debate have not be-
come part of judicial argumentation. The combination, in the rea-
soning of some judges, of the nature of the contract clause with the 
neighbouring criteria of the principles of social coexistence584 or 
conformity with law585 in article 3531 PolKC may be regarded as  
a weak echo of a controversy, clearly visible in the theory of law, as 
to whether the argumentation based on the nature of the contract 
permits the taking into account of non-legal factors in any dispute 
about the boundaries of the freedom of contract. In the academic 
________________ 
583 The similarity pertains to the recognising the following as contrary to the 
nature of legal relationship: excessive limitation of the freedom of a party or impo- 
sing conditions leading to the profound uncertainty or dependence. 
584 E.g. OSNCP 1992, 1, 1 (22.05.1991); Lex 188549 (8.12.2005).  
585 E.g. OSP 1996, 10, 174 (15.02.1996).  
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reports of judicial decisions, however, this fact was heavily empha-
sised.586 This is an element of the general state of play of the aca-
demic debate which indicates the absence of any clear ideas and the 
minor significance of the nature of the contract clause in legal prac-
tice587. 
Given that its 20 year history in the Polish civil code, it may, 
however, be concluded that it is gradually becoming an independ-
ent element of the argumentation of judges. The description of the 
principles underlying this practice will not be found in the ratio- 
nale for judgments. A reading of judicial decisions shows us that 
what the reasoning based on the nature of the contract has in com-
mon is the attention drawn to the economic sense of an obligation. 
Judges refer in this way to the “nature of a business contract”588 or 
“nature of a long term contract”589.  
The similarity of values underlying the argumentation of Polish, 
French and German judges may become even clearer if we sys-
tematise the Polish jurisprudence in accordance with the same 
manner of presentation applied to judicial decisions made based on 
article 1135 CC and § 307(2)(2) BGB.  
Furthermore, in Poland the nature of the legal relationship 
clause has become the basis for argumentation in favour of gaining 
benefits which a creditor may legitimately expect and argumenta-
tion supporting the use of said benefit. As is the case in Germany, 
the change of the distribution of risk adopted by the parties based 
on the nature of the risk served to facilitate the procurement of any 
legitimately expected contractual benefit. An example of this prac-
tice is a determination, in the context of a preliminary contract, that 
an advance payment to a seller in an amount equal to the price to 
be paid under a future sales contract is contrary to the “nature of 
the preliminary contract”. In making such determination, the court 
________________ 
586 Machnikowski 2005, 319; Trzaskowski 2005, 296 and 298. 
587 Machnikowski 2005, 319; Trzaskowski 2005, 300.  
588 E.g. OSNC 2007, 7-8, 122 (9.11.2006).  
589 E.g. Lex 274159 (15.02.2007).  
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precluded the possibility of the seller being paid the whole price 
without having entered into a sales contract or the buyer receiving 
the multiple of the price in the event the promised contract was not 
entered into through the fault of the seller590. Another example that 
demonstrates support of the benefit legitimately expected by the 
creditor is the reasoning that despite the absence of a statutory 
prohibition, it is impermissible to make the performance of a con-
tract to produce a work dependent on payment by a third party. 
The Court of Appeals in Warsaw ruled that such a provision was in 
conflict with the “nature of the contract to produce a work” and the 
“principle of parity of performances”. In ruling in this way, the 
Court rejected the possibility of allocating the risk of unlimited 
postponement of the payment date onto the creditor591. The juris-
prudence of the Polish Supreme Court is an example of the argu-
mentation based on the nature of the contract clause justified by the 
belief of a required relationship between the legitimate expecta-
tions of a creditor and the allocation of risk. The judgment pertain-
ing to the guarantee contract, unregulated in the Polish civil code. 
Here the Supreme Court questioned the possibility of an effective 
guarantee of payment of the amount specified in a management 
contract should the creditor be unable to gain this amount from the 
profit of the company592. Shortly after the incorporation of article 
3531 PolKC into the Polish civil code, it provided grounds for ar-
gumentation rejecting the clauses which entitled one party to uni-
laterally vary contract terms. This is demonstrated by the decisions 
of the Supreme Court relevant to the practice of contract law. The 
Supreme Court declared that unilateral variation of credit or de-
posit interest rates in the absence of express contractual conditions 
regarding such variation was “contrary to the nature of a business 
________________ 
590 Lex 189073 (21.05.2005); judgment of the Court of Appeals in Poznań of 
5.05.2010 (I ACa 316/10).  
591 OSA 2008, 10, 32 (Court of Appeals in Warsaw, 17.07.2007).  
592 OSNC 2007, 7-8, 122 (9.11.2006).  
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contract”. In that context, the Supreme Court added that it led to  
a breach of contractual justice.593 
The nature of the contract clause has also provided Polish judi-
cial practice grounds for argumentation in favour of using the 
benefit gained by the creditor. The duty to take into account the 
objective capacity of the creditor to enjoy contractual benefits, ob-
served in French and German judicial decisions, is somewhat re-
flected in decision of the Polish Supreme Court regarding the du-
ties of a leaseholder imposed by contract terms. The Supreme Court 
ruled that a contractual term obliging the leaseholder to make out-
lays on the leased object may be regarded as “contrary to the nature 
of the contract” only if the aim was to deprive the leaseholder of 
economic freedom.594 Finding that the purpose of article 3531 PolKC 
is to provide boundaries to the freedom of contract results in the 
protection of benefits gained from a contract, as is the case in the 
interpretation of article 307(2)(2) BGB. This protection consists most 
often in the application of the nature of the contract clause to the 
establishment of the boundaries of freedom required to enjoy the 
contractual benefit. In the first years following the adoption of arti-
cle 3531 PolKc, this function of the clause was fulfilled by ratio deci-
dendi which resulted in a contractual clause allowing the termina-
tion of a contract for a specific period was contrary to the nature of 
a lease contract595 or contract of tenancy596. Hence, this served as an 
absolute guarantee of freedom to enjoy the contractual benefit on 
the part of the rent-paying leaseholder or tenant. However,  
a concern arose quickly as to such determination of boundaries to 
the freedom of contracting parties597. This concern was alleviated 
by an amendment to the civil code. It weakened the protection, 
construed from the nature of the contract, surrounding the freedom 
________________ 
593 OSNC 1992, 1, 1(22.05.1991); OSNC 1992, 6, 90 6.03.1992; OSP 1993, 6, 90 
(19.05.1993).  
594 Lex 303365 (27.10.2004). 
595 OSP 1996, 10, 174 (15.02.1996); OSP 1997, 6-7, 71 (03.03.1997).  
596 OSNC 1998, 3, 36 (27.10.1997).  
597 See OSNC, 9, 144 (22.01.1998).  
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to enjoy any contractual benefits attained.598 In the argumentation 
of Supreme Court judges based on the nature of the contract clause 
and supporting the freedom to enjoy any contractual benefits, the 
issue of a retroactive cancellation clause in contracts entailing long-
term non-pecuniary benefits in exchange for periodical pecuniary 
benefits gained importance. Contracts of lease599 and franchise600 
were deemed to be so-called long-term contracts. This resulted in 
judicial decisions based on the argument that the retroactive termi-
nation of a long-term obligation is not possible as it is in “conflict 
with its nature”601. The economic effect of such a decision is that the 
party offering the non-pecuniary benefit is able to keep any pay-
ment until the termination of the contract. The examples of argu-
mentation based on the nature of the contract, which lead to the 
protection of the freedom to use a contractual benefit also include 
invalidity of contractual terms such as: waiver of the right to termi-
nate a real estate agency contract for important reasons;602 imposi-
tion of a duty to keep a fixed term deposit as credit collateral until 
repayment;603 repeal of the lessor’s duty to issue the object of lease 
to the lessee in due time;604 and adoption of a contractual clause 
entitling the supervised body to terminate a contract of supervision 
service at any time605.  
________________ 
598 In line with article 673 § 3 PolKC valid as of 10.07.2001, in a tenancy contract 
for a definite period, the parties may indicate instances in which the contract may 
be terminated.  
599 OSP 2003, 11, 144 (15.11.2002); OSNC 2010, 10, 142 (17.03.2010) . 
600 OSNC 2005,9,162 (08.10.2004); Lex 311313 (5.10.2005); Lex 274159 (15.02.2007).  
601 The courts stressed that in the event of retroactive (ex tunc) termination of 
such a contract, only the return of a pecuniary benefit would be possible which, 
despite the concluded mutual contract, would result in a donation.  
602 Lex 303359 (20.12.2005). 
603 Lex 179743 (15.12.2005).  
604 Lex 188549 (8.12.2005). The court justified the invalidity of such a clause 
with both the conflict with the nature of leasing and the principles of social coexist.  
605 Lex 560018 (3.11.2009). In this case, by referring to article 3531 PolKC, the 
court related to the conflict with the “essence of obligation”.  
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The outline of the Polish judicial decisions confirms that the 
sensitivity of judges to the practical effect of any judgment is of 
fundamental importance for reasoning based on the nature of the 
contract clause. The form and results of the judges’ argumentation 
support the position, which is developing in Poland, that interpre-
tation based on the nature of the contract should take into consi- 
deration the economics of a contract, i.e. non-legal factors of deci-
sion. What is more, the possibility of aligning Polish jurisprudence 
based on the nature of the contract in accordance with the same 
presentation outline cited above to French and German judicial 
decisions confirms its universal character. This all permits the as-
sumption that there is a model describing the essential qualities of 
an economic order which may lead to productive interpretation 
based on the nature of the contract clause. The most precise form of 
this model, reconstructed based on the analysed judicial decisions 
of the three continental European countries will be presented in the 
conclusions below.  
 
 
4.5. Conclusions  
 
The academic discourse and judicial decisions demonstrate that 
the introduction of the nature of the contract clause to civil codes 
has raised similar concerns in France, Germany and Poland. In my 
view, the reason for this lies in the difficulty of defining the rela-
tionship between the objectivity and flexibility of this criterion. 
Omitting or questioning the independence of this criterion is an 
attempt to avoid a clear solution to the problem. An example of 
such an evasion in the French theory of private law was the identi-
fication of article 1135 CC with a maxim ordering the performance 
of an obligation in line with what is good and just, and the limita-
tion of disputes regarding article 1135 CC to custom and equity. 
Another example is the practice of jointly or interchangeably refer-
ring to article 1135 CC and article 1134 CC as grounds for a deci-
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sion in a judgment that orders the performance of a contract in 
good faith. In Germany, this is expressed by stressing the great 
difficulty in distinguishing between the conflict with the nature of 
the contract and the conflict with the “essential principles of the 
statutory provision”. In Poland, this is expressed by invoking the 
nature of the contract clause in the rationale for judgments com-
bined with other clauses included in article 3531 PolKC as well as 
emphasizing such argumentation style in academic debate. 
In the course of the evolution of the theory of private law and 
judicial practice, such an approach did not disappear, but it lost 
significance. The first, in chronological terms, attempt to define the 
objective and independent character of the statutory nature of the 
contract clause was its combination with other provisions of statu-
tory law. French legal theorists developed an explanation that the 
analysed clause provided grounds to apply the general rules of law 
or introduction of terms implied in law for particular types of con-
tracts.606 This way of thinking was expressed in German legal the-
ory as well. German legal theorists indicated that control in accor-
dance with the nature of the contract was control in accordance with 
a normative pattern external to a disputed contract, which should 
primarily be based on conclusions drawn from statutory law. 
The link between the nature of the contract clause and statutory 
law is heavily emphasized in Polish academic debate. Some au-
thors, based on a verbatim interpretation, draw the conclusion 
from article 3531 PolKC, which mentions the nature of the legal 
relationship, that the use of this criterion entails control of compli-
ance with statutory requirements, and assumptions underlying 
statutory law with respect to the law of obligations and the result-
ing implications. Such limited reasoning based on the nature the of 
contract clause was, however, rejected by the French theory of pri-
vate law. It has never been expressly adopted in Germany. In Po-
land, the limitation has been violated by some authors. The evolu-
________________ 
606 This is a repetition of the naturalia contractus doctrine known since the  
Middle Ages.  
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tion of the legal theory in each of these countries led to the idea that 
control in accordance with the nature of the contract may consist of 
control in accordance with objective non-legal factors.  
An example of such reasoning in France is the statement that 
the duties implicated under article 1135 CC and established in judi-
cial decisions “may be perceived as implied in the law and are to an 
increasingly lesser extent regarded as results of law-making au-
thority of a judge”607. In Germany, this position is illustrated by the 
explanation according to which the construction of a standard as-
sessment in accordance with the nature of the contract is a normative 
process that may cover “justice considerations” and “is functionally 
similar to the drafting statutory provisions” applied in the absence of 
diverse intention of contracting parties. In the Polish academic de-
bate, this is expressed by a suggestion that control based on the na-
ture of the contract clause may, in particular, assume the require-
ment of minimum practical usefulness of an obligation. 
From the point of view of the evolution of academic debate and 
jurisprudence, one can see a trend in the strengthening of this posi-
tion. However, neither said legal theory nor the jurisprudence of 
any of the above countries proposed a universal test, which is de-
tailed and useful in practice, and based on the nature of the con-
tract criterion. On the other hand, one can see certain similarities 
between the results that the reasoning of judges based on the na-
ture of the contract clause leads to. Rouvière sought to capture 
these in the form of a model that is as precise and universal as pos-
sible. He pointed out the link between the nature of the contract 
criterion and the implementation of two values. The first value is 
the assurance that the purpose of the contract will be achieved, i.e. 
the contractual benefits legitimately expected by the parties.608 The 
second value is the assurance of such a balance in the allocation of 
risks, which is required for the full enjoyment of contractual bene-
fits.609 
________________ 
607 Lamoureux 2006, 514.  
608 Cf. Rouvière 2005, 166 and 170. 
609 Cf. Rouvière 2005, 174.  
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nature of the contract 
 
Value 1 –procuring a legitimately 
expected benefit  
Value 2 – protection of benefit pro-
cured and permitting its actual use  
principle 1.1. elimination of dispropor-
tion in risk allocation conflicting with 
the legitimate expectations of the credi-
tor610  
principle 2.1. assurance of the proper 
information required by a layperson611  
 
principle 1.2. introduction of a duty of 
the parties to commit to performing, 
when necessary, to achieve the pur-
pose of the contract612  
principle 2.2. recognition of a debtor’s 
guarantee, not expressed in the con-
tract and adequate to its purpose613  
principle 1.3. exclusion of the unilat-
eral variation of contract terms in the 
absence of an express condition con-
cerning such variation 614  
principle 2.3. taking into consideration 
the objective capacity of a party to 
enjoy contractual benefits615 
 
 principle.2.4. opposition to the exclu-
sion or undue limitation of a party’s 
freedom to enjoy contractual benefits616  
________________ 
610 E.g. Bull. civ., 1911, I, 134 (21.11.1911)); WLF A7812CS7 (13.11.1996); Bull. 
civ., 1999, I, 330 (1.12.1999); Bull. civ., 1987, I, 262 (13.10.1987); judgment of the 
Court of Appeals in Paris of 10.04.1991, Juris-Data, 021433; WLF A6344AHG 
(17.01.1995); WLF A7812CS7 (13.11.1996); Bull. civ., 1999, I,330 (1.12.1999); DB 2002, 
1441 (24.10.2001); BGHZ 150,286 –299 (16.04.2002); BGHZ 150,226 –237 (21.03.2002); 
Lex 189073 (21.05.2005); judgment of the Court of Appeals in Poznań of 5.05.2010, I 
ACa 316/10, OSA 2008, 10, 32 (Court of Appeals in Warsaw,17.07.2007); OSNC 
2007, 7-8, 122 (9.11.2006).  
611 E.g. Bull. civ. 1985, I, 211 (3.07.1985);Bull. civ.1985, I, 277 (30.10.1985); WLF 
A7715AAY (15.03.1988); WLF A6888A31 (14.12.1982); WLF A2983AAQ (8.04.1986); 
WLF A7715AAY (15.03.1988); WLF A1342CZQ (23.05.1995); WLF A 8600AB7 
(11.06.1996); WLF A2142AXM (20.11.2001); judgment of BGH of 9.06.2011 (III ZR 
157/10).  
612 WLF A8751CKC (2.02.1994). 
613 E.g. Bull. civ., 1996, I, 463 (17.12.1996); WLF A6755CUQ (17.03.1993); Judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals in Douai of 7.01.1999, Juris-Data, 042087.  
614 E.g. BGHZ 100, 157-185 (12.03.1987); OSNC 1992, 1, 1 (22.05.1991); OSNC 
1992, 6, 90 (6.03.1992); OSP 1993, 6, 90 (19.05.1993).  
615 E.g. judgment of the Court of Appeals in Agen of 4.10.2004, Juris-Data, 
275157; NJR-RR 2008, 189–192 (26.09.2007); Lex 303365 (27.10.2004). 
616 E.g. NJW 2005, 1774–1776 (1.02.2005); NJW 2008, 218 (27.02.2008); OSP 1996, 
10, 174 (15.02.1996); OSP 1997, 6-7, 71 (03.03.1997); OSNC 1998, 3, 36 (27.10.1997); 
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From a broad historical perspective, this is an independent de-
velopment of the “embryonic” idea of the nature of the contract 
argument made by Roman jurists who did not link it to the dog-
matic structure of particular types of contracts. This is the break 
from the argumentative practice to link the nature of the contract 
with its particular types and the dogmatic order of contract law 
which has dominated the European theory of private law since the 
Middle Ages. The adoption of the two  values indicated above as  
a foundation of the order upon which the reasoning based on the 
nature of the contract can rest provides grounds for building  
a model presenting the similarities in the results of the reasoning of 
French, German and Polish judges based on the criterion under 
discussion. These two values constitute the foundation for princi-
ples leading to their implementation. These principles may be for-
mulated by the generalisation of the results of specific decisions.  
The analysis of the judicial decisions underlying the model 
shows not only the principles, but also some differences. The dif-
ferences pertain to the levels of implementation of the values which 
constitute grounds for reasoning. These differences result primarily 
from the differing functions of provisions that include the nature of 
the contract clause in individual codes. When looking at the dates 
of the cited judicial decisions, one sees yet another aspect of the 
dynamics of the argumentative practice presented here. Article 
1135 CC became the foundation for the construction of the afore-
mentioned order in the late 1970s, i.e. 170 years after the adoption 
of the Code Civil. The possibility of a similar application of the 
nature of the contract clause was introduced in Germany due to 
article 9(2)(1) of the Standard Contract Terms Act adopted in 1976, 
and continued since 2002 by article 307(2)(2) BGB. In Poland, it was 
the result of the 1990 implementation of article 3531 PolKC, which 
defined the boundaries of the freedom of contract.  
________________ 
OSP 2003, 11, 144 (15.11.2002); OSNC 2010, 10, 142 (17.03.2010); OSNC 2005, 9, 162 
(08.10.2004); Lex 311313 (5.10.2005); Lex 274159 (15.02.2007); Lex 303359 
(20.12.2005); Lex 179743 (15.12.2005); Lex 188549 (8.12.2005); Lex 560018 (3.11.2009).  
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Note that the clear development of flexible argumentation 
based on the nature of the contract clause overlapped with so-
called decodification in the civil law tradition countries.617  This 
leads to a presumption that the new argumentative productivity of 
the nature of the contract clause has not simply been a consequence 
of this clause’s presence in the text of statutory law. The reasons for 
the development of this interpretative practice should instead be 
sought in the crisis of the 19th century vision of civil law codifica-
tion. It should be remembered that during its construction the sys-
tematic order of contract law, which was also developed in argu-
mentation based on the nature of contract, established the frame-
work for codification. 
From the point of view of historical and comparative analyses, 
these conclusions raise further questions. Does the resurfacing and 
significant development of reasoning based on the nature of the 
contract criterion and rooted in the values set forth above confirm 
the intuition of Roman jurists that such argumentation must take 
into consideration the existence of the order I defined as eco-
nomic?618 Can the application of the nature of the contract argu-
ment, which has been predominant for centuries, to building a sys-
temic order of contract law be regarded as merely the result of  
inspiration from medieval philosophy and the conservatism of le-
gal thinking which was rooted in ius commune? The answers to 
these questions will help assess the argumentative potential of the 
nature of the contract criterion in times of decodification. With the 
aim of formulating these answers, in the next chapter, I will com-
pare the results of the historical and comparative analyses with 
some dilemmas in contemporary academic debate on contract law. 
 
________________ 
617 See Merryman 1985, 151; Irti 1979, 22.  









THE NATURE OF THE CONTRACT  
ARGUMENT AND SOME DILEMMAS  






5.1. The nature of the contract and the intention  
of contracting parties 
 
The notion of the nature of the contract, introduced to legal lan-
guage in ancient Rome has become a fixed element of legal argu-
mentation. The Latin phrase natura contractus has formal equiva-
lents in national legal languages. In France, it is referred to as nature 
de la convention; in Germany, it is Natur des Vertrages; and in Poland, 
natura stosunku zobowiązaniowo-prawnego. This formal similarity 
raises the question of whether the concepts represented by these 
phrases are similar and if so, to what extent. Research of the civil 
law tradition spanning the period from Antiquity to modern times 
has shown that one cannot speak of any linear evolution. However, 
in the diversity of this area of legal discourse, certain common and 
fixed elements can be identified. These common and fixed elements 
are founded on the linguistic intuition, according to which nature 
assumes the existence of a certain order. With respect to a contract, 
this means going beyond any result arising from the intention ex-
pressed by the parties. This translates into focusing attention on the 
contract as an element or an instrument of an order that exists in-
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dependently from the intention of the parties. We have concluded 
that such a linguistic practice may consist of expressing the practical 
sense of a contract. It may also serve the purpose of argumentation 
aimed at changing or supplementing the intention of the parties as 
represented by express terms. The practical sense of a contract was 
already expressed in this manner by Roman jurists. They combined 
the common nature of obligations with their purpose, despite the 
fact that the actions of the parties evoked dogmatic doubts619 and 
discrepancies,620 or resulted in diverse qualifications.621 Examples 
of such an application of the notion of the nature of the contract can 
also be found in modern legal discourse.622 This kind of linguistic 
practice is an example of a broader phenomenon of affecting the 
legal reasoning by the philosophical notion of the nature of things. 
The practical significance of the presence of the notion of the nature 
of the contract in legal argumentation and its impact on the devel-
opment of legal dogma, should, primarily, be connected to the im-
plication of implied terms or amendment of express terms. In both 
cases one is confronted with doubts or a conflict with the principle 
of the fundamental significance of the common intention of the 
parties, which has been repeated since Antiquity, as well as the 
respect for the intention of the parties who have entered into a con-
tract permitted by law.623 
The fundamental role of the intention of the parties is expressed 
in the typical Western law concept that the specificity of contract 
law consists of the fact that “it does not tell you what you may or 
may not make contracts about but simply how to proceed if you 
________________ 
619 D.16,3,24(Pap.). 
620 D.45,2,9,1(Pap.) and D.46,1,5(Ulp.).  
621 D.46,5,1pr.–4 (Ulp.). 
622 E.g. Pforden 1840, 326; Wächter 1880, 387 (§189).  
623 Cf. D.50,16,219 (Pap.): In conventionibus contrahentium voluntatem potius quam 
verba spectari placuit (It has been established, that, in agreements, the intention of 
the contracting parties should rather be considered than the terms of the stipula-
tion); art. 1156 CC; § 133 BGB; art. 65, § 2 PolKC.  
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want to make a legal agreement”.624 Such an approach to the free-
dom of contracting parties makes it is easier to agree on the sup-
plementation of their intention through the implication of implied 
terms. However, such an application of the notion of the nature of 
the contract results from medieval ius commune jurists’ combination 
of the nature of the contract with the type of the contract. This was 
inspired by the ancient law concept that a contract of a specific type 
may have a different scope with respect to content625 as well as the 
idea, based on scholastic philosophy, and in particular St. Thomas, 
of the systematic presentation of said possibilities.626 Thus, the legal 
theory of naturalia contractus came into being as an instrument that 
allowed the implication of implied terms to the expressed intention 
of the parties which, so as to have legal effect, may only cover the 
substantialia contractus. The analysis of works of European jurists 
from medieval times to the 18th century showed that, when gather-
ing naturalia for a systematic description of certain types of con-
tracts, they were inspired mainly by the ancient Roman case law 
preserved in Corpus Iuris Civilis. The extension of such an under-
standing of naturalia contractus is found their definition of legisla-
tive provisions (terms implied in law) which are incorporated in  
a contract unless the intention of the parties is different.627 In the 
European legal discourse during the pre-codification period, fur-
ther possibilities of the implication of implied terms under naturalia 
contractus were noticed. This is illustrated by the view of Domat 
who sought the source of natural consequences (suites naturelles) in 
equity.628 The introduction of the concept of a legal transaction by 
19th century German pandectists resulted in the continuation of the 
use of ius commune as it related to natura contractus in the notion of 
naturalia negotii. It served the purpose of a systematic description of 
________________ 
624 Smith 1993, 293.  
625 Gl. ad. D.18,1,72 ‘admicula’.  
626 Cf. Gordley 1991, 64.   
627 See e.g. L. J. F. Höpfner 1803, § 732.  
628 Domat 1777, 49–55 (L. I tit. II, sec. 2) and 55–57 (L. I tit. II sec. 3).    
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the content of a legal transaction.629 The pandectists also introduced 
the idea that while the terms implied in law may occur under natu-
ralia negotii, terms discovered by judges, based on the nature of 
things may also occur.630 The implication of terms implied by law, 
which is rooted in naturalia contractus, is widely recognised in the 
modern private law in continental Europe. My research showed 
explicitly how it gave rise to article 1135 CC, which became a tem-
plate for some other civil codifications.631 In contract law theory, 
which continues the pandectist tradition, the use of the naturalia 
negotii notion has become a permanent indicator of terms not 
agreed by the parties.632  Windschied’s juxtaposition of naturalia 
negotii with expressed terms633 was a signal of doubts in 20th cen-
tury science of law as to the scope and justification of such implied 
terms in contracts. Basically, the results of the legal regulation of  
a particular type of contract were recognised as the natural conse-
quences of such a contract without much dispute. Practice allowed 
the possibility of further implied terms. In the German science of 
law, this caused a controversy regarding the permissibility and 
grounds for such an interpretation.634 In recent years it has led to 
the reinterpretation of the medieval concept of the natura contractus. 
Jürgen Oeschler deemed it a historical confirmation of the correct-
ness of modern concepts allowing the implication of implied terms 
for the purpose of securing reliance.635 The development of implied 
terms, which have been employed extensively by French courts 
since the 1980s under article 1135 CC resulted in the gradual exten-
sion and clarification of the notion of the nature of the contract. 
This illustrates the concept of Rouvière, which is similar in its es-
________________ 
629 Cf. e.g. Puchta 1838, 41 (§ 45). 
630 E.g. Mühlenbruch, 1835, 201 (§104).   
631 E.g. 1258 CCE; art. 2, sec. 2 OR.   
632  Flume 1992, 80ff; Bork 2006, 272; Schellhammer 2008, 959; Radwański,  
Olejniczak 2011, 288. 
633 Windscheid 1875, 231 (§85).  
634 Oechsler 1997, 209-213.  
635 Oechsler 1997, 254.  
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sence to that of Oeschler. Frédéric Rouvière explained that the na-
ture of the contract served the purpose of argumentation that sup-
ports the achievement and preservation of the legitimately ex-
pected benefits of a contract.636 The implication of implied terms 
based on the nature of the contract clause will thus be the first ele-
ment of comparison of the reconstructed legal experience with the 
dilemmas of the modern contract law theory.  
Yet another and further reaching impact of legal reasoning 
rooted in this clause on the intention of contracting parties is its 
change. From the historical perspective, one may conclude, that 
this manner of applying the nature of the contract criterion to legal 
argumentation was developing more slowly and with greater diffi-
culty than the naturalia contractus concept. This kind of reasoning 
stems from the Antiquity. Among the “embryonic” forms of appli-
cation of the notion of the nature of the contract in the argumenta-
tion of Roman jurists one encounters an instance of indicating 
natura contractus as an obstacle to the validity of an agreement in 
which the parties intended to modify a contract of sale.637 It may be 
supposed that such an inclusion of the nature of the contract in the 
argumentation was supported by the fact that the Roman jurists 
did not recognise the full freedom of the parties to modify a con-
tract ex post facto. Thus, Ulpian’s use of an argument based on 
natura contractus was not in obvious contradiction with the then 
current understanding of respect for the intention of the contrac- 
ting parties. 
Such argumentation was not developed in ancient Rome. The 
medieval commentary identified the term natura contractus in 
Ulpian’s texts with substantia contractus, i.e. with what makes an 
agreement binding in law. Thus, the text was combined with the 
scholastic schema equating the nature of the contract with the type of 
contract. The medieval and early modern ius commune jurists who, 
not unlike their ancient predecessors, did not know the principle of 
________________ 
636 Rouvière 2005, 166–174.  
637 D.2,14,7,5 (Ulp.).  
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freedom of contract, applied and propagated the criterion of “con-
tradiction to the nature” as grounds for the invalidity of terms 
which were not in compliance with the required qualities of the 
specific type of contract.638 The idea of applying the nature of the 
contract to a change in the intention of the contracting parties, not 
limited explicitly to the control of compatibility of this intention 
with the requirements of the type of contract, was introduced by 
Althusius, one of the precursors of the principle of freedom of con-
tract in modern times. His proposals to adopt conventionis natura as 
one of the boundaries of said principle639 were not part of the 18th 
and 19th century discussions in which it was given its modern form. 
In the legal tradition researched here, such an application of the 
nature of the contract criterion was encountered as late as in the 
legal regulations of the late 20th century. In Germany, this can be 
seen in the regulation which allowed such standards terms that are 
in breach of the nature of the contract640 to be found invalid. In Po-
land, this was brought about by the amendment of the civil code by 
which the notion of the nature of the legal relationship was 
adopted as one of the boundaries to the freedom of contract.641 The 
interpretation of said regulations explicitly rejected the identifica-
tion of the criterion of the nature of the contract with its type. The 
academic discussion surrounding said regulations gave rise to  
a question, which was already known from the French delibera-
tions about the natural consequences of a contract, as to whether, 
and to what extent, an interpretation based on the nature criterion 
may exceed the direct consequences of legislative regulation. The 
view that by applying the nature of the contract criterion to amend 
the content of an obligation, a court may exceed the provisions of 
law and the direct consequences thereof, has been expressed dis-
tinctly in Germany, and increasingly so in Poland. A judge may 
________________ 
638 See Cujacius 1658, Vol. 4 col. 215; Donellus 1763, XII,II,1.  
639 Althusius 1649, Lib. I, cap. 64, n. 30.  
640 § 9 section 2 item 2 AGBG of 1976, superseded in 2002 by § 307 section  
2 item 2 BGB.  
641 Art. 3531 PolKC.  
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make an assessment based on a model built on “justice considera-
tions” 642  or aimed at “usefulness and reasonableness”. 643  The 
analysis of German and Polish practice corroborated the effective-
ness of such a view. It showed new opportunities for using the na-
ture criterion for the interpretation of contract in a manner support-
ing the legitimate expectations of a creditor. The changes in the 
intentions of contracting parties based on the nature of the contract 
clause will thus be the second element in the comparison of the 
reconstructed legal experience with the modern dilemmas of the 
theory of contract law. The universality of this kind of legal reason-
ing is not, however, tantamount to a uniform idea of the order rep-
resented by the notion of the nature of the contract. Wide-scale 
historical and comparative research provides grounds to two sepa-
rate forms of such an order. I have defined the first as systematic 
and the second as economic. These are two different points of ref-
erence, according to which contract law, going beyond the express 
terms, prescribes what the parties must do. In the first case, we 
refer to the system described by lawyers, in which the parties’ con-
tract exists. In the second case, we assume that there are grounds, 
independent from the law, for the contract to result in the benefit 
expected at its conclusion.  
Thus, the vast experience of applying the notion of the nature of 
the contract meets with two vital issues in the modern discourse on 
contract law. The first is the question of the relevance and utility of 
the notion of the type of contract. The second question is whether, 
and how, the economic theory of contract may affect contract law. 
Answers to these two inquiries should provide an inspiration for 
using the nature of the contract argument. They should also pro-
vide grounds to forecast the role it may play in the rapidly chang-
ing laws.  
 
________________ 
642 Cf. Coester 2006,  341; Lapp 2010, n. 65; Ballo 2010, 389; Fuchs 2006, 707;  
643 Trzaskowski 2005, 347 ff.  
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5.2. Nature of the contract and the usefulness  
of the notion of the type of contract  
 
The term “type of contract” is a historical product of the civil 
law tradition. It was developed in the Middle Ages when the idea 
of freedom of contract was not known. Since that time, it has been 
the core element of the systemic vision of law which allowed the 
implication of terms implied in the dogmatic description of certain 
types of contracts (so called naturalia contractus), in the absence of  
a different intention of the parties. This is the dominant, but not 
unanimous, view of contract law in the continental legal tradi-
tion.644 For instance, as early as late 19th century, Ernst I. Bekker,  
a German pandectist, believed that the development of the legal 
system would consist of establishing general rules, up to the mo-
ment when the rules pertaining to certain types of legal transac-
tions lost their significance645. This idea was not corroborated by 
civil codifications. Even today one can indicate authors who em-
phasize the importance of types of contracts as an optimal solution 
for reconstructing reality in accordance with the needs of business 
or the expectations of the legislator646. On the other hand, many 
texts note certain doubts, and criticise the fundamental relevance of 
type in the systematics of contract law. In the 1970s, Gorgio de 
Nova pointed out that the introduction of a provision to the Italian 
civil code, which explicitly permitted parties to conclude contracts 
which do not belong to the types specified by law,647 was a dra-
matic change in the legal description of the freedom of contract 
which, however, did not change the thinking of lawyers. The typi-
cal contract-oriented legal reasoning remained648. The reasons for 
this, according to de Nova, were the conservative mentality of law-
________________ 
644 For the different position of the common law tradition see Samuel 2011,  
117 ff.  
645 Bekker 1889, 126 (§97).  
646 Andrés Santos 2011, 3-4.  
647 Art. 1322 CCI.  
648 Nova 1974, 4-5.  
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yers and their aspirations to achieve certainty649. He believed that 
this would result in restraint in the use of general clauses,650 in 
judges forbearing from using the possibility to base the interpreta-
tion of an atypical contract on general rules of contract law and 
intention of the parties651. 
The research of methods through which legal practitioners con-
nect contracts with a specific type, performed by de Nova, demon-
strated that they have benefits. This research also disclosed certain 
doubts as to the results obtained in this manner. The basic benefit, 
in the opinion of de Nova, is the reduction of the risk of arbitrary 
decisions based on unclear rationale.652 What is also beneficial is 
the application of a formula for reasoning that supports the reason-
able inclination to compare an assessed situation with a model.653 
He also expressed some doubts. He pointed out that the reference 
to certain types of contracts itself does not guarantee a higher cer-
tainty of a result of interpretation as the application of a general 
clause does654. He indicated that such a style of reasoning resulted 
from respect for tradition and not from the requirements of legisla-
tive drafting techniques655. He showed that it was not possible to 
establish definitive criteria to determine whether a contract belongs 
to a type or not656 and that the system of contract types changes, 
with some delay, in relation to historical and economic evolution.657 
Pointing out that contracts which do not fit any type defined by 
law play a key role in modern legal practice 658 is the starting point 
for Felix Dasser’s recently formulated proposal for comprehensive 
________________ 
649 Nova 1974, 3. 
650 Nova 1974, 7. 
651 Nova 1974, 12. 
652 Nova 1974, 159.  
653 Nova 1974, 172.  
654 Nova 1974, 57.  
655 Nova 1974, 166.  
656 Nova 1974, 169.  
657 Nova 1974, 173.  
658 Dasser 2000, 3-5 and 109-110. 
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changes to the systematic vision of contract law.659 It encompasses  
a clear criticism of the extent and traditional understanding of the 
legislative regulation of contract types. The Swiss lawyer acknow- 
ledged that treating types of contracts as classification categories 
leads to conflicts with the freedom of contract principle660; may 
lead to wilfulness in assigning a contract a certain type;661 and that 
establishing new legislative types does not always result in the 
elimination of doubts.662 The essence of the resulting proposal for 
change is the adoption of the topos of an infinite number of contract 
models (Vertragstypenkontinuum). In Dasser’s view, this should 
make contract law more flexible, thus allowing the practical pur-
pose of a specific contract to be better reflected.663 With respect to 
contract law dogma, this means joining the proposals to develop  
a general contract law and to limit the regulation of types only to 
those cases where the general rules prove insufficient.664 In respect 
of the application of the notion of nature of the contract, this was 
reflected in two issues. Firstly, in recognising the usefulness of the 
regulation of contract types naturalia when it reduces transaction 
costs.665 Secondly, in the view that the criterion of the nature of the 
contract which is present in the general rules of contract law should 
not be combined with its systematisation by types.666 Historical 
experience confirms both these opinions. With regard to doubts as 
to the role of types of contract in modern law, I find the historical 
arguments in favour of weakening their relevance in the determi-
nation of the legal effects of a contract particularly valuable.  
The first one goes beyond naturalia contractus in argumentation 
based on the nature of the contract. It should be noted that consid-
________________ 
659 Dasser 2000, 5.  
660 Dasser 2000, 111.  
661 Dasser 2000, 2. 
662 Dasser 2000, 3. 
663 Dasser 2000, 110 and 281-283.  
664 Dasser 2000, 276.  
665 Dasser 2000, 283.   
666 Dasser 2000, 287-288.  
164 
erations of the nature of contract in the work product of some law-
yers in the 18th century usus modernus and 19th century pandectists 
gave grounds for the systematic comparison of principles pertain-
ing to all contracts or to a number of different types of contracts. 
This, however, was not a generalisation of naturalia of individual 
types, because it consisted of comparing universal premises of con-
tract validity667 and establishing groups of different types of con-
tracts based on their common qualities. Taking into consideration 
the contractual practice this led to the singling out of contracts due 
to the ease of their conclusion668. Mutual contracts were combined 
due to their simultaneity in performance 669 or the specific order of 
performance670. The combination of the nature of the contract with 
its economic purpose, clearly visible in academic writing, is conti- 
nued in modern court interpretations of the notion of the nature of 
the contract which, inter alia, encompasses the “nature of a long 
term contract”671 or the “nature of a business contract”.672 Legal 
practice raises, however, some doubts as to whether the develop-
ment of the general rules of contract law could fully eliminate the 
usefulness of systematisation according to type. On the other hand, 
the development of common rules for various types of contracts 
may be regarded as a historical result of the diminished role of con-
tract types in legal argumentation.  
The second historical argument in favour of reducing the im-
portance of types in the interpretation of contracts is that of going 
beyond the terms implied in law when defining the natural conse-
quences of a contract. This is illustrated by the French jurispru-
dence based on article 1135 CC. Over the last few decades, the 
courts have introduced and gradually recognised the objective 
________________ 
667 Boehmer 1797, Ex. 27, cap. 1 §§ 2; 6; 11; 12; 14; 15; 16; Höpfner 1803, 792,  
(Lib. III, 14, §733) ; Thibaut 1809, 108 (§141).   
668 Savigny 1853, 226 (§75).  
669 Wächter 1880, 387(§189).  
670 Pforden 1840, 326.  
671 E.g. SN (15.02.2007), II CSK 484/06, LEX n. 274159. 
672 E.g. SN (9.11.2006), OSNC 2007, Vol. 7-8, item 122. 
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character of duties not regulated by the code, i.e. the obligation of 
security (obligation de sécurité)673 or the obligation of information 
and counsel.674  
In the context of the evolution of the systematics of contract law, 
this speaks in favour of including the nature of the contract clause 
in the general rules of contract law. The legal practice that I re-
searched permits taking a step further than de Nova and  Dasser. 
One does not have to stop at a general declaration of the utility of 
the general clause, which may reduce the importance of the notion 
of type in the interpretation of contracts.675 One does not have to 
limit the presumption of a flexible contract law to the idea that any 
referral to the nature of the contract itself raises doubts and “means 
nothing more” than a consideration of all case-related circum-
stances in accordance with law and good faith676. The analysis of 
argumentation based on the notion of the nature of the contract has 
led to the observation that the order I defined as economic677 is  
a supplemental and, to some extent, an alternative to the systematic 
order expressed in the dogmatic description of the types of con-
tracts. Hence, a question arises as to whether there are any similari-




5.3. The nature of the contract and the basic purposes  
of the economic theory of contract 
 
The method of considering contract law through the systematic 
description of the nature of types of contracts introduced in the 
medieval science of ius commune was, using the terminology of law 
________________ 
673 Cf. Ripert 1952, 169; Lamoureux 2006, 514.  
674 Lamoureux 2006, 514.  
675 Nova 1974, 6 and 57.  
676 Dasser 2000, 288.  
677 See fn. 80. 
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and economics, a considerable contribution of jurists in the reduc-
tion of transaction costs. This achievement of jurists has saved par-
ties the effort of determining and negotiating many terms govern-
ing the allocation of risks and benefits.678 These terms have been 
implemented or developed chiefly based on the texts of ancient 
Roman law, canon law and current philosophical trends. The basis 
for law and economics analysis is, however, the belief that there is 
an allocative efficiency, which is economically optimal for both 
parties to the contract and its social context.679 
One cannot find a parallel to the efficiency models of allocation 
in line with the so-called Pareto efficiency in the traditional science 
of law. The economic theory of contract established in the 1970s, 
did not result in a breakthrough in the theory and practice of con-
tract law.680 In traditional legal discourse, however, there are two 
types of situations that are functionally similar to the deliberations 
on the efficiency of the allocation of risks and benefits in a contract. 
The first one is the assessment of the validity of contractual terms. 
The second one consists of supplementing the contract with terms 
not contemplated by the intention of the parties. My research has 
proved that one of the grounds for argumentation in such cases 
was the nature of the contract.681 In the scope of said argumentation, 
functional similarities to two purposes of the economic theory of 
contract can be found682. The predominant one is the purpose of 
securing optimal reliance683. The combination of the notion of the 
nature of the contract with the agreed allocation of risks and bene-
________________ 
678 Cf. Schäfer, Ott 2000, 394; Cooter, Ulen 2008, 217-219.  
679 See Cooter, Ulen 2008, 17-18; Lando 2010, 121 ff.  
680 Posner 2002-2003, 863-868.  
681 In such context lawyers tend to refer to justice, equity, good faith, cf: Schäfer, 
Ott 2000, 393.  
682 Cooter, Ulen 2008, 232; indicates 6 purposes of the economic theory of con-
tracts.  
683 Cooter, Ulen 2008, 212-217. 
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fits noted by Roman jurists684 was used in the rigorous defence of 
this model. When defending natura contractus, Ulpian recognised 
that an agreement that modified a previously concluded contract685 
was invalid. Such a method of protecting reliance in the initial allo-
cation of interests in a contract did not, however, become a subject 
of reflection and was not continued in the medieval ius commune. 
The deliberations on specific terms added upon the entering into  
a contract (pacta ex continenti) or later (ex intervallo) have become  
a part of the discussion on the issue whether accessory terms (pacta 
adiecta) incidental to a transaction belong to the contents of recog-
nised types of contracts686. The deliberations on the nature of the 
contract have been connected with substantialia and naturalia of the 
respective types. The formula of “natural consequences", stemming 
from the medieval category of naturalia contractus, was included in 
article 1135 CC which, in the 20th century, played a vital role in the 
protection of the creditor’s reliance by the implication of implied 
terms by courts. A similar role was played by the introduction of 
the nature of the contract criterion to a provision setting out the 
instrument of control of standard terms687 or a provision establish-
ing the boundary of the freedom of contract688. In jurisprudence 
based on these provisions, the protection of the creditor’s reliance is 
more flexible than it was when first established in Roman law. To 
summarize the judicial practice, it can be stated that said protection 
consisted of: the inadmissibility of agreements allowing an unclear 
modification of the initial model of risk and benefits allocation689; 
________________ 
684  D.16,3,24 (Pap.); D.45,2,91, (Pap.); D.19,5,5,4 (Paul.); D.46,1,5 (Ulp.); 
D.46,5,1pr.-4 (Ulp.).  
685 D.2,14,7,5 (Ulp.). 
686 Volante 2001, 476-477. This occurred under a doctrine assuming that a con-
tract is concluded the moment the substantialia of a specific type are agreed upon 
and that, apart from that agreement, the parties may introduce special provisions 
(pacta adiecta) at once or allow their introduction in future.  
687 § 9 section 2 item AGBG; § 307 section 2, item BGB.  
688 Article 3531 PolKC. 
689 See above 151 fn. 610. 
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the correction of the model if it proved contradictory to the legiti-
mate expectations of the creditor, justified by the practical purpose 
of the contract690; the recognition of the ineffectiveness of terms 
excluding, or unduly restricting the creditor’s freedom to use the 
contract performance691; the amendment of a contract if it did not 
allow for the typical capacity of the creditor to use the result of 
performance; and, in French practice, the adoption of a guarantee, 
adequate for the purpose of the contract, for the debtor, despite the 
fact that such did not result from the express terms or legal regula-
tions.692  
An example of implied terms identified by the French Court of 
Cassation under article 1135 CC is also the duty to provide re-
quired information to a creditor who is a layman. At this point, the 
legal practice, which was the subject of the research, is consistent 
with the purpose of economic theory to encourage the efficient 
disclosure of information within the contractual relationship.693  
The comparison of the results of my research with the two law 
and economics postulates confirms that, together, they form a cer-
tain economic order. The beginning of this order can be traced back 
to ancient jurists’ understanding of the nature of the contract crite-
rion. However, basic qualities of this order were captured as late as 
in the 20th century interpretation of provisions including the con-
sidered criterion. In light of the historical and legal deliberations, 
the reason for such a development was a clear emergence, in mo- 
dern practice, of the fact that the dogmatic construction of the type of 
contract does not solve many doubts that arise from the use of the 
freedom of contract. In the judicial practice of the 20th century, the 
nature of the contract clause became grounds for the interpretation 
of contracts from the point of view of the legitimate expectations of 
the creditor and the growth of level the flexibility in legal reasoning.  
________________ 
690 See above 151 fn. 612.  
691 See above 151 fn. 616.  
692 See above 151 fn. 613.  
693 Cooter, Ulen 2008, 208.  
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In comparing the principles built upon this jurisprudence with 
the catalogue of six purposes of the economic theory of contract 
developed by Cooter and Ulen, the matter of cooperation draws 
attention.694 In the jurisprudence analysed, I have encountered in-
stances of the obligation to cooperate being included in implied 
terms only when it is necessary for contract performance.695 The 
law and economics doctrine, on the other hand, strongly empha-
sises the postulate of converting games with non-cooperative solu-
tions into games with cooperative solutions. It is one of the as-
sumptions of reasonableness that leads to the maximum efficiency 
of contract.696 The legal practice analysed here provided grounds 
for the assumption that its common axis is the support for achiev-
ing a benefit that a creditor, quite legitimately, may expect the mo-
ment the obligation arises, as well as protection of the possibility to 
actually use the benefit. The economic reasonableness, discernable 
in the reconstructed legal practice, leads to support of not only 
formal, but also true equality of contracting parties. This is a ratio 
that justifies the limits and methods of supplementing or modify-
ing the express terms. When comparing this conclusion with the 
German dogmatic discourse about terms implied in fact, I have 
noticed that the results of interpreting the nature of the contract 
provide confirmation of the doctrine that seeks grounds for sup-
plementing or modifying express terms based on the theory of reli-
ance (Vertrauenschutz).697 While comparing the same conclusions 
with the law and economics position, we will see conformity with 
Posner’s diagnosis. He justified the poor practical response of the 
economic theory of contract by, in particular, the inaccuracy of as-
sumptions regarding the full rationality of the parties698. On the 
other hand, he pointed out that some notions developed by eco-
nomics, e.g. transaction costs or symmetry of information, have 
________________ 
694 Cooter, Ulen 2008, 232.  
695 Civ.  (2.02.1994), WLF A8751CKC.  
696 Cooter, Ulen 2008, 203-207.  
697 Oechsler 1997, 219 – 223 and 242-245 (and further reading there). 
698 Posner 2002-2003, 863. 
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entered into and raised the level of legal discourse.699 However, one 
should not forget that Beimowski’s proposal to replace the nature 
of the contract criterion with law and economics concepts has not 
been accepted.700 
When looking at the so-called economic order reconstructed in 
this research, I have concluded, that economics can still support the 
application of the nature of the contract argument. I view this sup-
port as providing parameters which help determine when and how 
express terms should be supplemented or amended so as to avoid 
non-compliance with the legitimate expectations of the creditor 
from the moment of entering into the contract.  
 
 
5.4. The role of the nature of the contract argument  
in the rapidly changing laws 
 
One can see a recurring opinion in the philosophy of law that to 
introduce the notion of the nature of things to legal discourse 
means to look for an order of some sort.701 My research has con-
firmed the notion of natura contractus originates in the ancient Ro-
man law. It has corroborated the purpose of using this notion in 
legal argumentation from Antiquity, through the science of Roman 
law in the late 11th century to the end of 19th century, up to the 
modern interpretation of provisions encompassing the nature of 
the contract criterion. Looking at the results of this historical and 
comparative research, we can formulate two principal conclusions. 
Firstly, the chances of the effective use of the nature of the contract 
argument should be seen in the inclusion of this phrase in the ge- 
neral rules of contract law, the purpose of which is to supplement 
or amend express terms. Secondly, the order underlying the appli-
cation of the nature of the contract argument should allow for eco-
nomic purposes supporting the attainment and use of the benefit 
________________ 
699 Posner 2002-2003, 879-880. 
700 Beimowski 1989, 36. 
701 Cf. Coing 1976, 173. 
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the creditor might legitimately expect upon entering into a con-
tract.These conclusions lead to greater interference with the content 
of an agreement than is the case with the medieval understanding 
of the nature of the contract, which dominated legal discourse for 
centuries, i.e. the implication of terms implied by law (so-called 
naturalia contractus). The novelty of such conclusions consists not in 
assuming the nature of the contract as a criterion for a modification 
of express terms 702 or separation between the nature and type of 
contract.703 It stems from the pursuit of the flexible connection of 
such interference with the content of a contract with the creditor’s 
capacity to recognise and resolve justified contract risks, permitted 
since the mid-20th century. The research conducted here helps dis-
tinguish three historical forms of dependence between the interfer-
ence with the content of contract, based on the nature of the con-
tract criterion and the level of the creditor's capacity to recognise 
and resolve justified contract risks. They can be presented graphi-
cally as functions, in which y represents the permitted interference 
with the content of a contract and x is the creditor’s capacity to re- 
cognise benefits that might be legitimately expected upon entering 





               






702 See D.2,14,7,5 (Ulp.). 








The diagram helps capture the continuation and changes in the 
application of the nature of the contract argument. It clearly shows 
that the nature of the contract argument has always served to de-
termine the content of contract through opinions regarding the 
enforceability of contractual agreements and implication of terms 
implied in law or in fact (y is always higher than 0). The first mani-
festation of changeability is the interference level (the value on the 
y axis), which is different for each model of process of determining 
the contents of a contract. In the oldest model, the interference was 
in fact limited to the “freezing” of the allocation of risks and bene-
fits (natura contractus) assumed upon entering into a contract 
(model a). A wider scope of interference was established in ius 
commune by the implication of terms implied in the dogmatic de-
scription of certain types of contracts (naturalia contractus), (model 
b). What both these models share is that the interference with the 
content of contract was not associated with the true capacity of the 
creditor to recognise the benefits and risks resulting from the con-
tract (in models a and b the value on the y axis is constant). 
Further interference was manifested by interpretations that 
considered the level of legitimate expectations of the creditor 
(model c). The diagram which illustrates this was developed based 
on the jurisprudence of late 20th and early 21st centuries in line with 
article 1135 CC, § 9, section 2, item 2 BGB and article 3531 PolKC, 
which include the criterion of the nature of the contract. This model 
presents the qualitative and quantitative change (the curve from 
the y axis to point E). The diagram shows that below some level of 
the creditor’s capacity to recognise the benefits that might be le-
gitimately expected upon entering into a contract (left of point E), 
the nature of the contract allows greater interference with the con-
tent of contract. It supports attaining and using the benefits the 
creditor might legitimately expect. 
The scope of this flexible application of the nature of the con-
tract argument is confirmed by the legal practice presented here. In 
Germany, the nature of the contract functions as the criterion that 
173 
controls standard terms. In the interpretation of article 1135 CC and 
article 3531 PolKc, it can serve as a basis for supplementing or 
modifying the express terms in favour of a creditor who had less 
information than his or her counterparty and may have been in  
a weaker economic position. A stronger economic position creates 
favourable conditions for using standard terms, and in the case of 
negotiating contracts, it creates favourable conditions for detailed 
indication of expected benefits and possible risks. A weaker eco-
nomic position, on the other hand, creates favourable conditions for 
using standard terms and the use of proposed contractual tem-
plates. The economically weaker contracting party cannot afford to 
compensate for the asymmetry of information by negotiating con-
tracts so as to assure that they provide the most precise description 
of benefits and risks related. The qualitative and quantitative 
changes identified in the application of the nature of the contract 
argument remedies these disproportions.These changes can be re-
garded as an expression of a belief, recurring in modern legal  
science, that it in order to protect the fairness of their results it is 
necessary to restrict the freedom of contracts. 704  The observed 
change in the application of the nature of the contract argument 
may thus evoke some concerns as to whether or not it poses  
a threat to enjoy the freedom to choose the terms of agreements by 
contracting parties. I believe that the application of the nature of 
the contract criterion, as in the regulations analysed above, to 
amend or supplement a duly executed contract does not preclude 
this freedom (line c crosses the y axis below 100%).705 The concern 
as to whether or not such argumentation will result in undue re-
striction of the freedom of contract and certainty of law remains 
legitimate. Legal practice teaches us that the protection against 
such risk requires precise definition by the legislator when the 
status of a creditor justifies the flexible amendment or supplement 
of express terms in line with the nature of the contract criterion 
________________ 
704 Alpa, Andenas 2010, 236.  
705 Similarly to the DCFR art. II - 8:102(1) (e) and II – 9:101 (2) (a).  
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(setting point E). An example of such a solution, albeit, in my view, 
too narrow a solution, is limiting the nature of the contract argu-
ment in § 307, section 2 item 2 BGB to the function of standard 
terms control criterion706. However, one should not identify the 
application of the nature of the contract argument limited to credi-
tors of a specific status with the exclusion of the possibility of im-
plication of the terms in fact in the interest of creditors who do not 
have such status (right of point E). With regard to the latter, the 
idea of interference with the content of contract based not on the 
nature of the contract criterion but on equity or good faith remains 
valid.707 In making this distinction the uniqueness of interference 
with the content of contract based on equity should be emphasised. 
This would clearly confirm the independence and specific character 
of the nature of the contract argument with regard to such equity or 
good faith clauses.708 This specific character of the analysed clause 
is the last issue one needs to discuss here. The acceptance and de-
velopment of a flexible application of the nature of the contract 
argument by courts (model c) is a result of the specific character 
underlying this argumentation of order. Judges should be re-
minded that this model of the application of the nature of the con-
tract has been made possible by departing from linking the nature 
of the contract with its type. This is a result of the victory of intui-
tion linking the nature of the contract with the existence of an order 
I have referred to as economic709. One may hope that the predict-
ability of the results of such argumentation will support the under-
standing of qualities inherent in such an order. The results of his-
________________ 
706 The purpose of argumentation justifies its limitation to instances of consid-
erable asymmetry of information and disproportion of economic power, i.e. protec-
tion of creditors, consumers and small entrepreneurs. Such a restriction is not im-
posed in art. II - 8:102(1) (e) and II – 9:101 (2) (a) DCFR.  
707 No one can predict and regulate any and all risks and benefits in the con-
tract.  
708 This issue is presented already in the text of Ulpian D.2,14,7,5 and article 
1135 CC. See also Dajczak 2009, 65.  
709 See fn. 80. 
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torical and comparative research may be of some help, as to when 
and how to remove incompatibility between express terms and 
legitimate expectations of a creditor.  
In conclusion, the changes identified in the application of the 
nature of the contract argument help demonstrate the resulting 
threats to the freedom of contract. They also inspire answers to 
questions as to how to combine the argumentative practice ana-
lysed in this book with the freedom of contracting parties to choose 
the terms of agreements. If we recognise the objective character of 
the fall of the 19th century paradigm of the freedom of contract,710 
the history of the nature of the contract argument in the civilian 
tradition will lead to the prognosis for the future of contract law. If 
legislators and judges take into consideration the direction and 
character of changes in the legal reasoning reconstructed in my 
research, said changes may gain importance. The history of the 
nature of the contract clause confirms that modern law needs  
a specific and flexible instrument to reduce the inequality in con-
tracting parties’ true freedom to design agreements. Whether the 
nature of the contract clause may become this instrument in future 
legal texts is an open question. The historical study of the use of 
this phrase in legal argumentation shows us, however, that the 
effectiveness of the protection against inequality requires changes 
in the civilian systematic vision of contract law. The opinion that “it 
is implicit in the nature of reality that there are more types of trans-
actions than names for them” 711 is not new. Recent interpretation 
of the nature of the contract clause more clearly reveals the tension 
between the formalistic classification of contracts by type and the 
practical diversity of creditors’ expectations. Any significant 
asymmetry of information exchanged between the parties or any 
significant difference in their economic positions has, in recent dec-
ades, resulted in the growth of inequalities with respect to the abil-
________________ 
710 See Scherrer 1948, 42; Atiyah 1979, 693-715; Zweigert, Kötz 1996, 323–325. 
711 D. 19, 5, 4 (Ulp.). Engl. transl. by A. Watson, The Digest of Justinian, Vol. 1, 
Philadelphia 1985.  
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ity to understand the practical sense of the words of contracts and 
to shape the contents of legitimate contractual expectations. Think-
ing realistically about the conclusions drawn in this book, I propose 
that the nature of contract consists of the flexible protection of the 
legitimate expectations of the parties.712 
 
________________ 
712 The so-called economic order reflected in the interpretation of the nature of 
the contract clause is not focused on the maximization of welfare but on the realiza-
tion of the legitimate expectations of the creditor. Thus, my research on the civilian 
tradition provides historical and comparative arguments for reliance contract the-
ory. For the development and essence of the reliance theory in the common law, see 
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